arXiv subjects

Lingjie Duan

Publications and source records attributed to Lingjie Duan.

100 records · Page 6Linked to original sources

arXiv2014

Cost-Aware Green Cellular Networks with Energy and Communication Cooperation

Energy cost of cellular networks is ever-increasing to match the surge of wireless data traffic, and the saving of this cost is important to reduce the operational expenditure (OPEX) of wireless operators in future. The recent advancements of renewable energy integration and two-way energy flow in smart grid provide potential new solutions to save the cost. However, they also impose challenges, especially on how to use the stochastically and spatially distributed renewable energy harvested at cellular base stations (BSs) to reliably supply time- and space-varying wireless traffic over cellular networks. To overcome these challenges, in this article we present three approaches, namely, {\emph{energy cooperation, communication cooperation, and joint energy and communication cooperation}}, in which different BSs bidirectionally trade or share energy via the aggregator in smart grid, and/or share wireless resources and shift loads with each other to reduce the total energy cost.

cs.IT↗

arXiv2014

On Spatial Capacity of Wireless Ad Hoc Networks with Threshold Based Scheduling

This paper studies spatial capacity in a stochastic wireless ad hoc network, where multi-stage probing and data transmission are sequentially performed. We propose a novel signal-to-interference-ratio (SIR) threshold based scheduling scheme, where by starting with the first probing, each transmitter iteratively decides to further probe or stay idle, depending on whether the estimated SIR in the proceeding probing is larger or smaller than a predefined threshold. Although one can assume that the transmitters are initially deployed according to a homogeneous Poisson point process (PPP), the SIR based scheduling makes the PPP no longer applicable to model the locations of retained transmitters in the subsequent probing and data transmission phases, due to the interference induced coupling in their decisions. We first focus on single-stage probing and find that when the SIR threshold is set sufficiently small to assure an acceptable interference level in the network, the proposed scheme can greatly outperform the non-scheduling reference scheme in terms of spatial capacity. We clearly characterize the spatial capacity and obtain exact/approximate closed-form expressions, by proposing a new approximate approach to deal with the correlated SIR distributions over non-Poisson point processes. Then we successfully extend to multi-stage probing by properly designing the multiple SIR thresholds to assure gradual improvement of the spatial capacity. Furthermore, we analyze the impact of multi-stage probing overhead and present a probing-capacity tradeoff in scheduling design. Finally, extensive numerical results are presented to demonstrate the performance of the proposed scheduling as compared to existing schemes.

cs.IT↗

arXiv2014

Joint Energy and Spectrum Cooperation for Cellular Communication Systems

Powered by renewable energy sources, cellular communication systems usually have different wireless traffic loads and available resources over time. To match their traffics, it is beneficial for two neighboring systems to cooperate in resource sharing when one is excessive in one resource (e.g., spectrum), while the other is sufficient in another (e.g., energy). In this paper, we propose a joint energy and spectrum cooperation scheme between different cellular systems to reduce their operational costs. When the two systems are fully cooperative in nature (e.g., belonging to the same entity), we formulate the cooperation problem as a convex optimization problem to minimize their weighted sum cost and obtain the optimal solution in closed form. We also study another partially cooperative scenario where the two systems have their own interests. We show that the two systems seek for partial cooperation as long as they find inter-system complementarity between the energy and spectrum resources. Under the partial cooperation conditions, we propose a distributed algorithm for the two systems to gradually and simultaneously reduce their costs from the non-cooperative benchmark to the Pareto optimum. This distributed algorithm also has proportional fair cost reduction by reducing each system's cost proportionally over iterations. Finally, we provide numerical results to validate the convergence of the distributed algorithm to the Pareto optimality and compare the centralized and distributed cost reduction approaches for fully and partially cooperative scenarios.

cs.IT↗

arXiv2014

Pricing for local and global WiFi markets

This paper analyzes two pricing schemes commonly used in WiFi markets: the flat-rate and the usage-based pricing. The flat-rate pricing encourages the maximum usage, while the usage-based pricing can flexibly attract more users especially those with low valuations in mobile Internet access. First, we use theoretical analysis to compare the two schemes and show that for a single provider in a market, as long as the WiFi capacity is abundant, the flat-rate pricing leads to more revenue. Second, we study how a global provider (e.g., Skype) collaborates with this monopolist in each local market to provide a global WiFi service. We formulate {the interactions between the global and local providers as a dynamic game. In Stage I, the global provider bargains with the local provider in each market to determine the global WiFi service price and revenue sharing agreement. In Stage II, local users and travelers choose local or global WiFi services. We analytically show that the global provider prefers to use the usage-based pricing to avoid a severe competition with the local provider. At the equilibrium, the global provider always shares the majority of his revenue with the local provider to incentivize the cooperation. Finally, we analytically study how the interaction changes if the local market has more than one local provider. In this case, the global provider can integrate the coverages of multiple local providers and provide a better service. Compared to the local monopoly case, local market competition enables the global provider to share less revenue with each of the local providers. However, we numerically show that the global provider's revenue could decrease, as he shares his revenue with more providers and can only charge a lower price.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2014

Motivating Smartphone Collaboration in Data Acquisition and Distributed Computing

This paper analyzes and compares different incentive mechanisms for a master to motivate the collaboration of smartphone users on both data acquisition and distributed computing applications. To collect massive sensitive data from users, we propose a reward-based collaboration mechanism, where the master announces a total reward to be shared among collaborators, and the collaboration is successful if there are enough users wanting to collaborate. We show that if the master knows the users' collaboration costs, then he can choose to involve only users with the lowest costs. However, without knowing users' private information, then he needs to offer a larger total reward to attract enough collaborators. Users will benefit from knowing their costs before the data acquisition. Perhaps surprisingly, the master may benefit as the variance of users' cost distribution increases. To utilize smartphones' computation resources to solve complex computing problems, we study how the master can design an optimal contract by specifying different task-reward combinations for different user types. Under complete information, we show that the master involves a user type as long as the master's preference characteristic outweighs that type's unit cost. All collaborators achieve a zero payoff in this case. If the master does not know users' private cost information, however, he will conservatively target at a smaller group of users with small costs, and has to give most benefits to the collaborators.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2012

Capacity Allocation and Pricing Strategies for Wireless Femtocell Services

Indoor cell phone users often suffer from poor connectivity. One promising solution, femtocell technology, has been rapidly developed and deployed over the past few years. One of the biggest challenges for femtocell deployment is lack of a clear business model. This paper investigates the economic incentive for the cellular operator (also called macrocell operator) to enable femtocell service by leasing spectrum resource to an independent femtocell operator. On the one hand, femtocell services can increase communication service quality and thus increase the efficiency of the spectrum resource. On the other hand, femtocell services may introduce more competition to the market. We model the interactions between a macrocell operator, a femtocell operator, and users as a three-stage dynamic game, and derive the equilibrium pricing and capacity allocation decisions. We show that when spectrum resources are very limited, the macrocell operator has incentive to lease spectrum to femtocell operators, as femtocell service can provide access to more users and efficiently increase the coverage. However, when the total spectrum resource is large, femtocell service offers significant competition to macrocell service. Macrocell operator thus has less incentive to enable femtocell service. We also investigate the issue of additional operational cost and limited coverage of femtocell service on equilibrium decisions, consumer surplus and social welfare.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2011

Attack Prevention for Collaborative Spectrum Sensing in Cognitive Radio Networks

Collaborative spectrum sensing can significantly improve the detection performance of secondary unlicensed users (SUs). However, the performance of collaborative sensing is vulnerable to sensing data falsification attacks, where malicious SUs (attackers) submit manipulated sensing reports to mislead the fusion center's decision on spectrum occupancy. Moreover, attackers may not follow the fusion center's decision regarding their spectrum access. This paper considers a challenging attack scenario where multiple rational attackers overhear all honest SUs' sensing reports and cooperatively maximize attackers' aggregate spectrum utilization. We show that, without attack-prevention mechanisms, honest SUs are unable to transmit over the licensed spectrum, and they may further be penalized by the primary user for collisions due to attackers' aggressive transmissions. To prevent such attacks, we propose two novel attack-prevention mechanisms with direct and indirect punishments. The key idea is to identify collisions to the primary user that should not happen if all SUs follow the fusion center's decision. Unlike prior work, the proposed simple mechanisms do not require the fusion center to identify and exclude attackers. The direct punishment can effectively prevent all attackers from behaving maliciously. The indirect punishment is easier to implement and can prevent attacks when the attackers care enough about their long-term reward.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2011

Contract-Based Cooperative Spectrum Sharing

Providing proper economic incentives is essential for the success of dynamic spectrum sharing. Cooperative spectrum sharing is one effective way to achieve this goal. In cooperative spectrum sharing, secondary users (SUs) relay traffics for primary users (PUs), in exchange for dedicated transmission time for the SUs' own communication needs. In this paper, we study the cooperative spectrum sharing under incomplete information, where SUs' types (capturing their heterogeneity in relay channel gains and evaluations of power consumptions) are private information and not known by PUs. Inspired by the contract theory, we model the network as a labor market. The single PU is the employer who offers a contract to the SUs. The contract consists of a set of contract items representing combinations of spectrum accessing time (i.e., reward) and relaying power (i.e., contribution). The SUs are employees, and each of them selects the best contract item to maximize his payoff. We study the optimal contract design for both weak and strong incomplete information scenarios. First, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for feasible contracts in both scenarios. In the weak incomplete information scenario, we further derive the optimal contract that achieves the same maximum PU's utility as in the complete information benchmark. In the strong incomplete information scenario, we propose a Decompose-and-Compare algorithm that achieves a close-to-optimal contract. We future show that the PU's average utility loss due to the suboptimal algorithm and the strong incomplete information are both relatively small (less than 2% and 1:3%, respectively, in our numerical results with two SU types).

cs.NI↗

arXiv2010

Investment and Pricing with Spectrum Uncertainty: A Cognitive Operator's Perspective

This paper studies the optimal investment and pricing decisions of a cognitive mobile virtual network operator (C-MVNO) under spectrum supply uncertainty. Compared with a traditional MVNO who often leases spectrum via long-term contracts, a C-MVNO can acquire spectrum dynamically in short-term by both sensing the empty "spectrum holes" of licensed bands and dynamically leasing from the spectrum owner. As a result, a C-MVNO can make flexible investment and pricing decisions to match the current demands of the secondary unlicensed users. Compared to dynamic spectrum leasing, spectrum sensing is typically cheaper, but the obtained useful spectrum amount is random due to primary licensed users' stochastic traffic. The C-MVNO needs to determine the optimal amounts of spectrum sensing and leasing by evaluating the trade off between cost and uncertainty. The C-MVNO also needs to determine the optimal price to sell the spectrum to the secondary unlicensed users, taking into account wireless heterogeneity of users such as different maximum transmission power levels and channel gains. We model and analyze the interactions between the C-MVNO and secondary unlicensed users as a Stackelberg game. We show several interesting properties of the network equilibrium, including threshold structures of the optimal investment and pricing decisions, the independence of the optimal price on users' wireless characteristics, and guaranteed fair and predictable QoS among users. We prove that these properties hold for general SNR regime and general continuous distributions of sensing uncertainty. We show that spectrum sensing can significantly improve the C-MVNO's expected profit and users' payoffs.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2010

Competition with Dynamic Spectrum Leasing

This paper presents a comprehensive analytical study of two competitive cognitive operators' spectrum leasing and pricing strategies, taking into account operators' heterogeneity in leasing costs and users' heterogeneity in transmission power and channel conditions. We model the interactions between operators and users as a three-stage dynamic game, where operators make simultaneous spectrum leasing and pricing decisions in Stages I and II, and users make purchase decisions in Stage III. Using backward induction, we are able to completely characterize the game's equilibria. We show that both operators make the equilibrium leasing and pricing decisions based on simple threshold policies. Moreover, two operators always choose the same equilibrium price despite their difference in leasing costs. Each user receives the same signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) at the equilibrium, and the obtained payoff is linear in its transmission power and channel gain. We also compare the duopoly equilibrium with the coordinated case where two operators cooperate to maximize their total profit. We show that the maximum loss of total profit due to operators' competition is no larger than 25%. The users, however, always benefit from operators' competition in terms of their payoffs. We show that most of these insights are robust in the general SNR regime.

cs.NI↗