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Lingyun Ying

Publications and source records attributed to Lingyun Ying.

12 recordsLinked to original sources

Mini-Programs, Mega-Problems: Unveiling OAuth-based Authentication Misuses in Mini-Programs via Dynamic Analysis

Mini-programs have become a dominant paradigm for lightweight application deployment within super apps such as WeChat. To support seamless integration, super apps provide OAuth mechanisms for user login. However, improper integration of OAuth-based Authentication (OBA) flows by third-party developers can lead to critical security flaws. In this paper, we discover three new types of runtime OBA misuses that differ from prior static-code-based studies, enabling attackers to impersonate victims. To assess their real-world impact, we design and implement MINIAUTH, the first analysis framework for systematically analyzing OBA misuse at scale. MINIAUTH automatically pinpoints the OBA login page of a mini-program, executes the workflow dynamically, and analyzes its runtime behaviors. This enables it to handle obfuscated mini-programs and uncover vulnerabilities that existing approaches cannot detect. Applying MINIAUTH to 44,273 WeChat and 2,721 Baidu mini-programs, we uncover 1,834 misuse cases, including critical logic flaws that enable client-side identity forgery via exposed credentials and authentication bypass through static or plaintext identifiers. Our cross-platform evaluation further shows that such misuses are not confined to a single ecosystem but consistently appear across different mini-program platforms. We also identify a cryptographic design flaw in Baidu's OBA APIs that allows brute-forcing of session keys. We responsibly disclosed our findings to the developers and platforms, receiving acknowledgments and assigned CNVD/CNNVD IDs. These results underscore the need for more robust developer guidance and enhanced platform-level safeguards.

cs.CR

Thinking More, Harnessing Better: State Machine Guided Harness Automatic Generation with Project Digestion and Workflow Decomposition

High-quality fuzz harnesses are essential for effective gray-box fuzzing. While Large Language Models (LLMs) offer promise for automating this task, existing one-turn generation methods suffer from hallucinations and inadequate coverage due to coarse-grained function targeting and misaligned generation workflows. We present SynapseFlow, an automatic harness generator that addresses these limitations through two key innovations: dataflow-aware function aggregation and a staged, rollback-enabled generation workflow decomposition. SynapseFlow first analyzes source code to construct Structural Flow Graphs and extract coherent Function Triplets. It then synthesizes harnesses via a decomposed four-stage process governed by a staged rollback algorithm to ensure correctness. We evaluated SynapseFlow on 25 real-world open-source software projects. The experimental results indicate that SynapseFlow outperforms state-of-the-art tools (OSS-Fuzz-Gen, CKGFuzzer, PromeFuzz), achieving 3.07$\times$, 1.71$\times$, and 4.26$\times$ higher branch coverage, and 1.77$\times$, 1.51$\times$, and 1.36$\times$ higher bug detection rates, respectively. Most importantly, SynapseFlow discovered 7 previously unreported bugs (5 assigned CVEs), demonstrating its practical effectiveness in real-world bug discovery.

cs.CR

ShadowProbe: Language-Extensible Detection of Hidden Algorithmic Complexity Vulnerabilities

Algorithmic Complexity Vulnerabilities (ACVs) arise when adversarial inputs trigger worst-case execution behavior, causing severe performance degradation or Denial-of-Service conditions. A key but underexplored source is shadow complexity: non-trivial computational costs hidden inside seemingly benign standard library APIs. Because these costs are invisible at call sites, attackers can exploit them to induce unexpected superlinear runtime behavior. Existing ACV detectors often rely on fuzzing, symbolic execution, or hybrid analysis, but they are usually language-specific, require substantial manual effort to construct harnesses, and depend on heavy runtime instrumentation. We present ShadowProbe, a scalable and language-extensible framework for discovering ACVs through lightweight static analysis, automated reconstruction of execution contexts, and Large Language Model (LLM) assisted test generation. ShadowProbe uses a structured multi-stage pipeline: it statically screens for candidate functions guided by shadow-complexity signals, reconstructs minimal executable contexts from project-level symbols, and synthesizes size-controlled inputs to probe worst-case behavior. It then validates candidates using execution-time measurements and robust statistical growth inference, separating true algorithmic blowups from runtime noise such as garbage collection and JIT compilation effects. We evaluate ShadowProbe on the WISE benchmark, where it consistently improves analysis efficiency over existing approaches. We further apply it to large-scale systems including CPython, the JDK, Zig, Rustc, and vLLM, uncovering many previously unknown ACVs, many of which have been confirmed and partially remediated by maintainers. These results show that ShadowProbe can identify hidden algorithmic risks across diverse real-world codebases.

cs.CR

Your Space is My Zone: Demystifying the Security Risks of AI-Powered Applications on Pre-Trained Model Hubs

AI-powered Applications (AI-Apps), hosted on platforms such as Hugging Face, are democratizing access to pre-trained models through online inference and fine-tuning services. While lowering AI adoption barriers, these platforms introduce an unexplored attack surface, as AI-Apps are often developed by untrusted parties with weak isolation and misconfigured security settings. In this paper, we present the first systematic security analysis of AI-Apps across three leading platforms. To structure our investigation, we map the AI-App lifecycle to established risk taxonomies (e.g., OWASP), identifying five threat categories and ten attack vectors ranging from generic web flaws to high-impact architectural issues. Our analysis reveals critical failures including broken access control, insecure resource reuse, insufficient input validation, and sensitive data exposure. Notably, we uncover three novel architectural vulnerabilities inherent to platform design and demonstrate how traditional issues (e.g., world-readable logs) are uniquely amplified in this ecosystem. To assess real-world impact, we develop an analysis framework Insightor and apply it to over 970,000 public AI-Apps. Alarmingly, we find thousands of apps leaking credentials, hundreds containing input injection vulnerabilities that allow arbitrary code execution, and tens harboring embedded backdoors -- indicating active exploitation. We have responsibly disclosed all findings to the affected platforms and developers.

cs.CR

Cross-modal Retrieval Models for Stripped Binary Analysis

Retrieving binary code via natural language queries is a pivotal capability for downstream tasks in the software security domain, such as vulnerability detection and malware analysis. However, it is challenging to identify binary functions semantically relevant to the user query from thousands of candidates, as the absence of symbolic information distinguishes this task from source code retrieval. In this paper, we introduce, BinSeek, a two-stage cross-modal retrieval framework for stripped binary code analysis. It consists of two models: BinSeek-Embedding is trained on large-scale dataset to learn the semantic relevance of the binary code and the natural language description, furthermore, BinSeek-Reranker learns to carefully judge the relevance of the candidate code to the description with context augmentation. To this end, we built an LLM-based data synthesis pipeline to automate training construction, also deriving a domain benchmark for future research. Our evaluation results show that BinSeek achieved the state-of-the-art performance, surpassing the the same scale models by 31.42% in Rec@3 and 27.17% in MRR@3, as well as leading the advanced general-purpose models that have 16 times larger parameters.

cs.SE

From Obfuscated to Obvious: A Comprehensive JavaScript Deobfuscation Tool for Security Analysis

JavaScript's widespread adoption has made it an attractive target for malicious attackers who employ sophisticated obfuscation techniques to conceal harmful code. Current deobfuscation tools suffer from critical limitations that severely restrict their practical effectiveness. Existing tools struggle with diverse input formats, address only specific obfuscation types, and produce cryptic output that impedes human analysis. To address these challenges, we present JSIMPLIFIER, a comprehensive deobfuscation tool using a multi-stage pipeline with preprocessing, abstract syntax tree-based static analysis, dynamic execution tracing, and Large Language Model (LLM)-enhanced identifier renaming. We also introduce multi-dimensional evaluation metrics that integrate control/data flow analysis, code simplification assessment, entropy measures and LLM-based readability assessments. We construct and release the largest real-world obfuscated JavaScript dataset with 44,421 samples (23,212 wild malicious + 21,209 benign samples). Evaluation shows JSIMPLIFIER outperforms existing tools with 100% processing capability across 20 obfuscation techniques, 100% correctness on evaluation subsets, 88.2% code complexity reduction, and over 4-fold readability improvement validated by multiple LLMs. Our results advance benchmarks for JavaScript deobfuscation research and practical security applications.

cs.CR

ReCopilot: Reverse Engineering Copilot in Binary Analysis

Binary analysis plays a pivotal role in security domains such as malware detection and vulnerability discovery, yet it remains labor-intensive and heavily reliant on expert knowledge. General-purpose large language models (LLMs) perform well in programming analysis on source code, while binaryspecific LLMs are underexplored. In this work, we present ReCopilot, an expert LLM designed for binary analysis tasks. ReCopilot integrates binary code knowledge through a meticulously constructed dataset, encompassing continue pretraining (CPT), supervised fine-tuning (SFT), and direct preference optimization (DPO) stages. It leverages variable data flow and call graph to enhance context awareness and employs test-time scaling to improve reasoning capabilities. Evaluations on a comprehensive binary analysis benchmark demonstrate that ReCopilot achieves state-of-the-art performance in tasks such as function name recovery and variable type inference on the decompiled pseudo code, outperforming both existing tools and LLMs by 13%. Our findings highlight the effectiveness of domain-specific training and context enhancement, while also revealing challenges in building super long chain-of-thought. ReCopilot represents a significant step toward automating binary analysis with interpretable and scalable AI assistance in this domain.

cs.CR

Magnifier: Detecting Network Access via Lightweight Traffic-based Fingerprints

Network access detection plays a crucial role in global network management, enabling efficient network monitoring and topology measurement by identifying unauthorized network access and gathering detailed information about mobile devices. Existing methods for endpoint-based detection primarily rely on deploying monitoring software to recognize network connections. However, the challenges associated with developing and maintaining such systems have limited their universality and coverage in practical deployments, especially given the cost implications of covering a wide array of devices with heterogeneous operating systems. To tackle the issues, we propose Magnifier for mobile device network access detection that, for the first time, passively infers access patterns from backbone traffic at the gateway level. Magnifier's foundation is the creation of device-specific access patterns using the innovative Domain Name Forest (dnForest) fingerprints. We then employ a two-stage distillation algorithm to fine-tune the weights of individual Domain Name Trees (dnTree) within each dnForest, emphasizing the unique device fingerprints. With these meticulously crafted fingerprints, Magnifier efficiently infers network access from backbone traffic using a lightweight fingerprint matching algorithm. Our experimental results, conducted in real-world scenarios, demonstrate that Magnifier exhibits exceptional universality and coverage in both initial and repetitive network access detection in real-time. To facilitate further research, we have thoughtfully curated the NetCess2023 dataset, comprising network access data from 26 different models across 7 brands, covering the majority of mainstream mobile devices. We have also made both the Magnifier prototype and the NetCess2023 dataset publicly available\footnote{https://github.com/SecTeamPolaris/Magnifier}.

cs.NI

PowerPeeler: A Precise and General Dynamic Deobfuscation Method for PowerShell Scripts

PowerShell is a powerful and versatile task automation tool. Unfortunately, it is also widely abused by cyber attackers. To bypass malware detection and hinder threat analysis, attackers often employ diverse techniques to obfuscate malicious PowerShell scripts. Existing deobfuscation tools suffer from the limitation of static analysis, which fails to simulate the real deobfuscation process accurately. In this paper, we propose PowerPeeler. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first dynamic PowerShell script deobfuscation approach at the instruction level. It utilizes expression-related Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) nodes to identify potential obfuscated script pieces. Then, PowerPeeler correlates the AST nodes with their corresponding instructions and monitors the script's entire execution process. Subsequently, PowerPeeler dynamically tracks the execution of these instructions and records their execution results. Finally, PowerPeeler stringifies these results to replace the corresponding obfuscated script pieces and reconstruct the deobfuscated script. To evaluate the effectiveness of PowerPeeler, we collect 1,736,669 real-world malicious PowerShell samples with diversity obfuscation methods. We compare PowerPeeler with five state-of-the-art deobfuscation tools and GPT-4. The evaluation results demonstrate that PowerPeeler can effectively handle all well-known obfuscation methods. Additionally, the deobfuscation correctness rate of PowerPeeler reaches 95%, significantly surpassing that of other tools. PowerPeeler not only recovers the highest amount of sensitive data but also maintains a semantic consistency over 97%, which is also the best. Moreover, PowerPeeler effectively obtains the largest quantity of valid deobfuscated results within a limited time frame. Furthermore, PowerPeeler is extendable and can be used as a helpful tool for other cyber security solutions.

cs.CR

LoadLord: Loading on the Fly to Defend Against Code-Reuse Attacks

Code-reuse attacks have become a kind of common attack method, in which attackers use the existing code in the program to hijack the control flow. Most existing defenses focus on control flow integrity (CFI), code randomization, and software debloating. However, most fine-grained schemes of those that ensure such high security suffer from significant performance overhead, and only reduce attack surfaces such as software debloating can not defend against code-reuse attacks completely. In this paper, from the perspective of shrinking the available code space at runtime, we propose LoadLord, which dynamically loads, and timely unloads functions during program running to defend against code-reuse attacks. LoadLord can reduce the number of gadgets in memory, especially high-risk gadgets. Moreover, LoadLord ensures the control flow integrity of the loading process and breaks the necessary conditions to build a gadget chain. We implemented LoadLord on Linux operating system and experimented that when limiting only 1/16 of the original function. As a result, LoadLord can defend against code-reuse attacks and has an average runtime overhead of 1.7% on the SPEC CPU 2006, reducing gadgets by 94.02%.

cs.CR

SeqNet: An Efficient Neural Network for Automatic Malware Detection

Malware continues to evolve rapidly, and more than 450,000 new samples are captured every day, which makes manual malware analysis impractical. However, existing deep learning detection models need manual feature engineering or require high computational overhead for long training processes, which might be laborious to select feature space and difficult to retrain for mitigating model aging. Therefore, a crucial requirement for a detector is to realize automatic and efficient detection. In this paper, we propose a lightweight malware detection model called SeqNet which could be trained at high speed with low memory required on the raw binaries. By avoiding contextual confusion and reducing semantic loss, SeqNet maintains the detection accuracy when reducing the number of parameters to only 136K. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our methods and the low training cost requirement of SeqNet in our experiments. Besides, we make our datasets and codes public to stimulate further academic research.

cs.CR

New Era of Deeplearning-Based Malware Intrusion Detection: The Malware Detection and Prediction Based On Deep Learning

With the development of artificial intelligence algorithms like deep learning models and the successful applications in many different fields, further similar trails of deep learning technology have been made in cyber security area. It shows the preferable performance not only in academic security research but also in industry practices when dealing with part of cyber security issues by deep learning methods compared to those conventional rules. Especially for the malware detection and classification tasks, it saves generous time cost and promotes the accuracy for a total pipeline of malware detection system. In this paper, we construct special deep neural network, ie, MalDeepNet (TB-Malnet and IB-Malnet) for malware dynamic behavior classification tasks. Then we build the family clustering algorithm based on deep learning and fulfil related testing. Except that, we also design a novel malware prediction model which could detect the malware coming in future through the Mal Generative Adversarial Network (Mal-GAN) implementation. All those algorithms present fairly considerable value in related datasets afterwards.

cs.CR