SearcharxivSearch

arXiv subjects

Linjie Liu

Publications and source records attributed to Linjie Liu.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

ScaleResfusion: Residual Rectified Flow based on Residual Vector Field

Real-world Image Restoration (Real-IR) aims to recover high-quality (HQ) images from complex and unknown degradations. Recent diffusion-based methods have substantially improved perceptual quality, yet two obstacles remain: methods that sample from Gaussian noise require many steps and are often less faithful to the degraded input, whereas residual-based methods that start from the low-quality (LQ) image typically train task-specific models from scratch, with optimization objectives coupled to a particular noise scheduler, and therefore cannot reuse modern pre-trained generative priors. We present \textbf{ScaleResfusion}, which rewrites residual restoration as a scheduler-independent adaptation interface for pre-trained text-to-image rectified-flow models. Its core, \textbf{Residual Rectified Flow} (RRF), inserts the residual term $R$ into the linear transport path of Rectified Flow, so that sampling starts from noisy LQ at an exact acceleration point, where the signal-to-noise ratio of the starting state is continuously controlled by the residual ratio $\gamma$. The resulting optimization target, the \textbf{residual vector field}, contains no scheduler-specific coefficients and differs from the pre-trained rectified-flow target only by the residual offset $\gamma R$; adapting a frozen billion-scale backbone therefore reduces to fitting this compact residual correction with LoRA-only training. A knowledge-distillation pipeline built around RRF further reduces sampling to as few as 4 steps. Experiments on real-world super-resolution across multiple benchmarks show that ScaleResfusion achieves state-of-the-art restoration quality and transfers consistently across pre-trained rectified-flow backbones from 2B to 9B parameters.

cs.CV

Fermi-LAT View on Three Ultra-high-energy 1LHAASO Sources in the $52^{\circ}<l<55^{\circ}$ Region

Using more than 17 yr of Fermi-LAT data, we performed a detailed investigation of the complex $52^{\circ}<l<55^{\circ}$ region, which encompasses the three ultra-high-energy sources 1LHAASO J1928+1746u, 1LHAASO J1928+1813u, and 1LHAASO J1929+1846u. This region hosts multiple SNRs, pulsars, GeV and TeV sources. Our analysis resolves the GeV emission into three pointlike sources (J1925+1729P, J1930+1851P, and J1932+1916P) and two extended sources (J1929+1732E and J1930+1826E), and improves significantly on the description based on the 4FGL-DR4 catalog. Source J1932+1916P is identified as the known gamma-ray pulsar PSR J1932+1916, while J1925+1729P may be a new gamma-ray pulsar candidate distinct from the known gamma-ray pulsar PSR J1925+1720. This warrants future investigation and a search for pulsations. Source J1930+1851P coincides with the TeV source PWN/SNR G54.1+0.3 and its GeV-TeV spectrum is consistent with both leptonic and hadronic interpretations, although a leptonic origin in relation to the known PWN is more likely. The GeV-TeV spectrum of J1929+1732E is consistent with a hybrid lepto-hadronic scenario in which the TeV emission traces the PWN powered by the pulsar PSR J1928+1746, while the GeV emission may result from interactions between particles escaped from the parent SNR and illuminating the gas environment. Similarly, J1930+1826E is likely connected to PWN/SNR G54.1+0.3 under a hadronic scenario involving escaped particles in their early propagation stage. Owing to spectral and/or morphological mismatches, the connection of these five GeV sources to the three LHAASO sources is not clear. This warrants deeper observations with HAWC and LHAASO, and a dedicated study of the modeling of the Galactic diffuse emission. Future CTAO observations with higher angular resolution are expected to deliver crucial information for the study of this region.

astro-ph.HE

Probing the $\gamma$-ray Emission Origin of Two Star-forming Galaxies NGC 2403 and NGC 3424 with the Fermi-LAT

Star-forming galaxies (SFGs) are a subclass of $\gamma$-ray emitters and a correlation between their $\gamma$-ray luminosity ($L_{\rm \gamma}$) and the total infrared (IR) luminosity ($L_{\rm IR}$) has been established based on the Fermi Large Area Telescope (LAT) data. NGC 2403 and NGC 3424 have been reported as outliers in the $L_{\rm \gamma}$-$L_{\rm IR}$ correlation with light curves showing significant variability, which contrasts with the temporally stable $\gamma$-ray emission in other SFGs, originating primarily from cosmic rays interacting with interstellar medium. In this study, we reanalyze the $\gamma$-ray emission in the directions of NGC 2403 and NGC 3424 using more than 16.5 yr Fermi-LAT data. NGC 3424 is found to be spatially coincident with the detected $\gamma$-ray source, while NGC 2403 is significantly offset from the nearest $\gamma$-ray source, suggesting an implausible association. We confirm the previously reported variability of both $\gamma$-ray sources and the significant deviation from the $L_{\rm \gamma}$-$L_{\rm IR}$ correlation when assuming an association of both $\gamma$-ray sources with the two galaxies. Our findings lend further support to the interpretation that their $\gamma$-ray emission is driven primarily by alternative radiative processes-rather than by star formation activity-such as the ejecta of the Type IIP supernova SN 2004dj in NGC 2403 interacting with a surrounding high-density shell and an obscured active galactic nucleus in NGC 3424.

astro-ph.HE

Coevolutionary dynamics of cooperation, risk, and cost in collective risk games

Addressing both natural and societal challenges requires collective cooperation. Studies on collective-risk social dilemmas have shown that individual decisions are influenced by the perceived risk of collective failure. However, existing feedback evolving game models often focus on a single feedback mechanism, such as the coupling between cooperation and risk or between cooperation and cost. In many real-world scenarios, however, the level of cooperation, the cost of cooperating, and the collective risk are dynamically interlinked. Here, we present an evolutionary game model that considers the interplay of these three variables. Our analysis shows that the worst-case scenario, characterized by full defection, maximum risk, and the highest cost of cooperation, remains a stable evolutionary attractor. Nevertheless, cooperation can emerge and persist because the system also supports stable equilibria with non-zero cooperation. The system exhibits multistability, meaning that different initial conditions lead to either sustained cooperation or a tragedy of the commons. These findings highlight that initial levels of cooperation, cost, and risk collectively determine whether a population can avert a tragic outcome.

nlin.AO

Strategic competition in informal risk sharing mechanism versus collective index insurance

The frequent occurrence of natural disasters has posed significant challenges to society, necessitating the urgent development of effective risk management strategies. From the early informal community-based risk sharing mechanisms to modern formal index insurance products, risk management tools have continuously evolved. Although index insurance provides an effective risk transfer mechanism in theory, it still faces the problems of basis risk and pricing in practice. At the same time, in the presence of informal community risk sharing mechanisms, the competitiveness of index insurance deserves further investigation. Here we propose a three-strategy evolutionary game model, which simultaneously examines the competitive relationship between formal index insurance purchasing (I), informal risk sharing strategies (S), and complete non-insurance (A). Furthermore, we introduce a method for calculating insurance company profits to aid in the optimal pricing of index insurance products. We find that basis risk and risk loss ratio have significant impacts on insurance adoption rate. Under scenarios with low basis risk and high loss ratios, index insurance is more popular; meanwhile, when the loss ratio is moderate, an informal risk sharing strategy is the preferred option. Conversely, when the loss ratio is low, individuals tend to forego any insurance. Furthermore, accurately assessing the degree of risk aversion and determining the appropriate ratio of risk sharing are crucial for predicting the future market sales of index insurance.

q-fin.RM

Creation of independently controllable and long lifetime polar skyrmion textures in ferroelectric-metallic heterostructures

Topological textures like vortices, labyrinths and skyrmions formed in ferroic materials have attracted extensive interests during the past decade for their fundamental physics, intriguing topology, and technological prospects. So far, polar skyrmions remain scarce in ferroelectrics as they require a delicate balance between various dipolar interactions. Here, we report that PbTiO3 thin films in a metallic contact undergo a topological phase transition and stabilize a broad family of skyrmion-like textures (e.g., skyrmion bubbles, multiple {\pi}-twist target skyrmions, and skyrmion bags) with independent controllability, analogous to those reported in magnetic systems. Weakly-interacted skyrmion arrays with a density over 300 Gb/inch2 are successfully written, erased and read-out by local electrical and mechanical stimuli of a scanning probe. Interestingly, in contrast to the relatively short lifetime <20 hours of the skyrmion bubbles, the multiple {\pi}-twist target skyrmions and skyrmion bags show topology-enhanced stability with lifetime over two weeks. Experimental and theoretical analysis implies the heterostructures carry electric Dzyaloshinskii-Moriya interaction mediated by oxygen octahedral tiltings. Our results demonstrate ferroelectric-metallic heterostructures as fertile playground for topological states and emergent phenomena.

cond-mat.mtrl-sci

The paradigm of tax-reward and tax-punishment strategies in the advancement of public resource management dynamics

In contemporary society, the effective utilization of public resources remains a subject of significant concern. A common issue arises from defectors seeking to obtain an excessive share of these resources for personal gain, potentially leading to resource depletion. To mitigate this tragedy and ensure sustainable development of resources, implementing mechanisms to either reward those who adhere to distribution rules or penalize those who do not, appears advantageous. We introduce two models: a tax-reward model and a tax-punishment model, to address this issue. Our analysis reveals that in the tax-reward model, the evolutionary trajectory of the system is influenced not only by the tax revenue collected but also by the natural growth rate of the resources. Conversely, the tax-punishment model exhibits distinct characteristics when compared to the tax-reward model, notably the potential for bistability. In such scenarios, the selection of initial conditions is critical, as it can determine the system's path. Furthermore, our study identifies instances where the system lacks stable points, exemplified by a limit cycle phenomenon, underscoring the complexity and dynamism inherent in managing public resources using these models.

math.DS

Evolution of conditional cooperation in collective-risk social dilemma with repeated group interactions

The evolution and long-term sustenance of cooperation has consistently piqued scholarly interest across the disciplines of evolutionary biology and social sciences. Previous theoretical and experimental studies on collective risk social dilemma games have revealed that the risk of collective failure will affect the evolution of cooperation. In the real world individuals usually adjust their decisions based on environmental factors such as risk intensity and cooperation level. However, it is still not well understood how such conditional behaviors affect the evolution of cooperation in repeated group interactions scenario from a theoretical perspective. Here, we construct an evolutionary game model with repeated interactions, in which defectors decide whether to cooperate in subsequent rounds of the game based on whether the risk exceeds their tolerance threshold and whether the number of cooperators exceeds the collective goal in the early rounds of the game. We find that the introduction of conditional cooperation strategy can effectively promote the emergence of cooperation, especially when the risk is low. In addition, the risk threshold significantly affects the evolutionary outcomes, with a high risk promoting the emergence of cooperation. Importantly, when the risk of failure to reach collective goals exceeds a certain threshold, the timely transition from a defective strategy to a cooperative strategy by conditional cooperators is beneficial for maintaining high-level cooperation.

physics.soc-ph

Coevolutionary dynamics of population and institutional rewards in public goods games

In social dilemmas, individuals face a conflict between their own self-interest and the collective interest of the group. The provision of reward has been shown to be an effective means to drive cooperation in such situations. However, previous research has often made the idealized assumption that rewards are constant and do not change in response to changes in the game environment. In this paper, we introduce reward into the public goods game and develop a coevolutionary game model in which the strength of reward is adaptively adjusted according to the population state. Specifically, we assume that decreasing levels of cooperation lead to an increase in reward strength, while increasing levels of cooperation result in a decrease in reward strength. By investigating coevolutionary dynamics between population state and reward systems, we find that interior stable coexistence state can emerge in our model, where the levels of cooperation and reward strength remain at constant levels. In addition, we also reveal that the emergence of a full cooperation state only requires a minimal level of reward strength. Our study highlights the potential of adaptive feedback reward as a tool for achieving long-term stability and sustainability in social dilemmas.

physics.soc-ph

Coevolutionary dynamics via adaptive feedback in collective-risk social dilemma game

Human society and natural environment form a complex giant ecosystem, where human activities not only lead to the change of environmental states, but also react to them. By using collective-risk social dilemma game, some studies have already revealed that individual contributions and the risk of future losses are inextricably linked. These works, however, often use an idealistic assumption that the risk is constant and not affected by individual behaviors. We here develop a coevolutionary game approach that captures the coupled dynamics of cooperation and risk. In particular, the level of contributions in a population affects the state of risk, while the risk in turn influences individuals' behavioral decision-making. Importantly, we explore two representative feedback forms describing the possible effect of strategy on risk, namely, linear and exponential feedbacks. We find that cooperation can be maintained in the population by keeping at a certain fraction or forming an evolutionary oscillation with risk, independently of the feedback type. However, such evolutionary outcome depends on the initial state. Taken together, a two-way coupling between collective actions and risk is essential to avoid the tragedy of the commons. More importantly, a critical starting portion of cooperators and risk level is what we really need for guiding the evolution toward a desired direction.

physics.soc-ph

Conditional investment strategy in evolutionary trust games with repeated group interactions

It has a long tradition to study trust behavior among humans or artificial agents by investigating the trust game. Although previous studies based on evolutionary game theory have revealed that trust and trustworthiness can be promoted if network structure or reputation is considered, they often assume that interactions among agents are one-shot and investors do not consider the investment environment before making decisions, which collide with many realistic situations. In this paper, we introduce the conditional investment strategy into the repeated N-player trust game, in which conditional investors decide to invest or not depending on their assessment of the trustworthiness level of the group. By using the approach of the Markov decision process, we study the evolutionary dynamics of trust in repeated group interactions with the conditional investment strategy. We find that conditional investors can form an effective alliance with trustworthy trustees, hence they can sweep out untrustworthy trustees. Moreover, we verify that such alliance can exist in a wide range of model parameters. These results may explain why trusting in others and reciprocating them with trustworthy actions can be sustained in game interactions among intelligent agents.

math.DS

Indirect exclusion can promote cooperation in repeated group interactions

Social exclusion has been regarded as one of the most effective measures to promote the evolution of cooperation. In real society, the way in which social exclusion works can be direct or indirect. However, thus far there is no related work to explore how indirect exclusion influences the evolution of cooperation from a theoretical perspective. Here, we introduce indirect exclusion into the repeated public goods game where the game organizer probabilistically selects cooperators after the first game round to participate in the following possible game interactions. We then investigate the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation both in infinite and finite well-mixed populations. Through theoretical analysis and numerical calculations, we find that the introduction of indirect exclusion can induce the stable coexistence of cooperators and defectors or the dominance of cooperators, which thus effectively promotes the evolution of cooperation. Besides, we show that the identifying probability of the organizer has a nonlinear effect on public cooperation when its value is lower than an intermediate value, while the higher identifying probability can maintain a high level of cooperation. Furthermore, our results show that increasing the average rounds of game interactions can effectively promote the evolution of cooperation.

physics.soc-ph

Effects of interconnections among corruption, institutional punishment, and economic factors for the evolution of cooperation

The view that altruistic punishment plays an important role in supporting public cooperation among human beings and other species has been widely accepted by the public. However, the positive role of altruistic punishment in enhancing cooperation will be undermined if corruption is considered. Recently, behavioral experiments have confirmed this finding and further investigated the effects of the leader's punitive power and the economic potential. Nevertheless, there are relatively few studies focusing on how these factors affect the evolution of cooperation from a theoretical perspective. Here, we combine institutional punishment public goods games with bribery games to investigate the effects of the above factors on the evolution of cooperation. Theoretical and numerical results reveal that the existence of corruption will reduce the level of cooperation when cooperators are more inclined to provide bribes. In addition, we demonstrate that stronger leader and richer economic potential are both important to enhance cooperation. In particular, when defectors are more inclined to provide bribes, stronger leaders can sustain the contributions of public goods from cooperators if the economic potential is weak.

math.DS

Early exclusion leads to cyclical cooperation in repeated group interactions

Explaining the emergence and maintenance of cooperation among selfish individuals from an evolutionary perspective remains a grand challenge in biology, economy, and social sciences. Social exclusion is believed to be an answer to this conundrum. However, previously related studies often assume one-shot interactions and ignore how free-riding is identified, which seem to be too idealistic. In this work, we consider repeated interactions where excluders need to pay a monitoring cost to identify free-riders for exclusion and free-riders cannot participate in the following possible game interactions once they are identified and excluded by excluders in the repeated interaction process. We reveal that the introduction of such exclusion can prevent the breakdown of cooperation in repeated group interactions. In particular, we demonstrate that an evolutionary oscillation among cooperators, defectors, and excluders can appear in infinitely large populations when early exclusion is implemented. In addition, we find that the population spends most of the time in states where cooperators dominate for early exclusion when stochastic mutation-selection is considered in finite populations. Our results highlight that early exclusion is successful in solving the mentioned enigma of cooperation in repeated group interactions.

physics.soc-ph

Combination of institutional incentives for cooperative governance of risky commons

Finding appropriate incentives to enforce collaborative efforts for governing the commons in risky situations is a long-lasting challenge. Previous works have demonstrated that both punishing free-riders and rewarding cooperators could be potential tools to reach this goal. Despite weak theoretical foundations, policy-makers frequently impose a punishment-reward combination. Here, we consider the emergence of positive and negative incentives and analyze their simultaneous impact on sustaining risky commons. Importantly, we consider institutions with fixed and flexible incentives. We find that a local sanctioning scheme with pure reward is the optimal incentive strategy. It can drive the entire population towards a highly cooperative state in a broad range of parameters, independently of the type of institutions. We show that our finding is also valid for flexible incentives in the global sanctioning scheme, although the local arrangement works more effectively.

physics.soc-ph

Ultrafast ratchet dynamics of skyrmion by defect engineering under gigahertz magnetic fields

The novel ratchet motion of magnetic skyrmions driven by microwave magnetic fields, with the motion direction and speed tunable by field parameters, provides a promising route to drive magnetic skyrmions in materials with poor conductivity. However, as an indirect motion, skyrmion ratchet motion speed is generally low in comparison with the direct motions driven by current. Toward practical applications, it is important to ask if there are mechanisms to realize ultrafast ratchet motion of magnetic skyrmions and how such novel motion can be integrated into racetrack-type skyrmion devices. In this work, we explore the effects of defects and edges on the ratchet motion of magnetic skyrmions under time-varying magnetic fields in GHz. We demonstrate that the ratchet motion of skyrmion is not only guided along the defect tracks or edges, but also with a remarkable speed-up (with a factor over ten) compared with that in the bulk region. The skyrmion ratchet motion speed reaches 100 m/s along a straight defect track/edge and 10^9 rad/s along a circular edge under a field of ~50 mT, comparable to those direct motions driven by currents. Moreover, the skyrmion ratchet motion along the defect track/edge can be facilely controlled by the field and defect parameters. Analysis based on time-averaged Thiele equation of skyrmion verifies that such a speed-up effect is due to the increased time-averaged driving force perpendicular to the skyrmion motion when it approaches the defect track or edge, analogous to that discovered in direct motions driven by currents.

cond-mat.mes-hall

Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a population with probabilistic corrupt enforcers and violators

Pro-social punishment is a key driver of harmonious and stable society. However, this institution is vulnerable to corruption since law-violators can avoid sanctioning by paying bribes to corrupt law-enforcers. Consequently, to understand how altruistic behavior survives in a corrupt environment is an open question. To reveal potential explanations here we introduce corrupt enforcers and violators into the public goods game with pool punishment, and assume that punishers, as corrupt enforcers, may select defectors probabilistically to take a bribe from, and meanwhile defectors, as corrupt violators, may select punishers stochastically to be corrupted. By means of mathematical analysis, we aim to study the necessary conditions for the evolution of cooperation in such corrupt environment. We find that cooperation can be maintained in the population in two distinct ways. First, cooperators, defectors, and punishers can coexist by all keeping a steady fraction of the population. Second, these three strategies can form a cyclic dominance that resembles a rock-scissors-paper cycle or a heteroclinic cycle. We theoretically identify conditions when the competing strategies coexist in a stationary way or they dominate each other in a cyclic way. These predictions are confirmed numerically.

physics.soc-ph

Evolutionary dynamics in the public goods games with switching between punishment and exclusion

Pro-social punishment and exclusion are common means to elevate the level of cooperation among unrelated individuals. Indeed, it is worth pointing out that the combined use of these two strategies is quite common across human societies. However, it is still not known how a combined strategy where punishment and exclusion are switched can promote cooperation from the theoretical perspective. In this paper, we thus propose two different switching strategies, namely peer switching that is based on peer punishment and peer exclusion, and pool switching that is based on pool punishment and pool exclusion. Individuals adopting the switching strategy will punish defectors when their numbers are below a threshold and exclude them otherwise. We study how the two switching strategies influence the evolutionary dynamics in the public goods game. We show that an intermediate value of the threshold leads to a stable coexistence of cooperators, defectors and players adopting the switching strategy in a well-mixed population, and this regardless of whether the pool-based or the peer-based switching strategy is introduced. Moreover, we show that the pure exclusion strategy alone is able to evoke a limit cycle attractor in the evolutionary dynamics, such that cooperation can coexist with other strategies.

physics.soc-ph