arXiv subjects

Lioba Heimbach

Publications and source records attributed to Lioba Heimbach.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

EVM Workloads in the Wild: Evidence for Multi-Dimensional Gas Metering, State Growth, Delayed Execution, and Parallelism

Gas metering on EVM-compatible blockchains assumes that execution conditions are stable: that the resource mix is constant enough to justify collapsing execution costs into a single scalar with fixed relative prices, and that state drift between submission and execution does not materially alter a transaction's outcome. We measure the extent to which this assumption fails. We present a trace-level measurement study of EVM workloads on Ethereum (L1) and Base (L2) throughout 2025, sampling 3,000 blocks per day per chain. We decompose each transaction into opcode-level execution gas, intrinsic gas, refunds, and persistent state deltas. To measure state sensitivity, we re-execute transactions from September 2025 on older states and record how gas usage and storage access patterns change. We find the resource mix to be far from stable: on Base, storage reads and compute account for 29.2% and 24.3% of execution gas, while Ethereum devotes 34.9% to storage writes. Ethereum's gas limit doubling during 2025 shifted its own profile toward compute-heavier, Base-like patterns. Base also exhibits a higher fraction of cold storage reads (49.7% versus 39.6% on Ethereum). Persistent state growth, a permanent cost priced as a transient one, reaches 435 GB on Base versus 30 GB on Ethereum. Execution outcomes are equally unstable: gas estimates vary across nearby historical states for 46.0% of transactions on Base, compared to 13.9% on Ethereum, with especially high sensitivity for MEV and DeFi activity. Storage access patterns also diverge across states, limiting the effectiveness of access lists and complicating parallel execution. Our work provides an empirical foundation for multi-dimensional gas metering and explicit pricing of state growth. It shows that state-sensitive execution behavior complicates workload estimation, directly affecting transaction predictability and user experience.

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arXiv2026

Blockspace Under Pressure: An Analysis of Spam MEV on High-Throughput Blockchains

On high-throughput, low-fee blockchains, a qualitatively new form of maximal extractable value (MEV) has emerged: searchers submit large volumes of speculative transactions, whose profitability is resolved only at execution time. We refer to this as spam MEV. On major rollups, it can at times consume more than half of block gas, even though only a small fraction of probes ultimately results in a trade. Despite growing awareness of this phenomenon, there is no principled framework for understanding how blockchain design parameters shape its prevalence and impact. We develop such a framework, modeling spam transactions competing for on-chain opportunities under a competitive equilibrium that drives their profits to zero, and deriving equilibrium spam volumes as a function of block capacity, minimum gas price, and the transaction fee mechanism. Empirical evidence from Base and Arbitrum supports the model: spam grew sharply as block capacity was scaled up and fell when minimum gas prices were introduced. Our analysis yields three main insights. First, spam is always costly: when block capacity is scarce, it displaces users and drives up gas prices; as block capacity grows, it increasingly consumes execution resources, raising network externality, i.e., the cost of provisioning and processing blocks. We show that spam takes an increasing share of each additional unit of block capacity, so capping it before all users are included creates a favorable trade-off: forgoing a small amount of user welfare eliminates disproportionate spam and externality. Second, we extend the analysis to priority fee ordering and show that ordering transactions by gas price helps reduce spam, as spammers must pay more to reach early block positions. Third, as user demand grows and blockspace is scaled accordingly, spam's share of block capacity plateaus rather than growing indefinitely.

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arXiv2026

Cadence: Extreme Pipelining with Multiple Concurrent Proposers

We present Cadence, a Byzantine fault-tolerant multi-proposer consensus protocol with arbitrarily low block intervals, optimal resilience, and optimal fast-path latency. Cadence divides time into equally spaced slots, one block per slot, each finalized in its own consensus instance. Blocks do not build directly on their predecessor, so instances run independently and none waits for an earlier block to finish or propagate; we call this extreme pipelining, decoupling the block interval from network latency. Cadence also removes the single-leader monopoly over transaction inclusion and ordering: under multiple concurrent proposers (MCP), several validators propose for each block, and it guarantees that, under synchrony, a transaction a correct proposer includes cannot be censored or deferred (short-term censorship resistance), and that no proposer can craft its proposal in reaction to the others' (hiding). To realize extreme pipelining, we introduce a general framework that turns any one-shot consensus meeting our slot-consensus specification into a multi-shot protocol. We instantiate it for MCP with two protocols of our own: Chorus, a slot consensus whose fast path finalizes a block in an optimal three rounds, with speculative finality one round earlier, and Conductor, an orchestrator that opens slots at an even cadence, more slowly under asynchrony to keep open slots bounded. To our knowledge, Cadence is the first MCP protocol to provide short-term censorship resistance and hiding at the fast-path latency of single-leader consensus. We prove safety, liveness, censorship resistance, and hiding under partial synchrony with optimal resilience (n = 3f+1). In simulation over Monad's 200 validators with five proposers per slot, finalization averages 219 ms (167 ms to speculative finality); at a 100 ms block interval a transaction waits on average 50 ms to enter a proposal.

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arXiv2026

Censorship-Resistant Sealed-Bid Auctions on Blockchains

Auctions are now central to blockchain markets, settling NFT sales, token launches, DeFi liquidations, and arbitrage opportunities. Each on-chain bid is a public transaction whose inclusion is decided by a single consensus proposer per block. The proposer can observe pending bids, exclude competitors, and submit bids of their own, breaking the fairness guarantees of classical sealed-bid auctions. To enable latency-sensitive sealed-bid auctions in blockchain settings, we formalize four properties -- each necessary to prevent a concrete attack -- and design a protocol achieving all four: hiding bid contents, existence, and bidder identity until reveal (Hiding); counting all timely honest bids and rejecting late adversarial bids (Simultaneous Release); preventing silent withdrawal of committed bids (No Free Bid Withdrawal); and charging on-chain fees only to winners (Auction Participation Efficiency). Our protocol uses a timestamping oracle (instantiated with a committee of 2f_ts+1 timestampers) and a censorship-resistant inclusion predicate (instantiated using a FOCIL-based inclusion list), with only the winning bid settled on-chain. Our construction relies on two zero-knowledge proofs: an eligibility proof that anonymously proves deposit membership to the timestamping committee, and an auction proof that binds a bid to a specific auction for the inclusion list committee. We implement both using Groth16 over BN254 with Poseidon hashing in arkworks/Rust: the auction proof generates in 13 ms and verifies in under 1 ms; eligibility proofs for Merkle trees up to 2^32 bidders generate in 47-159 ms and verify in about 1 ms. Together, this yields a sealed-bid auction primitive practical for high-value, time-sensitive blockchain settings.

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arXiv2025

Multiple Sides of 36 Coins: Measuring Peer-to-Peer Infrastructure Across Cryptocurrencies

Blockchain technologies underpin an expanding ecosystem of decentralized applications, financial systems, and infrastructure. However, the fundamental networking layer that sustains these systems, the peer-to-peer layer, of all but the top few ecosystems remains largely opaque. In this paper, we present the first longitudinal, cross-network measurement study of 36 public blockchain networks. Over 9 months, we deployed 15 active crawlers, sourced data from two additional community crawlers, and conducted hourly connectivity probes to observe the evolving state of these networks. Furthermore, by leveraging Ethereum's discovery protocols, we inferred metadata for an additional 19 auxiliary networks that utilize the Ethereum peer discovery protocol. We also explored Internet-wide scans, which only require probing each protocol's default ports with a simple, network-specific payload. This approach allows us to rapidly identify responsive peers across the entire address space without having to implement custom discovery and handshake logic for every blockchain. We validated this method on Bitcoin and similar networks with known ground truth, then applied it to Cardano, which we could not crawl directly. Our study uncovers dramatic variation in network size from under 10 to more than 10,000 active nodes. We quantify trends in IPv4 versus IPv6 usage, analyze autonomous systems and geographic concentration, and characterize churn, diurnal behavior, and the coverage and redundancy of discovery protocols. These findings expose critical differences in network resilience, decentralization, and observability. Beyond characterizing each network, our methodology demonstrates a general framework for measuring decentralized networks at scale. This opens the door for continued monitoring, benchmarking, and more transparent assessments of blockchain infrastructure across diverse ecosystems.

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arXiv2025

Transaction Fee Market Design for Parallel Execution

Given the low throughput of blockchains like Bitcoin and Ethereum, scalability - the ability to process an increasing number of transactions - has become a central focus of blockchain research. One promising approach is the parallelization of transaction execution across multiple threads. However, achieving efficient parallelization requires a redesign of the incentive structure within the fee market. Currently, the fee market does not differentiate between transactions that access multiple high-demand storage keys (i.e., unique identifiers for individual data entries) versus a single low-demand one, as long as they require the same computational effort. Addressing this discrepancy is crucial for enabling more effective parallel execution. In this work, we aim to bridge the gap between the current fee market and the need for parallel execution by exploring alternative fee market designs. To this end, we propose a framework consisting of two key components: a Gas Computation Mechanism (GCM), which quantifies the load a transaction places on the network in terms of parallelization and computation, measured in units of gas, and a Transaction Fee Mechanism (TFM), which assigns a price to each unit of gas. We additionally introduce a set of desirable properties for a GCM, propose several candidate mechanisms, and evaluate them against these criteria. Our analysis highlights two strong candidates: the weighted area GCM, which integrates smoothly with existing TFMs such as EIP-1559 and satisfies a broad subset of the outlined properties, and the time-proportional makespan GCM, which assigns gas costs based on the context of the entire block's schedule and, through this dependence on the overall execution outcome, captures the dynamics of parallel execution more accurately.

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arXiv2025

Optimistic MEV in Ethereum Layer 2s: Why Blockspace Is Always in Demand

Layer 2 rollups are rapidly absorbing DeFi activity, securing over $40 billion and accounting for nearly half of Ethereum's DEX volume by Q1 2025, yet their MEV dynamics remain understudied. We address this gap by defining and quantifying optimistic MEV, a form of speculative, on-chain MEV whose detection and execution logic reside largely on-chain in smart contracts. As a result of their speculative nature and lack of off-chain opportunity verification, optimistic MEV transactions frequently decide not to execute any trades. In this work, we focus on cyclic arbitrage, which we find is predominantly executed as optimistic MEV on Layer 2s. Using our multi-stage identification pipeline on Arbitrum, Base, and Optimism, we show that in Q1 2025, transactions from cyclic arbitrage contracts account for over 50% of on-chain gas on Base and Optimism and 7% on Arbitrum, driven mainly by "interaction" probes (on-chain computations searching for arbitrage). This speculative probing indicates that cyclic arbitrage on Layer 2s is predominantly executed as optimistic MEV and contributes to generally keeping blocks on Base and Optimism persistently full. Despite consuming over half of on-chain gas, these optimistic MEV transactions pay less than one quarter of total gas fees. Cross-network comparison reveals divergent success rates, differing patterns of code reuse, and sensitivity to varying sequencer ordering and block production times. Finally, OLS regressions link optimistic MEV trade count to ETH volatility, retail trading activity, and DEX aggregator usage. Together, these findings show that optimistic MEV has become a major source of persistent spam-like transaction activity on Layer 2s, dominating blockspace with low-value probes and reshaping the composition of on-chain activity.

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arXiv2025

Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for Leaderless Blockchain Protocols

We initiate the study of transaction fee mechanism design for blockchain protocols in which multiple block producers contribute to the production of each block. Our contributions include: - We propose an extensive-form (multi-stage) game model to reason about the game theory of multi-proposer transaction fee mechanisms. - We define the strongly BPIC property to capture the idea that all block producers should be motivated to behave as intended: for every user bid profile, following the intended allocation rule is a Nash equilibrium for block producers that Pareto dominates all other Nash equilibria. - We propose the first-price auction with equal sharing (FPA-EQ) mechanism as an attractive solution to the multi-proposer transaction fee mechanism design problem. We prove that the mechanism is strongly BPIC and guarantees at least a 63.2% fraction of the maximum-possible expected welfare at equilibrium. - We prove that the compromises made by the FPA-EQ mechanism are qualitatively necessary: no strongly BPIC mechanism with non-trivial welfare guarantees can be DSIC, and no strongly BPIC mechanism can guarantee optimal welfare at equilibrium.

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arXiv2025

The Early Days of the Ethereum Blob Fee Market and Lessons Learnt

Ethereum has adopted a rollup-centric roadmap to scale by making rollups (layer 2 scaling solutions) the primary method for handling transactions. The first significant step towards this goal was EIP-4844, which introduced blob transactions that are designed to meet the data availability needs of layer 2 protocols. This work constitutes the first rigorous and comprehensive empirical analysis of transaction- and mempool-level data since the institution of blobs on Ethereum on March 13, 2024. We perform a longitudinal study of the early days of the blob fee market analyzing the landscape and the behaviors of its participants. We identify and measure the inefficiencies arising out of suboptimal block packing, showing that at times it has resulted in up to 70% relative fee loss. We hone in and give further insight into two (congested) peak demand periods for blobs. Finally, we document a market design issue relating to subset bidding due to the inflexibility of the transaction structure on packing data as blobs and suggest possible ways to fix it. The latter market structure issue also applies more generally for any discrete objects included within transactions.

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arXiv2025

Deanonymizing Ethereum Validators: The P2P Network Has a Privacy Issue

Many blockchain networks aim to preserve the anonymity of validators in the peer-to-peer (P2P) network, ensuring that no adversary can link a validator's identifier to the IP address of a peer due to associated privacy and security concerns. This work demonstrates that the Ethereum P2P network does not offer this anonymity. We present a methodology that enables any node in the network to identify validators hosted on connected peers and empirically verify the feasibility of our proposed method. Using data collected from four nodes over three days, we locate more than 15% of Ethereum validators in the P2P network. The insights gained from our deanonymization technique provide valuable information on the distribution of validators across peers, their geographic locations, and hosting organizations. We further discuss the implications and risks associated with the lack of anonymity in the P2P network and propose methods to help validators protect their privacy. The Ethereum Foundation has awarded us a bug bounty, acknowledging the impact of our results.

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arXiv2024

On the Lifecycle of a Lightning Network Payment Channel

The Bitcoin Lightning Network, launched in 2018, serves as a layer 2 scaling solution for Bitcoin. The Lightning Network allows users to establish channels between each other and subsequently exchange off-chain payments. Together, these channels form a network that facilitates payments between parties even if they do not have a channel in common. The Lightning Network has gained popularity over the past five years as it offers an attractive alternative to on-chain transactions by substantially reducing transaction costs and processing times. Nevertheless, due to the privacy-centric design of the Lightning Network, little is understood about its inner workings. In this work, we conduct a measurement study of the Lightning Network to shed light on the lifecycle of channels. By combining Lightning gossip messages with on-chain Bitcoin data, we investigate the lifecycle of a channel from its opening through its lifetime to its closing. In particular, our analysis offers unique insights into the utilization patterns of the Lightning Network. Even more so, through decoding the channel closing transactions, we obtain the first dataset of Lightning Network payments, observe the imbalance of channels during the closing, and investigate whether both parties are involved in the closing, or one closes the channel unilaterally. For instance, we find nearly 60% of cooperatively closed channels are resurrected, i.e., their outputs were used to fund another channel.

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arXiv2024

The Potential of Self-Regulation for Front-Running Prevention on DEXes

The transaction ordering dependency of the smart contracts building decentralized exchanges (DEXes) allow for predatory trading strategies. In particular, front-running attacks present a constant risk for traders on DEXes. Whereas legal regulation outlaws most front-running practices in traditional finance, such measures are ineffective in preventing front-running on DEXes. While novel market designs hindering front-running may emerge, it remains unclear whether the market's participants, in particular, liquidity providers, would be willing to adopt these new designs. A misalignment of the participant's private incentives and the market's social incentives can hinder the market from adopting an effective prevention mechanism. We present a game-theoretic model to study the behavior of sophisticated traders, retail traders, and liquidity providers in DEXes. Sophisticated traders adjust for front-running attacks, while retail traders do not, likely due to lack of knowledge or irrationality. Our findings show that with less than 1% of order flow from retail traders, traders' and liquidity providers' interests align with the market's social incentives - eliminating front-running attacks. However, the benefit from embracing this novel market is often small and may not suffice to entice them. With retail traders making up a larger proportion (around 10%) of the order flow, liquidity providers tend to stay in pools that do not protect against front-running. This suggests both educating traders and providing additional incentives for liquidity providers are necessary for market self-regulation.

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arXiv2024

SoK: Attacks on DAOs

Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) are blockchain-based organizations that facilitate decentralized governance. Today, DAOs not only hold billions of dollars in their treasury but also govern many of the most popular Decentralized Finance (DeFi) protocols. This paper systematically analyses security threats to DAOs, focusing on the types of attacks they face. We study attacks on DAOs that took place in the past, attacks that have been theorized to be possible, and potential attacks that were uncovered and prevented in audits. For each of these (potential) attacks, we describe and categorize the attack vectors utilized into four categories. This reveals that while many attacks on DAOs take advantage of the less tangible and more complex human nature involved in governance, audits tend to focus on code and protocol vulnerabilities. Thus, additionally, the paper examines empirical data on DAO vulnerabilities, outlines risk factors contributing to these attacks, and suggests mitigation strategies to safeguard against such vulnerabilities.

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arXiv2024

Benchmarking GNNs Using Lightning Network Data

The Bitcoin Lightning Network is a layer 2 protocol designed to facilitate fast and inexpensive Bitcoin transactions. It operates by establishing channels between users, where Bitcoin is locked and transactions are conducted off-chain until the channels are closed, with only the initial and final transactions recorded on the blockchain. Routing transactions through intermediary nodes is crucial for users without direct channels, allowing these routing nodes to collect fees for their services. Nodes announce their channels to the network, forming a graph with channels as edges. In this paper, we analyze the graph structure of the Lightning Network and investigate the statistical relationships between node properties using machine learning, particularly Graph Neural Networks (GNNs). We formulate a series of tasks to explore these relationships and provide benchmarks for GNN architectures, demonstrating how topological and neighbor information enhances performance. Our evaluation of several models reveals the effectiveness of GNNs in these tasks and highlights the insights gained from their application.

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arXiv2024

Non-Atomic Arbitrage in Decentralized Finance

The prevalence of maximal extractable value (MEV) in the Ethereum ecosystem has led to a characterization of the latter as a dark forest. Studies of MEV have thus far largely been restricted to purely on-chain MEV, i.e., sandwich attacks, cyclic arbitrage, and liquidations. In this work, we shed light on the prevalence of non-atomic arbitrage on decentralized exchanges (DEXes) on the Ethereum blockchain. Importantly, non-atomic arbitrage exploits price differences between DEXes on the Ethereum blockchain as well as exchanges outside the Ethereum blockchain (i.e., centralized exchanges or DEXes on other blockchains). Thus, non-atomic arbitrage is a type of MEV that involves actions on and off the Ethereum blockchain. In our study of non-atomic arbitrage, we uncover that more than a fourth of the volume on Ethereum's biggest five DEXes from the merge until 31 October 2023 can likely be attributed to this type of MEV. We further highlight that only eleven searchers are responsible for more than 80% of the identified non-atomic arbitrage volume sitting at a staggering $132 billion and draw a connection between the centralization of the block construction market and non-atomic arbitrage. Finally, we discuss the security implications of these high-value transactions that account for more than 10% of Ethereum's total block value and outline possible mitigations.

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arXiv2023

A Fair and Resilient Decentralized Clock Network for Transaction Ordering

Traditional blockchain design gives miners or validators full control over transaction ordering, i.e., they can freely choose which transactions to include or exclude, as well as in which order. While not an issue initially, the emergence of decentralized finance has introduced new transaction order dependencies allowing parties in control of the ordering to make a profit by front-running others' transactions. In this work, we present the Decentralized Clock Network, a new approach for achieving fair transaction ordering. Users submit their transactions to the network's clocks, which run an agreement protocol that provides each transaction with a timestamp of receipt which is then used to define the transactions' order. By separating agreement from ordering, our protocol is efficient and has a simpler design compared to other available solutions. Moreover, our protocol brings to the blockchain world the paradigm of asynchronous fallback, where the algorithm operates with stronger fairness guarantees during periods of synchronous use, switching to an asynchronous mode only during times of increased network delay.

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arXiv2023

Dissecting the EIP-2930 Optional Access Lists

Ethereum introduced Transaction Access Lists (TALs) in 2020 to optimize gas costs during transaction execution. In this work, we present a comprehensive analysis of TALs in Ethereum, focusing on adoption, quality, and gas savings. Analyzing a full month of mainnet data with 31,954,474 transactions, we found that only 1.46% of transactions included a TAL, even though 42.6% of transactions would have benefited from it. On average, access lists can save around 0.29% of gas costs, equivalent to approximately 3,450 ETH (roughly US$ 5 Mio) per year. However, 19.6% of TALs included by transactions contained imperfections, causing almost 11.8% of transactions to pay more gas with TAL than without. We find that these inaccuracies are caused by the unknown state at the time of the TAL computation as well as imperfect TAL computations provided by all major Ethereum clients. We thus compare the gas savings when calculating the TAL at the beginning of the block vs. calculating it on the correct state, to find that the unknown state is a major source of TAL inaccuracies. Finally, we implement an ideal TAL computation for the Erigon client to highlight the cost of these flawed implementations.

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arXiv2023

Ethereum's Proposer-Builder Separation: Promises and Realities

With Ethereum's transition from Proof-of-Work to Proof-of-Stake in September 2022 came another paradigm shift, the Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) scheme. PBS was introduced to decouple the roles of selecting and ordering transactions in a block (i.e., the builder), from those validating its contents and proposing the block to the network as the new head of the blockchain (i.e., the proposer). In this landscape, proposers are the validators in the Proof-of-Stake consensus protocol, while now relying on specialized block builders for creating blocks with the highest value for the proposer. Additionally, relays act as mediators between builders and proposers. We study PBS adoption and show that the current landscape exhibits significant centralization amongst the builders and relays. Further, we explore whether PBS effectively achieves its intended objectives of enabling hobbyist validators to maximize block profitability and preventing censorship. Our findings reveal that although PBS grants validators the opportunity to access optimized and competitive blocks, it tends to stimulate censorship rather than reduce it. Additionally, we demonstrate that relays do not consistently uphold their commitments and may prove unreliable. Specifically, proposers do not always receive the complete promised value, and the censorship or filtering capabilities pledged by relays exhibit significant gaps.

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