arXiv subjects

Lionel Wong

Publications and source records attributed to Lionel Wong.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

On Benchmarking Human-Like Intelligence in Machines

Recent advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) have yielded powerful computational models that, by learning from vast amounts of human-generated data, are increasingly posited as approximate models of human cognition. However, we argue that many current evaluation paradigms for AI are insufficient for assessing human-like cognitive capabilities in these models. We identify a set of key shortcomings: a lack of human-validated labels, inadequate representation of human response variability and uncertainty, and reliance on simplified and ecologically invalid tasks. We support our claims by conducting a human evaluation study on nine existing AI benchmarks, suggesting major limitations in task and label designs. To address these limitations, we propose five concrete recommendations for future AI evaluation efforts that will enable more rigorous and meaningful understanding of human-like cognitive capacities in AI models.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Generation and Evaluation in the Human Invention Process through the Lens of Game Design

The human ability to learn rules and solve problems has been a central concern of cognitive science research since the field's earliest days. But we do not just follow rules and solve problems given to us by others: we modify those rules, create new problems, and set new goals and tasks for ourselves and others. Arguably, even more than rule following and problem solving, human intelligence is about creatively breaking and stretching the rules, changing the game, and inventing new problems worth thinking about. Creating a good rule or a good problem depends not just on the ideas one can think up but on how one evaluates such proposals. Here, we study invention through the lens of game design. We focus particularly on the early stages of novice, "everyday" game creation, where the stakes are low. We draw on a dataset of over 450 human created games, created by participants who saw an initial seed set of two-player grid-based strategy games. We consider two different cognitive mechanisms that may be at work during the early processes of intuitive game invention: an associative proposal based on previous games one has seen and compute-bounded model-based evaluation that an everyday game creator may use to refine their initial draft proposals. In our preliminary work, we conduct a model-based analysis of how people invented new games based on prior experience and find that generated games are best described by a model which incorporates model-based estimates of game quality at a population level. Our work points to how human invention is based not only on what people propose, but how they evaluate and offers a computational toolkit to scale empirical studies of model-based simulation in open-ended human innovation.

cs.HC↗

arXiv2026

People use fast and flat simulation to reason about new games

Games have long been a microcosm for studying planning and reasoning in both natural and artificial intelligence (AI), often focusing on expert-level or even super-human play. But real life also pushes human intelligence along a different frontier, requiring people to flexibly navigate decision-making problems that they have never thought about before. Here, we use novice gameplay to study how people reason about new problem settings. Through a series of large-scale behavioral studies with over 1000 participants and 121 two-player strategic board games (almost all novel to our participants), we show that people are systematic and adaptively rational in how they play a game for the first time, or evaluate a game (e.g., how fair or how fun it is likely to be) before they have played it even once. We explain these capacities via a computational cognitive model that we call the 'Intuitive Gamer', a model based on mechanisms of fast and flat (depth-limited) goal-directed probabilistic simulation. Our work offers new insights into how people rapidly evaluate, act, and make suggestions when encountering novel problems, and could inform the design of more flexible and human-like AI systems that can determine not just how to solve new tasks, but whether a task is worth thinking about at all.

q-bio.NC↗

arXiv2026

MedRedFlag: Investigating how LLMs Redirect Misconceptions in Real-World Health Communication

Real-world health questions from patients often unintentionally embed false assumptions or premises. In such cases, safe medical communication typically involves redirection: addressing the implicit misconception and then responding to the underlying patient context, rather than the original question. While large language models (LLMs) are increasingly being used by lay users for medical advice, they have not yet been tested for this crucial competency. Therefore, in this work, we investigate how LLMs react to false premises embedded within real-world health questions. We develop a semi-automated pipeline to curate MedRedFlag, a dataset of 1100+ questions sourced from Reddit that require redirection. We then systematically compare responses from state-of-the-art LLMs to those from clinicians. Our analysis reveals that LLMs often fail to redirect problematic questions, even when the problematic premise is detected, and provide answers that could lead to suboptimal medical decision making. Our benchmark and results reveal a novel and substantial gap in how LLMs perform under the conditions of real-world health communication, highlighting critical safety concerns for patient-facing medical AI systems. Code and dataset are available at https://github.com/srsambara-1/MedRedFlag.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

Evaluating Language Models' Evaluations of Games

Reasoning is not just about solving problems -- it is also about evaluating which problems are worth solving at all. Evaluations of artificial intelligence (AI) systems primarily focused on problem solving, historically by studying how models play games such as chess and Go. In this paper, we advocate for a new paradigm that assesses AI systems' evaluation of games. First, we introduce a formalism for evaluating such evaluations. We then leverage a large-scale dataset of over 100 novel board games and over 450 human judgments to compare evaluations produced by modern language and reasoning models against those of people and symbolic computational agents. We consider two kinds of evaluative queries: assessing the payoff (or fairness) and the funness of games. These queries span two dimensions relevant to the design of evaluations of AI evaluations: how complex a query is to compute and how difficult a query is to quantify. Our results show that reasoning models are generally more aligned to people in their evaluations of games than non-reasoning language models. However, we observe a non-monotonic relationship: as models get closer to game-theoretic optimal, their fit to human data weakens. We also observe more "jaggedness" across models for assessing funness, in line with the greater difficulty of quantifying this query. Across queries and games, reasoning models show highly variable and unpredictable resource usage when assessing queries, pointing to the importance of imbuing more resource-rational meta-reasoning in language and reasoning models.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

Medical Model Synthesis Architectures: A Case Study

Medicine is rife with high-stakes uncertainty. Doctors routinely make clinical judgments and decisions that juggle many fundamental unknowns, like predictions about what might be causing a patients' symptoms or decisions about what treatment to try next. Despite increasing interest in developing AI systems that aid or even replace doctors in clinical settings, current systems struggle with calibrated reasoning under uncertainty, and are often deeply opaque about their reasoning. We propose a framework for AI systems that can make practically useful but formally transparent clinical predictions under uncertainty. Given a clinical situation, our framework (MedMSA) uses language models to retrieve relevant prior knowledge, but constructs a formal probabilistic model to support calibrated and verifiable inferences under uncertainty. We show how an initial proof-of-concept of this framework can be used for differential diagnosis, producing an uncertainty-weighted list of potential diagnoses that could explain a patients' symptoms, and discuss future applications and directions for applying this framework more generally for safe clinical collaborations.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

What Patients Really Ask: Exploring the Effect of False Assumptions in Patient Information Seeking

Patients are increasingly using large language models (LLMs) to seek answers to their healthcare-related questions. However, benchmarking efforts in LLMs for question answering often focus on medical exam questions, which differ significantly in style and content from the questions patients actually raise in real life. To bridge this gap, we sourced data from Google's People Also Ask feature by querying the top 200 prescribed medications in the United States, curating a dataset of medical questions people commonly ask. A considerable portion of the collected questions contains incorrect assumptions and dangerous intentions. We demonstrate that the emergence of these corrupted questions is not uniformly random and depends heavily on the degree of incorrectness in the history of questions that led to their appearance. Current LLMs that perform strongly on other benchmarks struggle to identify incorrect assumptions in everyday questions.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

Resource Rational Contractualism Should Guide AI Alignment

AI systems will soon have to navigate human environments and make decisions that affect people and other AI agents whose goals and values diverge. Contractualist alignment proposes grounding those decisions in agreements that diverse stakeholders would endorse under the right conditions, yet securing such agreement at scale remains costly and slow -- even for advanced AI. We therefore propose Resource-Rational Contractualism (RRC): a framework where AI systems approximate the agreements rational parties would form by drawing on a toolbox of normatively-grounded, cognitively-inspired heuristics that trade effort for accuracy. An RRC-aligned agent would not only operate efficiently, but also be equipped to dynamically adapt to and interpret the ever-changing human social world.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Modeling Open-World Cognition as On-Demand Synthesis of Probabilistic Models

When faced with novel situations, people are able to marshal relevant considerations from a wide range of background knowledge and put these to use in inferences and predictions. What permits us to draw in globally relevant information and reason over it coherently? Here, we explore the hypothesis that people use a combination of distributed and symbolic representations to construct bespoke mental models tailored to novel situations. We propose a computational implementation of this idea -- a ``Model Synthesis Architecture'' (MSA) -- using language models to implement global relevance-based retrieval and model synthesis and probabilistic programs to implement bespoke, coherent world models. We evaluate our MSA as a model of human judgments on a novel reasoning dataset. The dataset -- built around a `Model Olympics` domain of sports vignettes -- tests models' capacity for human-like, open-ended reasoning by requiring (i) judgments about novel causal structures described in language; (ii) drawing on large bodies of background knowledge; and (iii) doing both in light of observations that introduce arbitrary novel variables. Our MSA approach captures human judgments better than language model-only baselines, under both direct and chain-of-thought generations from the LM that supports model synthesis. These results suggest that MSAs can be implemented in a way that mirrors people's ability to deliver locally coherent reasoning over globally relevant variables, offering a path to understanding and replicating human reasoning in open-ended domains.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2025

Language-Informed Synthesis of Rational Agent Models for Grounded Theory-of-Mind Reasoning On-The-Fly

Drawing real world social inferences usually requires taking into account information from multiple modalities. Language is a particularly powerful source of information in social settings, especially in novel situations where language can provide both abstract information about the environment dynamics and concrete specifics about an agent that cannot be easily visually observed. In this paper, we propose Language-Informed Rational Agent Synthesis (LIRAS), a framework for drawing context-specific social inferences that integrate linguistic and visual inputs. LIRAS frames multimodal social reasoning as a process of constructing structured but situation-specific agent and environment representations - leveraging multimodal language models to parse language and visual inputs into unified symbolic representations, over which a Bayesian inverse planning engine can be run to produce granular probabilistic judgments. On a range of existing and new social reasoning tasks derived from cognitive science experiments, we find that our model (instantiated with a comparatively lightweight VLM) outperforms ablations and state-of-the-art models in capturing human judgments across all domains.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2025

Retrieval-augmented systems can be dangerous medical communicators

Patients have long sought health information online, and increasingly, they are turning to generative AI to answer their health-related queries. Given the high stakes of the medical domain, techniques like retrieval-augmented generation and citation grounding have been widely promoted as methods to reduce hallucinations and improve the accuracy of AI-generated responses and have been widely adopted into search engines. This paper argues that even when these methods produce literally accurate content drawn from source documents sans hallucinations, they can still be highly misleading. Patients may derive significantly different interpretations from AI-generated outputs than they would from reading the original source material, let alone consulting a knowledgeable clinician. Through a large-scale query analysis on topics including disputed diagnoses and procedure safety, we support our argument with quantitative and qualitative evidence of the suboptimal answers resulting from current systems. In particular, we highlight how these models tend to decontextualize facts, omit critical relevant sources, and reinforce patient misconceptions or biases. We propose a series of recommendations -- such as the incorporation of communication pragmatics and enhanced comprehension of source documents -- that could help mitigate these issues and extend beyond the medical domain.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2025

Understanding Epistemic Language with a Language-augmented Bayesian Theory of Mind

How do people understand and evaluate claims about others' beliefs, even though these beliefs cannot be directly observed? In this paper, we introduce a cognitive model of epistemic language interpretation, grounded in Bayesian inferences about other agents' goals, beliefs, and intentions: a language-augmented Bayesian theory-of-mind (LaBToM). By translating natural language into an epistemic ``language-of-thought'' with grammar-constrained LLM decoding, then evaluating these translations against the inferences produced by inverting a generative model of rational action and perception, LaBToM captures graded plausibility judgments of epistemic claims. We validate our model in an experiment where participants watch an agent navigate a maze to find keys hidden in boxes needed to reach their goal, then rate sentences about the agent's beliefs. In contrast with multimodal LLMs (GPT-4o, Gemini Pro) and ablated models, our model correlates highly with human judgments for a wide range of expressions, including modal language, uncertainty expressions, knowledge claims, likelihood comparisons, and attributions of false belief.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2025

People use fast, goal-directed simulation to reason about novel games

People can evaluate features of problems and their potential solutions well before we can effectively solve them. When considering a game we have never played, for instance, we might infer whether it is likely to be challenging, fair, or fun simply from hearing the game rules, prior to deciding whether to invest time in learning the game or trying to play it well. Many studies of game play have focused on optimality and expertise, characterizing how people and computational models play based on moderate to extensive search and after playing a game dozens (if not thousands or millions) of times. Here, we study how people reason about a range of simple but novel Connect-N style board games. We ask people to judge how fair and how fun the games are from very little experience: just thinking about the game for a minute or so, before they have ever actually played with anyone else, and we propose a resource-limited model that captures their judgments using only a small number of partial game simulations and almost no look-ahead search.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Building Machines that Learn and Think with People

What do we want from machine intelligence? We envision machines that are not just tools for thought, but partners in thought: reasonable, insightful, knowledgeable, reliable, and trustworthy systems that think with us. Current artificial intelligence (AI) systems satisfy some of these criteria, some of the time. In this Perspective, we show how the science of collaborative cognition can be put to work to engineer systems that really can be called ``thought partners,'' systems built to meet our expectations and complement our limitations. We lay out several modes of collaborative thought in which humans and AI thought partners can engage and propose desiderata for human-compatible thought partnerships. Drawing on motifs from computational cognitive science, we motivate an alternative scaling path for the design of thought partners and ecosystems around their use through a Bayesian lens, whereby the partners we construct actively build and reason over models of the human and world.

cs.HC↗

arXiv2024

Grounding Language about Belief in a Bayesian Theory-of-Mind

Despite the fact that beliefs are mental states that cannot be directly observed, humans talk about each others' beliefs on a regular basis, often using rich compositional language to describe what others think and know. What explains this capacity to interpret the hidden epistemic content of other minds? In this paper, we take a step towards an answer by grounding the semantics of belief statements in a Bayesian theory-of-mind: By modeling how humans jointly infer coherent sets of goals, beliefs, and plans that explain an agent's actions, then evaluating statements about the agent's beliefs against these inferences via epistemic logic, our framework provides a conceptual role semantics for belief, explaining the gradedness and compositionality of human belief attributions, as well as their intimate connection with goals and plans. We evaluate this framework by studying how humans attribute goals and beliefs while watching an agent solve a doors-and-keys gridworld puzzle that requires instrumental reasoning about hidden objects. In contrast to pure logical deduction, non-mentalizing baselines, and mentalizing that ignores the role of instrumental plans, our model provides a much better fit to human goal and belief attributions, demonstrating the importance of theory-of-mind for a semantics of belief.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2024

Finding structure in logographic writing with library learning

One hallmark of human language is its combinatoriality -- reusing a relatively small inventory of building blocks to create a far larger inventory of increasingly complex structures. In this paper, we explore the idea that combinatoriality in language reflects a human inductive bias toward representational efficiency in symbol systems. We develop a computational framework for discovering structure in a writing system. Built on top of state-of-the-art library learning and program synthesis techniques, our computational framework discovers known linguistic structures in the Chinese writing system and reveals how the system evolves towards simplification under pressures for representational efficiency. We demonstrate how a library learning approach, utilizing learned abstractions and compression, may help reveal the fundamental computational principles that underlie the creation of combinatorial structures in human cognition, and offer broader insights into the evolution of efficient communication systems.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2024

LILO: Learning Interpretable Libraries by Compressing and Documenting Code

While large language models (LLMs) now excel at code generation, a key aspect of software development is the art of refactoring: consolidating code into libraries of reusable and readable programs. In this paper, we introduce LILO, a neurosymbolic framework that iteratively synthesizes, compresses, and documents code to build libraries tailored to particular problem domains. LILO combines LLM-guided program synthesis with recent algorithmic advances in automated refactoring from Stitch: a symbolic compression system that efficiently identifies optimal lambda abstractions across large code corpora. To make these abstractions interpretable, we introduce an auto-documentation (AutoDoc) procedure that infers natural language names and docstrings based on contextual examples of usage. In addition to improving human readability, we find that AutoDoc boosts performance by helping LILO's synthesizer to interpret and deploy learned abstractions. We evaluate LILO on three inductive program synthesis benchmarks for string editing, scene reasoning, and graphics composition. Compared to existing neural and symbolic methods - including the state-of-the-art library learning algorithm DreamCoder - LILO solves more complex tasks and learns richer libraries that are grounded in linguistic knowledge.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2023

Learning adaptive planning representations with natural language guidance

Effective planning in the real world requires not only world knowledge, but the ability to leverage that knowledge to build the right representation of the task at hand. Decades of hierarchical planning techniques have used domain-specific temporal action abstractions to support efficient and accurate planning, almost always relying on human priors and domain knowledge to decompose hard tasks into smaller subproblems appropriate for a goal or set of goals. This paper describes Ada (Action Domain Acquisition), a framework for automatically constructing task-specific planning representations using task-general background knowledge from language models (LMs). Starting with a general-purpose hierarchical planner and a low-level goal-conditioned policy, Ada interactively learns a library of planner-compatible high-level action abstractions and low-level controllers adapted to a particular domain of planning tasks. On two language-guided interactive planning benchmarks (Mini Minecraft and ALFRED Household Tasks), Ada strongly outperforms other approaches that use LMs for sequential decision-making, offering more accurate plans and better generalization to complex tasks.

cs.AI↗