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Lisa-Maria Neudert

Publications and source records attributed to Lisa-Maria Neudert.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

InfoOps Bench: A live information operations safety benchmark

In this paper we present an active, constantly updated AI benchmark which measures the integrity of frontier language models against being co-opted for use by authoritarian state "information operations": intentional, coordinated activities by one state to influence public opinion and information ecosystems in another state. These information operations are a well documented, persistent threat against contemporary democracy. Our benchmark is based on real examples from over 2,100 information operations drawn from a live monitoring pipeline which tracks online information assets with links to authoritarian regimes. Alongside this paper, we also release a companion website that updates the benchmark weekly with new claims. The dynamic nature of this public facing benchmark makes it resistant to saturation. In the benchmark, we test 17 models from 8 providers across four prompt framings. We find that most models can be co-opted for information operations at least some of the time. Integrity scores, defined as the share of judged responses in which the model neither preserved nor amplified the claim, range from 9.3% to 91%, an 81.7-percentage-point spread not explained by model size. Models approach participation in information operations in a variety of ways. Some models fabricate details and produce output more harmful than the original input claim; others make claims less harmful even while complying and producing some output. Fact-checking rates vary from 3.2% to 80.8%. Integrity against information operations is at least partly related to refusal to produce content even for benign claims, illustrating the challenge of balancing model usability with safety. Overall, our results show the potential for contemporary information operations to be substantially aided by frontier AI models.

cs.AI

Junk News & Information Sharing During the 2019 UK General Election

Today, an estimated 75% of the British public access information about politics and public life online, and 40% do so via social media. With this context in mind, we investigate information sharing patterns over social media in the lead-up to the 2019 UK General Elections, and ask: (1) What type of political news and information were social media users sharing on Twitter ahead of the vote? (2) How much of it is extremist, sensationalist, or conspiratorial junk news? (3) How much public engagement did these sites get on Facebook in the weeks leading and (4) What are the most common narratives and themes relayed by junk news outlets

cs.SI

Polarization, Partisanship and Junk News Consumption over Social Media in the US

What kinds of social media users read junk news? We examine the distribution of the most significant sources of junk news in the three months before President Donald Trump first State of the Union Address. Drawing on a list of sources that consistently publish political news and information that is extremist, sensationalist, conspiratorial, masked commentary, fake news and other forms of junk news, we find that the distribution of such content is unevenly spread across the ideological spectrum. We demonstrate that (1) on Twitter, a network of Trump supporters shares the widest range of known junk news sources and circulates more junk news than all the other groups put together; (2) on Facebook, extreme hard right pages, distinct from Republican pages, share the widest range of known junk news sources and circulate more junk news than all the other audiences put together; (3) on average, the audiences for junk news on Twitter share a wider range of known junk news sources than audiences on Facebook public pages.

cs.SI

Social Media, News and Political Information during the US Election: Was Polarizing Content Concentrated in Swing States?

US voters shared large volumes of polarizing political news and information in the form of links to content from Russian, WikiLeaks and junk news sources. Was this low quality political information distributed evenly around the country, or concentrated in swing states and particular parts of the country? In this data memo we apply a tested dictionary of sources about political news and information being shared over Twitter over a ten day period around the 2016 Presidential Election. Using self-reported location information, we place a third of users by state and create a simple index for the distribution of polarizing content around the country. We find that (1) nationally, Twitter users got more misinformation, polarizing and conspiratorial content than professionally produced news. (2) Users in some states, however, shared more polarizing political news and information than users in other states. (3) Average levels of misinformation were higher in swing states than in uncontested states, even when weighted for the relative size of the user population in each state. We conclude with some observations about the impact of strategically disseminated polarizing information on public life.

cs.SI