arXiv subjects

Lokranjan Lakshmikanthan

Publications and source records attributed to Lokranjan Lakshmikanthan.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Hearing is Believing? Evaluating and Analyzing Audio Language Model Sycophancy with SYAUDIO

Audio Language Models (ALMs) have recently shown strong capabilities in unified reasoning over speech, sound, and natural language; yet they inherit behavioral issues observed in Large Language Models, including sycophancy--the tendency to agree with user assertions even when they contradict objective evidence. While sycophancy has been extensively studied in text and vision-language models, its manifestation in audio-conditioned reasoning remains largely unexplored, despite the need for ALMs to rely on auditory cues such as acoustic events, speaker characteristics, and speech rate. To address this gap, we introduce SYAUDIO, the first benchmark dedicated to evaluating sycophancy in ALMs, consisting of 4,319 audio questions spanning Audio Perception, Audio Reasoning, Audio Math, and Audio Ethics. Built upon established audio benchmarks and augmented with TTS-generated arithmetic and moral reasoning tasks, SYAUDIO enables systematic evaluation across multiple domains and sycophancy types with carefully verified data quality. Furthermore, we analyze audio-specific sycophancy under realistic conditions involving noise and rate, and demonstrate that supervised fine-tuning with chain-of-thought data is an effective mitigation strategy for reducing sycophantic behavior in ALMs.

cs.SD↗

arXiv2026

Last-iterate Convergence for Symmetric, General-sum, $2 \times 2$ Games Under The Exponential Weights Dynamic

We conduct a comprehensive analysis of the discrete-time exponential-weights dynamic with a constant step size on all general-sum and symmetric $2 \times 2$ normal-form games, i.e. games with $2$ pure strategies per player, and where the ensuing payoff tuple is of the form $(A,A^\top)$ (where $A$ is the $2 \times 2$ payoff matrix corresponding to the first player). Such symmetric games commonly arise in real-world interactions between 'symmetric" agents who have identically defined utility functions -- such as Bertrand competition and multi-agent performative prediction, and display a rich multiplicity of equilibria despite the seemingly simple setting. Somewhat surprisingly, we show through a first-principles analysis that the exponential weights dynamic, which is popular in online learning, converges in the last iterate for such games regardless of initialization with an appropriately chosen step size. For certain games and/or initializations, we further show that the convergence rate is in fact exponential and holds for any step size. We illustrate our theory with extensive simulations and applications to the aforementioned game-theoretic interactions. In the case of multi-agent performative prediction, we formulate a new "mortgage competition" game between lenders (i.e. banks) who interact with a population of customers, and show that it fits into our framework.

cs.GT↗