arXiv subjects

Long Tran-Thanh

Publications and source records attributed to Long Tran-Thanh.

At least 55 records · Page 3Linked to original sources

arXiv2021

Fuzzy c-Means Clustering for Persistence Diagrams

Persistence diagrams concisely represent the topology of a point cloud whilst having strong theoretical guarantees, but the question of how to best integrate this information into machine learning workflows remains open. In this paper we extend the ubiquitous Fuzzy c-Means (FCM) clustering algorithm to the space of persistence diagrams, enabling unsupervised learning that automatically captures the topological structure of data without the topological prior knowledge or additional processing of persistence diagrams that many other techniques require. We give theoretical convergence guarantees that correspond to the Euclidean case, and empirically demonstrate the capability of our algorithm to capture topological information via the fuzzy RAND index. We end with experiments on two datasets that utilise both the topological and fuzzy nature of our algorithm: pre-trained model selection in machine learning and lattices structures from materials science. As pre-trained models can perform well on multiple tasks, selecting the best model is a naturally fuzzy problem; we show that fuzzy clustering persistence diagrams allows for model selection using the topology of decision boundaries. In materials science, we classify transformed lattice structure datasets for the first time, whilst the probabilistic membership values let us rank candidate lattices in a scenario where further investigation requires expensive laboratory time and expertise.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2021

Sequential Choice Bandits with Feedback for Personalizing users' experience

In this work, we study sequential choice bandits with feedback. We propose bandit algorithms for a platform that personalizes users' experience to maximize its rewards. For each action directed to a given user, the platform is given a positive reward, which is a non-decreasing function of the action, if this action is below the user's threshold. Users are equipped with a patience budget, and actions that are above the threshold decrease the user's patience. When all patience is lost, the user abandons the platform. The platform attempts to learn the thresholds of the users in order to maximize its rewards, based on two different feedback models describing the information pattern available to the platform at each action. We define a notion of regret by determining the best action to be taken when the platform knows that the user's threshold is in a given interval. We then propose bandit algorithms for the two feedback models and show that upper and lower bounds on the regret are of the order of $\tilde{O}(N^{2/3})$ and $\tildeΩ(N^{2/3})$, respectively, where $N$ is the total number of users. Finally, we show that the waiting time of any user before receiving a personalized experience is uniform in $N$.

stat.ML↗

arXiv2020

Learning Optimal Temperature Region for Solving Mixed Integer Functional DCOPs

Distributed Constraint Optimization Problems (DCOPs) are an important framework for modeling coordinated decision-making problems in multi-agent systems with a set of discrete variables. Later works have extended DCOPs to model problems with a set of continuous variables, named Functional DCOPs (F-DCOPs). In this paper, we combine both of these frameworks into the Mixed Integer Functional DCOP (MIF-DCOP) framework that can deal with problems regardless of their variables' type. We then propose a novel algorithm $-$ Distributed Parallel Simulated Annealing (DPSA), where agents cooperatively learn the optimal parameter configuration for the algorithm while also solving the given problem using the learned knowledge. Finally, we empirically evaluate our approach in DCOP, F-DCOP, and MIF-DCOP settings and show that DPSA produces solutions of significantly better quality than the state-of-the-art non-exact algorithms in their corresponding settings.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2020

AED: An Anytime Evolutionary DCOP Algorithm

Evolutionary optimization is a generic population-based metaheuristic that can be adapted to solve a wide variety of optimization problems and has proven very effective for combinatorial optimization problems. However, the potential of this metaheuristic has not been utilized in Distributed Constraint Optimization Problems (DCOPs), a well-known class of combinatorial optimization problems prevalent in Multi-Agent Systems. In this paper, we present a novel population-based algorithm, Anytime Evolutionary DCOP (AED), that uses evolutionary optimization to solve DCOPs. In AED, the agents cooperatively construct an initial set of random solutions and gradually improve them through a new mechanism that considers an optimistic approximation of local benefits. Moreover, we present a new anytime update mechanism for AED that identifies the best among a distributed set of candidate solutions and notifies all the agents when a new best is found. In our theoretical analysis, we prove that AED is anytime. Finally, we present empirical results indicating AED outperforms the state-of-the-art DCOP algorithms in terms of solution quality.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2020

Zealotry and Influence Maximization in the Voter Model: When to Target Zealots?

In this paper, we study influence maximization in the voter model in the presence of biased voters (or zealots) on complex networks. Under what conditions should an external controller with finite budget who aims at maximizing its influence over the system target zealots? Our analysis, based on both analytical and numerical results, shows a rich diagram of preferences and degree-dependencies of allocations to zealots and normal agents varying with the budget. We find that when we have a large budget or for low levels of zealotry, optimal strategies should give larger allocations to zealots and allocations are positively correlated with node degree. In contrast, for low budgets or highly-biased zealots, optimal strategies give higher allocations to normal agents, with some residual allocations to zealots, and allocations to both types of agents decrease with node degree. Our results emphasize that heterogeneity in agent properties strongly affects strategies for influence maximization on heterogeneous networks.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2019

Path Planning Problems with Side Observations-When Colonels Play Hide-and-Seek

Resource allocation games such as the famous Colonel Blotto (CB) and Hide-and-Seek (HS) games are often used to model a large variety of practical problems, but only in their one-shot versions. Indeed, due to their extremely large strategy space, it remains an open question how one can efficiently learn in these games. In this work, we show that the online CB and HS games can be cast as path planning problems with side-observations (SOPPP): at each stage, a learner chooses a path on a directed acyclic graph and suffers the sum of losses that are adversarially assigned to the corresponding edges; and she then receives semi-bandit feedback with side-observations (i.e., she observes the losses on the chosen edges plus some others). We propose a novel algorithm, EXP3-OE, the first-of-its-kind with guaranteed efficient running time for SOPPP without requiring any auxiliary oracle. We provide an expected-regret bound of EXP3-OE in SOPPP matching the order of the best benchmark in the literature. Moreover, we introduce additional assumptions on the observability model under which we can further improve the regret bounds of EXP3-OE. We illustrate the benefit of using EXP3-OE in SOPPP by applying it to the online CB and HS games.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Path Planning Problems with Side Observations-When Colonels Play Hide-and-Seek

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Defending with Shared Resources on a Network

In this paper we consider a defending problem on a network. In the model, the defender holds a total defending resource of R, which can be distributed to the nodes of the network. The defending resource allocated to a node can be shared by its neighbors. There is a weight associated with every edge that represents the efficiency defending resources are shared between neighboring nodes. We consider the setting when each attack can affect not only the target node, but its neighbors as well. Assuming that nodes in the network have different treasures to defend and different defending requirements, the defender aims at allocating the defending resource to the nodes to minimize the loss due to attack. We give polynomial time exact algorithms for two important special cases of the network defending problem. For the case when an attack can only affect the target node, we present an LP-based exact algorithm. For the case when defending resources cannot be shared, we present a max-flow-based exact algorithm. We show that the general problem is NP-hard, and we give a 2-approximation algorithm based on LP-rounding. Moreover, by giving a matching lower bound of 2 on the integrality gap on the LP relaxation, we show that our rounding is tight.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Streaming Bayesian Inference for Crowdsourced Classification

A key challenge in crowdsourcing is inferring the ground truth from noisy and unreliable data. To do so, existing approaches rely on collecting redundant information from the crowd, and aggregating it with some probabilistic method. However, oftentimes such methods are computationally inefficient, are restricted to some specific settings, or lack theoretical guarantees. In this paper, we revisit the problem of binary classification from crowdsourced data. Specifically we propose Streaming Bayesian Inference for Crowdsourcing (SBIC), a new algorithm that does not suffer from any of these limitations. First, SBIC has low complexity and can be used in a real-time online setting. Second, SBIC has the same accuracy as the best state-of-the-art algorithms in all settings. Third, SBIC has provable asymptotic guarantees both in the online and offline settings.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2019

Manipulating a Learning Defender and Ways to Counteract

In Stackelberg security games when information about the attacker's payoffs is uncertain, algorithms have been proposed to learn the optimal defender commitment by interacting with the attacker and observing their best responses. In this paper, we show that, however, these algorithms can be easily manipulated if the attacker responds untruthfully. As a key finding, attacker manipulation normally leads to the defender learning a maximin strategy, which effectively renders the learning attempt meaningless as to compute a maximin strategy requires no additional information about the other player at all. We then apply a game-theoretic framework at a higher level to counteract such manipulation, in which the defender commits to a policy that specifies her strategy commitment according to the learned information. We provide a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the optimal such policy, and in addition, a heuristic approach that applies even when the attacker's payoff space is infinite or completely unknown. Empirical evaluation shows that our approaches can improve the defender's utility significantly as compared to the situation when attacker manipulation is ignored.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Selfish Mining in Proof-of-Work Blockchain with Multiple Miners: An Empirical Evaluation

Proof-of-Work blockchain, despite its numerous benefits, is still not an entirely secure technology due to the existence of Selfish Mining (SM) strategies that can disrupt the system and its mining economy. While the effect of SM has been studied mostly in a two-miners scenario, it has not been investigated in a more practical context where there are multiple malicious miners individually performing SM. To fill this gap, we carry out an empirical study that separately accounts for different numbers of SM miners (who always perform SM) and strategic miners (who choose either SM or Nakamoto's mining protocol depending on which maximises their individual mining reward). Our result shows that SM is generally more effective as the number of SM miners increases, however its effectiveness does not vary in the presence of a large number of strategic miners. Under specific mining power distributions, we also demonstrate that multiple miners can perform SM and simultaneously gain higher mining rewards than they should. Surprisingly, we also show that the more strategic miners there are, the more robust the systems become. Since blockchain miners should naturally be seen as self-interested strategic miners, our findings encourage blockchain system developers and engineers to attract as many miners as possible to prevent SM and similar behaviour.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2019

Social Cost Guarantees in Smart Route Guidance

We model and study the problem of assigning traffic in an urban road network infrastructure. In our model, each driver submits their intended destination and is assigned a route to follow that minimizes the social cost (i.e., travel distance of all the drivers). We assume drivers are strategic and try to manipulate the system (i.e., misreport their intended destination and/or deviate from the assigned route) if they can reduce their travel distance by doing so. Such strategic behavior is highly undesirable as it can lead to an overall suboptimal traffic assignment and cause congestion. To alleviate this problem, we develop moneyless mechanisms that are resilient to manipulation by the agents and offer provable approximation guarantees on the social cost obtained by the solution. We then empirically test the mechanisms studied in the paper, showing that they can be effectively used in practice in order to compute manipulation resistant traffic allocations.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Imitative Follower Deception in Stackelberg Games

Information uncertainty is one of the major challenges facing applications of game theory. In the context of Stackelberg games, various approaches have been proposed to deal with the leader's incomplete knowledge about the follower's payoffs, typically by gathering information from the leader's interaction with the follower. Unfortunately, these approaches rely crucially on the assumption that the follower will not strategically exploit this information asymmetry, i.e., the follower behaves truthfully during the interaction according to their actual payoffs. As we show in this paper, the follower may have strong incentives to deceitfully imitate the behavior of a different follower type and, in doing this, benefit significantly from inducing the leader into choosing a highly suboptimal strategy. This raises a fundamental question: how to design a leader strategy in the presence of a deceitful follower? To answer this question, we put forward a basic model of Stackelberg games with (imitative) follower deception and show that the leader is indeed able to reduce the loss due to follower deception with carefully designed policies. We then provide a systematic study of the problem of computing the optimal leader policy and draw a relatively complete picture of the complexity landscape; essentially matching positive and negative complexity results are provided for natural variants of the model. Our intractability results are in sharp contrast to the situation with no deception, where the leader's optimal strategy can be computed in polynomial time, and thus illustrate the intrinsic difficulty of handling follower deception. Through simulations we also examine the benefit of considering follower deception in randomly generated games.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2018

On the Inducibility of Stackelberg Equilibrium for Security Games

Strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is the standard solution concept of Stackelberg security games. As opposed to the weak Stackelberg equilibrium (WSE), the SSE assumes that the follower breaks ties in favor of the leader and this is widely acknowledged and justified by the assertion that the defender can often induce the attacker to choose a preferred action by making an infinitesimal adjustment to her strategy. Unfortunately, in security games with resource assignment constraints, the assertion might not be valid; it is possible that the defender cannot induce the desired outcome. As a result, many results claimed in the literature may be overly optimistic. To remedy, we first formally define the utility guarantee of a defender strategy and provide examples to show that the utility of SSE can be higher than its utility guarantee. Second, inspired by the analysis of leader's payoff by Von Stengel and Zamir (2004), we provide the solution concept called the inducible Stackelberg equilibrium (ISE), which owns the highest utility guarantee and always exists. Third, we show the conditions when ISE coincides with SSE and the fact that in general case, SSE can be extremely worse with respect to utility guarantee. Moreover, introducing the ISE does not invalidate existing algorithmic results as the problem of computing an ISE polynomially reduces to that of computing an SSE. We also provide an algorithmic implementation for computing ISE, with which our experiments unveil the empirical advantage of the ISE over the SSE.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2018

Unifying the stochastic and the adversarial Bandits with Knapsack

This paper investigates the adversarial Bandits with Knapsack (BwK) online learning problem, where a player repeatedly chooses to perform an action, pays the corresponding cost, and receives a reward associated with the action. The player is constrained by the maximum budget $B$ that can be spent to perform actions, and the rewards and the costs of the actions are assigned by an adversary. This problem has only been studied in the restricted setting where the reward of an action is greater than the cost of the action, while we provide a solution in the general setting. Namely, we propose EXP3.BwK, a novel algorithm that achieves order optimal regret. We also propose EXP3++.BwK, which is order optimal in the adversarial BwK setup, and incurs an almost optimal expected regret with an additional factor of $\log(B)$ in the stochastic BwK setup. Finally, we investigate the case of having large costs for the actions (i.e., they are comparable to the budget size $B$), and show that for the adversarial setting, achievable regret bounds can be significantly worse, compared to the case of having costs bounded by a constant, which is a common assumption within the BwK literature.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2018

Designing the Game to Play: Optimizing Payoff Structure in Security Games

Effective game-theoretic modeling of defender-attacker behavior is becoming increasingly important. In many domains, the defender functions not only as a player but also the designer of the game's payoff structure. We study Stackelberg Security Games where the defender, in addition to allocating defensive resources to protect targets from the attacker, can strategically manipulate the attacker's payoff under budget constraints in weighted L^p-norm form regarding the amount of change. Focusing on problems with weighted L^1-norm form constraint, we present (i) a mixed integer linear program-based algorithm with approximation guarantee; (ii) a branch-and-bound based algorithm with improved efficiency achieved by effective pruning; (iii) a polynomial time approximation scheme for a special but practical class of problems. In addition, we show that problems under budget constraints in L^0-norm form and weighted L^\infty-norm form can be solved in polynomial time. We provide an extensive experimental evaluation of our proposed algorithms.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2018

On the Preliminary Investigation of Selfish Mining Strategy with Multiple Selfish Miners

Eyal and Sirer's selfish mining strategy has demonstrated that Bitcoin system is not secure even if 50% of total mining power is held by altruistic miners. Since then, researchers have been investigating either to improve the efficiency of selfish mining, or how to defend against it, typically in a single selfish miner setting. Yet there is no research on a selfish mining strategies concurrently used by multiple miners in the system. The effectiveness of such selfish mining strategies and their required mining power under such multiple selfish miners setting remains unknown. In this paper, a preliminary investigation and our findings of selfish mining strategy used by multiple miners are reported. In addition, the conventional model of Bitcoin system is slightly redesigned to tackle its shortcoming: namely, a concurrency of individual mining processes. Although a theoretical analysis of selfish mining strategy under this setting is yet to be established, the current findings based on simulations is promising and of great interest. In particular, our work shows that a lower bound of power threshold required for selfish mining strategy decreases in proportion to a number of selfish miners. Moreover, there exist Nash equilibria where all selfish miners in the system do not change to an honest mining strategy and simultaneously earn their unfair amount of mining reward given that they equally possess sufficiently large mining power. Lastly, our new model yields a power threshold for mounting selfish mining strategy slightly greater than one from the conventional model.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2016

Efficiency of active learning for the allocation of workers on crowdsourced classification tasks

Crowdsourcing has been successfully employed in the past as an effective and cheap way to execute classification tasks and has therefore attracted the attention of the research community. However, we still lack a theoretical understanding of how to collect the labels from the crowd in an optimal way. In this paper we focus on the problem of worker allocation and compare two active learning policies proposed in the empirical literature with a uniform allocation of the available budget. To this end we make a thorough mathematical analysis of the problem and derive a new bound on the performance of the system. Furthermore we run extensive simulations in a more realistic scenario and show that our theoretical results hold in practice.

cs.HC↗