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Louis L Chen

Publications and source records attributed to Louis L Chen.

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Meeting Uncertain Threats with Feedback

Air and missile defense, naval force protection, and critical-infrastructure security require rapid allocation of scarce effectors against multiple incoming threats when neutralization is uncertain and observed only after a firing round. We formulate this defensive-allocation problem as a Markov decision process in which a commander assigns a fixed amount of effector capacity each round to heterogeneous threats under three operational objectives: minimizing expected threat-clearance time, maximizing the probability of clearance by a deadline, and maximizing effective assignments before a deadline. Rather than expensive full dynamic optimization, we study simple time-oblivious policies suited to fast implementation. Fair allocation, which ignores threat difficulty and spreads fire evenly, is highly effective: it is optimal for all three objectives under homogeneous threats or low-capacity engagements. Moreover, when effector capacity scales at least linearly with the number of threats, its threat-clearance time trails that of the optimal policy by at most a constant number of rounds. We further develop threat-difficulty-aware greedy policies for each objective, including a constant-factor guarantee for effective assignment maximization. Numerically, greedy policies are near-optimal across heterogeneous instances, while fair allocation remains a principled choice when threat difficulties are unknown.

math.OC

On the Adversarial Robustness of Benjamini Hochberg

The Benjamini-Hochberg (BH) procedure is widely used to control the false detection rate (FDR) in multiple testing. Applications of this control abound in drug discovery, forensics, anomaly detection, and, in particular, machine learning, ranging from nonparametric outlier detection to out-of-distribution detection and one-class classification methods. Considering this control could be relied upon in critical safety/security contexts, we investigate its adversarial robustness. More precisely, we study under what conditions BH does and does not exhibit adversarial robustness, we present a class of simple and easily implementable adversarial test-perturbation algorithms, and we perform computational experiments. With our algorithms, we demonstrate that there are conditions under which BH's control can be significantly broken with relatively few (even just one) test score perturbation(s), and provide non-asymptotic guarantees on the expected adversarial-adjustment to FDR. Our technical analysis involves a combinatorial reframing of the BH procedure as a ``balls into bins'' process, and drawing a connection to generalized ballot problems to facilitate an information-theoretic approach for deriving non-asymptotic lower bounds.

math.ST