arXiv subjects

Lucas Hanouz

Publications and source records attributed to Lucas Hanouz.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

On the cryptographic potential of single-qubit rotations

In the domain of quantum communication, cryptographic protocols often require users to have access to trusted qubit sources or detectors. Recently, it was shown that on an architecture called the Qline, several protocols can equivalently be performed by parties capable only of single-qubit rotations. In this work, we introduce two composably secure constructions that together show how in most quantum cryptographic protocols, parties traditionally required to perform trusted qubit preparation or measurement can delegate these tasks to an untrusted provider and instead rely on a trusted single-qubit rotation device. Our first construction implements single-qubit measurement and is universally applicable across any context. In contrast, our second construction, which addresses qubit preparation, relies on specific assumptions regarding the underlying protocol. We show, however, that these assumptions are inherently satisfied by the vast majority of common quantum cryptographic protocols. A notable consequence of our results is the formal validation of the Qline as a versatile architecture capable of supporting a wide range of single-qubit protocols.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2026

Toward multi-purpose quantum communication networks: from theory to protocol implementation

Most quantum communication networks around the world are used for a single task: quantum key distribution. In order to initiate the transition to multi-purpose quantum communication networks, we demonstrate the implementation of two different tasks on the same quantum key distribution hardware. Specifically, we focus on quantum oblivious transfer and quantum tokens. Our main contribution is to establish a methodology that greatly simplifies the expertise required to achieve the deployment, assess its performance, and evaluate its feasibility at a large scale. The implementation that we present is full-stack. It is based on a development framework that allows running user-defined applications both with simulated or real quantum communication backend. The hardware used for the implementation is VeriQloud's Qline. The simulation backend reproduces exactly the inputs and outputs of the real hardware, but also its losses and errors. It can therefore be used to validate the implementation before running it on the real hardware. The sources of the software that we use are fully open, making our research reproducible. The security of the implementations on real hardware are discussed with respect to security bounds previously known in the literature. We also discuss the engineering choices that we made in order to make the implementations feasible. By establishing a methodology to evaluate the performance and security of quantum communication protocols, we take a significant step towards industrializing and deploying large-scale, multi-purpose quantum communication networks.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2025

Security of a secret sharing protocol on the Qline

Secret sharing is a fundamental primitive in cryptography, and it can be achieved even with perfect security. However, the distribution of shares requires computational assumptions, which can compromise the overall security of the protocol. While traditional Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) can maintain security, its widespread deployment in general networks would incur prohibitive costs. In this work, we present a quantum protocol for distributing additive secret sharing of 0, which we prove to be composably secure within the Abstract Cryptography framework. Moreover, our protocol targets the Qline, a recently proposed quantum network architecture designed to simplify and reduce the cost of quantum communication. Once the shares are distributed, they can be used to securely perform a wide range of cryptographic tasks, including standard additive secret sharing, anonymous veto, and symmetric key establishment.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2023

Establishing shared secret keys on quantum line networks: protocol and security

We show the security of multi-user key establishment on a single line of quantum communication. More precisely, we consider a quantum communication architecture where the qubit generation and measurement happen at the two ends of the line, whilst intermediate parties are limited to single-qubit unitary transforms. This network topology has been previously introduced to implement quantum-assisted secret-sharing protocols for classical data, as well as the key establishment, and secure computing. This architecture has numerous advantages. The intermediate nodes are only using simplified hardware, which makes them easier to implement. Moreover, key establishment between arbitrary pairs of parties in the network does not require key routing through intermediate nodes. This is in contrast with quantum key distribution (QKD) networks for which non-adjacent nodes need intermediate ones to route keys, thereby revealing these keys to intermediate parties and consuming previously established ones to secure the routing process. Our main result is to show the security of key establishment on quantum line networks. We show the security using the framework of abstract cryptography. This immediately makes the security composable, showing that the keys can be used for encryption or other tasks.

quant-ph↗