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Luis F. Giraldo

Publications and source records attributed to Luis F. Giraldo.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

World Models Unlock Optimal Foraging Strategies in Reinforcement Learning Agents

Patch foraging involves the deliberate and planned process of determining the optimal time to depart from a resource-rich region and investigate potentially more beneficial alternatives. The Marginal Value Theorem (MVT) is frequently used to characterize this process, offering an optimality model for such foraging behaviors. Although this model has been widely used to make predictions in behavioral ecology, discovering the computational mechanisms that facilitate the emergence of optimal patch-foraging decisions in biological foragers remains under investigation. Here, we show that artificial foragers equipped with learned world models naturally converge to MVT-aligned strategies. Using a model-based reinforcement learning agent that acquires a parsimonious predictive representation of its environment, we demonstrate that anticipatory capabilities, rather than reward maximization alone, drive efficient patch-leaving behavior. Compared with standard model-free RL agents, these model-based agents exhibit decision patterns similar to many of their biological counterparts, suggesting that predictive world models can serve as a foundation for more explainable and biologically grounded decision-making in AI systems. Overall, our findings highlight the value of ecological optimality principles for advancing interpretable and adaptive AI.

cs.AI

The Illusion of Rationality: Tacit Bias and Strategic Dominance in Frontier LLM Negotiation Games

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly being deployed as autonomous agents on behalf of institutions and individuals in economic, political, and social settings that involve negotiation. Yet this trend carries significant risks if their strategic behavior is not well understood. In this work, we revisit the NegotiationArena framework and run controlled simulation experiments on a diverse set of frontier LLMs across three multi turn bargaining games: Buyer Seller, Multi turn Ultimatum, and Resource Exchange. We ask whether improved general reasoning capabilities lead to rational, unbiased, and convergent negotiation strategies. Our results challenge this assumption. We find that models diverge into distinct, model specific strategic equilibria rather than converging to a unified optimal behavior. Moreover, strong numerical and semantic anchoring effects persist: initial offers are highly predictive of final agreements, and models consistently generate biased proposals by collapsing diverse internal valuations into rigid, generic price points. More concerningly, we observe dominance patterns in which some models systematically achieve higher payoffs than their counterparts. These findings underscore an urgent need to develop mechanisms to mitigate these issues before deploying such systems in real-world scenarios.

cs.GT