arXiv subjects

Lukas Bieringer

Publications and source records attributed to Lukas Bieringer.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2024

Practice-Informed, Practice-Ready: An AI security incident taxonomy

With the increasing prevalence of AI systems, several real-world AI security incidents have been reported. However, despite forthcoming legal mandates, the reporting and collection of these incidents still lacks practical standards and proposals. We bridge this gap by establishing a rigorous foundation based on discussions with a diverse group of AI practitioners spanning industrial, non-profit, research, and governmental sectors. Our proposed taxonomy provides concrete guidance to identify affected parties, recommend relevant security measures, and gain an actionable overview of the evolving AI security landscape. Our tests show that different coders consistently identify similar topics, but that automating incident tagging via an LLM like ChatGPT is of limited use. Notably, our framework has already served as the scientific basis for an established industry standard, proving its utility and readiness for widespread adoption.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

Towards more Practical Threat Models in Artificial Intelligence Security

Recent works have identified a gap between research and practice in artificial intelligence security: threats studied in academia do not always reflect the practical use and security risks of AI. For example, while models are often studied in isolation, they form part of larger ML pipelines in practice. Recent works also brought forward that adversarial manipulations introduced by academic attacks are impractical. We take a first step towards describing the full extent of this disparity. To this end, we revisit the threat models of the six most studied attacks in AI security research and match them to AI usage in practice via a survey with 271 industrial practitioners. On the one hand, we find that all existing threat models are indeed applicable. On the other hand, there are significant mismatches: research is often too generous with the attacker, assuming access to information not frequently available in real-world settings. Our paper is thus a call for action to study more practical threat models in artificial intelligence security.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2023

Machine Learning Security in Industry: A Quantitative Survey

Despite the large body of academic work on machine learning security, little is known about the occurrence of attacks on machine learning systems in the wild. In this paper, we report on a quantitative study with 139 industrial practitioners. We analyze attack occurrence and concern and evaluate statistical hypotheses on factors influencing threat perception and exposure. Our results shed light on real-world attacks on deployed machine learning. On the organizational level, while we find no predictors for threat exposure in our sample, the amount of implement defenses depends on exposure to threats or expected likelihood to become a target. We also provide a detailed analysis of practitioners' replies on the relevance of individual machine learning attacks, unveiling complex concerns like unreliable decision making, business information leakage, and bias introduction into models. Finally, we find that on the individual level, prior knowledge about machine learning security influences threat perception. Our work paves the way for more research about adversarial machine learning in practice, but yields also insights for regulation and auditing.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2022

Mental Models of Adversarial Machine Learning

Although machine learning is widely used in practice, little is known about practitioners' understanding of potential security challenges. In this work, we close this substantial gap and contribute a qualitative study focusing on developers' mental models of the machine learning pipeline and potentially vulnerable components. Similar studies have helped in other security fields to discover root causes or improve risk communication. Our study reveals two \facets of practitioners' mental models of machine learning security. Firstly, practitioners often confuse machine learning security with threats and defences that are not directly related to machine learning. Secondly, in contrast to most academic research, our participants perceive security of machine learning as not solely related to individual models, but rather in the context of entire workflows that consist of multiple components. Jointly with our additional findings, these two facets provide a foundation to substantiate mental models for machine learning security and have implications for the integration of adversarial machine learning into corporate workflows, \new{decreasing practitioners' reported uncertainty}, and appropriate regulatory frameworks for machine learning security.

cs.CR↗