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Lynette Hammond Gerido

Publications and source records attributed to Lynette Hammond Gerido.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Quantifying Membership Inference Risks in Genomic Data Sharing: The Role of Attacker's Auxiliary Information

Genomic data sharing is essential for biomedical research but introduces significant privacy risks, including membership inference attacks, in which an adversary determines whether a specific individual's data was used in a study. Existing privacy protections are typically applied after a release format has already been chosen, leaving researchers without a principled method to assess dataset-specific risk beforehand. We propose a server-assisted, principal component analysis-based pre-release auditing framework that maps genomic data into a shared low-dimensional space, applies epsilon-local differential privacy via the Laplace mechanism with a formally derived sensitivity for principal component analysis scores, and estimates membership inference attack power at a controlled 5% false-positive rate using a distance-threshold attack. A membership-neutrality diagnostic based on Unbiased Reconstruction Robustness is reported alongside attack power, precision, and recall. Experiments using the openSNP and 1000 Genomes Project datasets across multiple dimensionalities and privacy budgets show that separation between the researcher's dataset and public auxiliary data in principal component analysis space is a dominant determinant of attack success, exceeding the effect of perturbation level alone. Comparison against a genome-wide association study-style likelihood ratio test baseline further contextualizes the measured risk. This framework enables researchers, data repositories, and institutional review bodies to quantify dataset-specific membership inference risk before genomic data publication, supporting more informed and privacy-aware biomedical data-sharing decisions.

cs.CR↗

Privacy-Preserving Clustering Algorithm and Parameter Selection for Collaborative Population Stratification Using Distributed PCA

We propose a privacy-preserving selection layer for collaborative population stratification workflows, enabling an honest-but-curious server to recommend a strong clustering algorithm-hyperparameter configuration from privacy protected shares. Instead of using a fixed workflow such as PCA followed by K-Means with a preset number of clusters, the framework compares multiple clustering methods and parameter settings under privacy constraints. To avoid relying on a public reference basis, we construct a shared low-dimensional representation through a distributed-PCA (DPCA) procedure in which each party computes local top-$r$ principal-component information and the server aggregates only low-rank summaries to recover a global basis. Building on this representation, the framework supports three LDP-protected pipelines: PCA then Noise, Noise then PCA, and Noise-Only. The server evaluates clustering methods and parameter settings using internal validation metrics and recommends a top-performing configuration from the perturbed data; this step is pure post-processing. Experiments on openSNP and 1000 Genomes show that the server-side selection layer reliably identifies strong settings from LDP-protected data. Across both datasets, the PCA-based pipelines outperform Noise-Only in clustering utility, communication cost, and runtime, and show lower membership-inference attack (MIA) power at small privacy budgets. Overall, they provide the best utility--scalability trade-off in our setting.

cs.CR↗