arXiv subjects
Publications and source records attributed to Lyubov N. Positselskaya.
We discuss a duel-type game in which Player I uses his resource continuously and Player II distributes it by discrete portions. Each player knows how much resources he and his opponent have at every moment of time. The solution of the game is given in an explicit form. Keywords: noisy duel, payoff, strategy, the value of a game, consumption of resource.
We study a nonzero-sum game of two players which is a generalization of the antagonistic noisy duel of discrete type. The game is considered from the point of view of various criterions of optimality. We prove existence of epsilon-equilibrium situations and show that the epsilon-equilibrium strategies that we have found are epsilon-maxmin. Conditions under which the equilibrium plays are Pareto-optimal are given. Keywords: noisy duel, payoff function, strategy, equilibrium situation, Pareto optimality, the value of a game.