arXiv subjects

Márton Benedek

Publications and source records attributed to Márton Benedek.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2025

Computing Balanced Solutions for Large International Kidney Exchange Schemes When Cycle Length Is Unbounded

In kidney exchange programmes (KEP) patients may swap their incompatible donors leading to cycles of kidney transplants. Nowadays, countries try to merge their national patient-donor pools leading to international KEPs (IKEPs). As shown in the literature, long-term stability of an IKEP can be achieved through a credit-based system. In each round, every country is prescribed a "fair" initial allocation of kidney transplants. The initial allocation, which we obtain by using solution concepts from cooperative game theory, is adjusted by incorporating credits from the previous round, yielding the target allocation. The goal is to find, in each round, an optimal solution that closely approximates this target allocation. There is a known polynomial-time algorithm for finding an optimal solution that lexicographically minimizes the country deviations from the target allocation if only $2$-cycles (matchings) are permitted. In practice, kidney swaps along longer cycles may be performed. However, the problem of computing optimal solutions for maximum cycle length $\ell$ is NP-hard for every $\ell\geq 3$. This situation changes back to polynomial time once we allow unbounded cycle length. However, in contrast to the case where $\ell=2$, we show that for $\ell=\infty$, lexicographical minimization is only polynomial-time solvable under additional conditions (assuming P $\neq$ NP). Nevertheless, the fact that the optimal solutions themselves can be computed in polynomial time if $\ell=\infty$ still enables us to perform a large scale experimental study for showing how stability and total social welfare are affected when we set $\ell=\infty$ instead of $\ell=2$.

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arXiv2025

Impact of AI Tools on Learning Outcomes: Decreasing Knowledge and Over-Reliance

Students at all levels of education are increasingly relying on generative artificial intelligence (AI) tools to complete assignments and achieve higher exam scores. However, it remains unclear how this reliance affects their motivation, their genuine understanding of the material, and the extent to which it substitutes for the process of knowledge acquisition. To investigate the impact of generative AI on learning outcomes, an experiment was conducted at Corvinus University of Budapest. In an operations research class, students were randomly assigned into two groups: one was permitted to use AI tools during classes and examinations, while the other was not. To ensure fairness, a compensation mechanism was introduced: students in the lower-performing group received point adjustments until the average performance of the two groups was equalized. Despite the organizers' best efforts to explain the design and to create equal opportunities for all participants, many students perceived the experiment as a major disruption. Although the experiment was approved by every relevant university authority -- including the Ethics Board, the Head of Department, the Program Director, and the Student Council -- students escalated their concerns to the media and eventually to the State Secretary for Higher Education of Hungary. As a result, the experiment had to be substantially revised before completion: on the final exam the test group was merged with the control group. Still, the data allowed us to draw decisive conclusions regarding the students' learning habits. Uncontrolled use of AI tools leads to disengaged students and low understanding of material. The extreme reactions of the students proved even more revealing than the data collected: generative AI tools have already become indispensable for students, raising fundamental questions about the validity of their learning process.

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arXiv2024

Partitioned Matching Games for International Kidney Exchange

We introduce partitioned matching games as a suitable model for international kidney exchange programmes, where in each round the total number of available kidney transplants needs to be distributed amongst the participating countries in a "fair" way. A partitioned matching game $(N,v)$ is defined on a graph $G=(V,E)$ with an edge weighting $w$ and a partition $V=V_1 \cup \dots \cup V_n$. The player set is $N = \{1, \dots, n\}$, and player $p \in N$ owns the vertices in $V_p$. The value $v(S)$ of a coalition $S \subseteq N$ is the maximum weight of a matching in the subgraph of $G$ induced by the vertices owned by the players in $S$. If $|V_p|=1$ for all $p\in N$, then we obtain the classical matching game. Let $c=\max\{|V_p| \; |\; 1\leq p\leq n\}$ be the width of $(N,v)$. We prove that checking core non-emptiness is polynomial-time solvable if $c\leq 2$ but co-NP-hard if $c\leq 3$. We do this via pinpointing a relationship with the known class of $b$-matching games and completing the complexity classification on testing core non-emptiness for $b$-matching games. With respect to our application, we prove a number of complexity results on choosing, out of possibly many optimal solutions, one that leads to a kidney transplant distribution that is as close as possible to some prescribed fair distribution.

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arXiv2023

The Complexity of Matching Games: A Survey

Matching games naturally generalize assignment games, a well-known class of cooperative games. Interest in matching games has grown recently due to some breakthrough results and new applications. This state-of-the-art survey provides an overview of matching games and extensions, such as $b$-matching games and partitioned matching games; the latter originating from the emerging area of international kidney exchange. In this survey we focus on computational complexity aspects of various game-theoretical solution concepts, such as the core, nucleolus and Shapley value, when the input is restricted to a matching game or one if its variants.

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arXiv2023

Computing Balanced Solutions for Large International Kidney Exchange Schemes

To overcome incompatibility issues, kidney patients may swap their donors. In international kidney exchange programmes (IKEPs), countries merge their national patient-donor pools. We consider a recently introduced credit system. In each round, countries are given an initial ``fair'' allocation of the total number of kidney transplants. This allocation is adjusted by a credit function yielding a target allocation. The goal is to find a solution that approaches the target allocation as closely as possible, to ensure long-term stability of the international pool. As solutions, we use maximum matchings that lexicographically minimize the country deviations from the target allocation. We perform, for the first time, a computational study for a {\it large} number of countries. For the initial allocations we use two easy-to-compute solution concepts, the benefit value and the contribution value, and four classical but hard-to-compute concepts, the Shapley value, nucleolus, Banzhaf value and tau value. By using state-of-the-art software we show that the latter four concepts are now within reach for IKEPs of up to fifteen countries. Our experiments show that using lexicographically minimal maximum matchings instead of ones that only minimize the largest deviation from the target allocation (as previously done) may make an IKEP up to 54% more balanced.

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