Searcharxiv⌕ Search

arXiv subjects

M'hamed Gaïgi

Publications and source records attributed to M'hamed Gaïgi.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Dam Management in the Era of Climate Change

Climate change has a dramatic impact, particularly by concentrating rainfall into a few short periods, interspersed with long dry spells. In this context, the role of dams is crucial. We consider the optimal control of a dam, where the water level must neither exceed a designated safety threshold nor fall below a minimum level to ensure functionality and sustainability for the downstream river. To model dry spells and intense rainfall events, commonly referred to as water bombs, we introduce a Hawkes process, a well-known example of a self-exciting process characterized by time-correlated intensity, which endogenously reproduces the clustering of events. The problem is formulated as an optimal switching problem with constraints. We establish existence results and propose numerical methods for approximating the solution. Finally, we illustrate the main achievements of this approach through numerical examples focusing in particular on the sensitivity of the self-exciting parameter describing the importance of both water bombs and dry-spells. For the parameter configurations considered in this paper, the optimal water level inside the dam decreases as the self-exciting parameter increases. This numerical finding suggests that, under the considered calibration, the management response is driven more strongly by overtopping risk than by drought risk. In conclusion, dams will increasingly lose their role as water reserves and take on a greater role in flood protection.

math.OC↗

Nonzero-sum stochastic impulse games with an application in competitive retail energy markets

We study a nonzero-sum stochastic differential game with both players adopting impulse controls, on a finite time horizon. The objective of each player is to maximize her total expected discounted profits. The resolution methodology relies on the connection between Nash equilibrium and the corresponding system of quasi-variational inequalities (QVIs in short). We prove, by means of the weak dynamic programming principle for the stochastic differential game, that the value function of each player is a constrained viscosity solution to the associated QVIs system in the class of linear growth functions. We also introduce a family of value functions converging to our value function of each player, and which is characterized as the unique constrained viscosity solutions of an approximation of our QVIs system. This convergence result is useful for numerical purpose. We apply a probabilistic numerical scheme which approximates the solution of the QVIs system to the case of the competition between two electricity retailers. We show how our model reproduces the qualitative behaviour of electricity retail competition.

math.OC↗