arXiv subjects

M. A. Natiello

Publications and source records attributed to M. A. Natiello.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2021

Relational electromagnetism and the electromagnetic force

The force exerted by an electromagnetic body on another body in relative motion, and its minimal expression, the force on moving charges or \emph{Lorentz' force} constitute the link between electromagnetism and mechanics. Expressions for the force were produced first by Maxwell and later by H. A. Lorentz, but their expressions disagree. The construction process was the result, in both cases, of analogies rooted in the idea of the ether. Yet, the expression of the force has remained despite its production context. We present a path to the electromagnetic force that starts from Ludwig Lorenz' relational electromagnetism. The present mathematical abduction does not rest on analogies. Following this path we show that relational electromagnetism, as pursued by the Göttingen school, is consistent with Maxwell's transformation laws and compatible with the idea that the "speed of light" takes the same value in all (inertial) frames of reference, while it cannot be conceived on the basis of analogies with material motion.

physics.class-ph↗

arXiv2020

The construction of Electromagnetism

We examine the construction of electromagnetism in its current form, and in an alternative form, from a point of view that combines a minimal realism with strict demands of reason that we first introduce. We follow the historical development as presented in the record of original publications, the underlying epistemology (often explained by the authors) and the mathematical constructions. The historical construction develops along socio-political disputes (mainly, the reunification of Germany and the second industrial revolution), epistemic disputes (at least two demarcations of science in conflict) and several theories of electromagnetism. Such disputes resulted in the militant adoption of the ether by some, a position that expanded in parallel with the expansion of Prussia, but was facilitated by the earlier adoption of a standpoint that required physical hypothesis in the form of analogies as condition for understanding, antithetic to Newton's "\emph{hypotheses non fingo}". ...

physics.hist-ph↗

arXiv2018

The construction of mechanics. A new path to Newton's equations

In the present essay we attempt to reconstruct Newtonian mechanics under the guidance of logical principles and of a constructive approach related to the genetic epistemology of J. Piaget and R. García \citep{piag89}. Instead of addressing Newton's equations as a set of axioms, ultimately given by the revelation of a prodigious mind, we search for the fundamental knowledge, beliefs and provisional assumptions that can produce classical mechanics. We start by developing our main tool: the No Arbitrariness Principle, that we present in a form that is apt for a mathematical theory as classical mechanics. Subsequently, we introduce the presence of the observer, analysing then the relation objective-subjective and seeking objectivity going across subjectivity. We take special care of establishing the precedence among all contributions to mechanics, something that can be better appreciated by considering the consequences of removing them: (a) the consequence of renouncing logic and the laws of understanding is not being able to understand the world, (b) renouncing the early elaborations of primary concepts such as time and space leads to a dissociation between everyday life and physics, the latter becoming entirely pragmatic and justified \emph{a-posteriori} (because it is convenient), (c) changing our temporary beliefs has no real cost other than effort. Finally, we exemplify the present approach by reconsidering the constancy of the velocity of light. It is shown that it is a result of Newtonian mechanics, rather than being in contradiction with it. We also indicate the hidden assumption that leads to the (apparent) contradiction.

math.HO↗