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Maël Jenny

Publications and source records attributed to Maël Jenny.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

RAISED: Self-Distillation for Robustness to Prompt Injection in LLM Agents

Tool-using language-model agents are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because they must act on untrusted external content. Existing training-time defenses can reduce attack success rates, but often at the cost of general capabilities. We show that training-based defenses induce substantial drift in the model's output distribution, altering its behavior even in benign settings and providing a potential mechanism for utility degradation. We further identify a failure mode of these defenses: On benign tool-use tasks, the model refrains from a step needed to finish an authorized task, particularly when that step is indicated by a tool output. To address these limitations, we introduce RAISED (Robust Attack Invariance through Self-Distillation), a training framework that combines self-generation and self-distillation. The model first generates its own tool-use scenarios, with an emphasis on cases where task completion requires acting on legitimate guidance from tool outputs. Then, through self-distillation, the student is trained to match the teacher's clean-context behavior on both clean and injected variants of the same trajectory. RAISED substantially reduces the attack success rate of prompt injections in tool responses while, unlike prior training-based defenses, preserving utility on both agentic and general-purpose benchmarks.

cs.CR↗

PatchBench: Measuring Collateral Damage in Activation Patching

An LLM safety patch can pass a benchmark while still being a poor repair. This risk is especially acute for jailbreak repairs, where the goal is to correct a specific unsafe behaviour without changing unrelated behaviours. A patch may block exact evaluation prompts yet fail on close harmful variants, or suppress harmful behaviour by over-refusing benign prompts that share its wording or structure. Existing protocols primarily test whether models can be broken, while aggregate metrics (attack success, refusal rates, global capability) cannot distinguish selective repairs from broader local suppression. To address this gap, we introduce PatchBench, a benchmark of empirically observed model-specific jailbreak failures inducing actionable harmful answers. Starting from 27,870 prompts from 37 public datasets, we curate 15,314 English prompts and query 8 open-source instruction-tuned models. Combining WildGuard filtering, pairwise Elo ranking, and manual verification, we retain a curated bank of 400 high-confidence jailbreak failures. We further introduce PatchBench-Local, an evaluation protocol testing whether a patch is behaviourally precise. For each harmful source prompt, PatchBench-Local generates three families of local neighbours: harmful variants preserving malicious intent, benign prompts with matched structure, and benign prompts reusing key harmful terms. It evaluates harmful-neighbour correction and benign-neighbour preservation, distinguishing selective repair from broader local suppression. Evaluating four activation steering methods with PatchBench-Local and MMLU shows that global capability can remain nearly unchanged while local benign regressions are severe, confirming aggregate metrics miss important collateral damage. PatchBench-Local provides a more precise basis for developing and comparing jailbreak repair methods.

cs.LG↗

Reformulation-Contrastive Learning for Mixed Integer Programs

Mixed-integer linear programs (MILP) model many real-world decision problems, motivating machine-learning methods that exploit recurring structure to accelerate MILP solving. MILPs can admit many equivalent formulations: integrality-preserving changes of variables and the addition of redundant constraints can alter their formulations while preserving the optimization problem. We leverage these reformulations as a source of self-supervision for learning general-purpose representations of MILP variables and constraints. We characterize the affine reformulations that are valid for every input instance, and distinguish re-descriptions, which leave variables unchanged, from substitutions, which transform them predictably. Building on equivariant self-supervised learning, we introduce ReMILP (reformulation-contrastive MILP representation learning), which jointly trains a graph neural network and a hypernetwork to predict how variable embeddings transform under changes of variables. Without solver-derived labels, ReMILP learns representations that exhibit the intended invariance and equivariance on unseen problem classes. Across binary solution, constraint activity and integrality gap prediction, these representations carry task-relevant information when frozen and provide a useful initialization for fine-tuning.

cs.LG↗

Activation Surgery: Jailbreaking White-box LLMs without Touching the Prompt

Most jailbreak techniques for Large Language Models (LLMs) primarily rely on prompt modifications, including paraphrasing, obfuscation, or conversational strategies. Meanwhile, abliteration techniques (also known as targeted ablations of internal components) have been used to study and explain LLM outputs by probing which internal structures causally support particular responses. In this work, we combine these two lines of research by directly manipulating the model's internal activations to alter its generation trajectory without changing the prompt. Our method constructs a nearby benign prompt and performs layer-wise activation substitutions using a sequential procedure. We show that this activation surgery method reveals where and how refusal arises, and prevents refusal signals from propagating across layers, thereby inhibiting the model's safety mechanisms. Finally, we discuss the security implications for open-weights models and instrumented inference environments.

cs.CR↗