Majid Garoosi | Searcharxiv

arXiv2026

PyFEX: Uncovering Evasive Python-based Threats via Resilient and Exhaustive Path Exploration

The rapid expansion of the Python ecosystem has fueled two distinct but converging threats: adversaries increasingly target the software supply chain via the Python Package Index (PyPI), while also building evasive, cross-platform malicious binaries compiled from source code written in Python. Current program analysis techniques struggle to address this dual threat. Static analysis based tools are often blinded by runtime obfuscation and compiled bytecode, while dynamic analysis based ones are fragile, prone to evasion by environmental guardrails, and often terminates prematurely due to unsatisfied dependencies. To overcome these limitations, we present PyFEX, a resilient forced-execution engine. PyFEX explores a program's behavioral space systematically by forcing execution across all conditional branches to bypass evasion checks. To address the fragility of dynamic execution, it introduces a novel resilient crash recovery mechanism that synthesizes dummy objects to satisfy failed operations at the runtime, allowing analysis to proceed past fatal errors, and employs path merging to mitigate path explosion. PyFEX further incorporates an automated entry identification mechanism that proactively discovers and invokes dormant functions, exposing malicious logic hidden within uncalled APIs. To demonstrate the efficacy of this engine, we built PyFEXScan, a proof-of-concept malware detector built on top of PyFEX. Evaluated against both known malicious PyPI packages and real-world compiled binaries, PyFEX exposes critical behaviors missed by the existing state-of-the-art tools. In a live deployment on PyPI, PyFEXScan discovered 212 previously unknown malicious packages accounting for over 91,648 downloads, underscoring the necessity of resilient, exhaustive analysis for securing the Python ecosystem.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

HoneySat: A Network-based Satellite Honeypot Framework

Satellites are the backbone of several mission-critical services that enable our modern society to function, for example, GPS. For years, satellites were assumed to be secure because of their indecipherable architectures and the reliance on security by obscurity. However, technological advancements have made these assumptions obsolete, paving the way for potential attacks, and sparking interest in satellite security. Unfortunately, to this day, there is no efficient way to collect data on adversarial techniques for satellites, hurting the generation of security intelligence that can lead to the development of effective countermeasures. In this paper, we present HoneySat, the first high-interaction satellite honeypot framework, fully capable of convincingly simulating a real-world CubeSat, a type of Small Satellite (SmallSat). To provide evidence of HoneySat's effectiveness, we surveyed experienced SmallSat operators in charge of in-orbit satellites and deployed HoneySat over the Internet to entice adversaries. Our results show that 90% of satellite operators agreed that HoneySat provides a realistic and engaging simulation of a SmallSat mission. Additionally, HoneySat successfully deceived human adversaries in the wild and collected 22 real-world satellite-specific adversarial interactions. Finally, in a major demonstration of HoneySat's robustness, we collaborated with an aerospace company to perform a hardware-in-the-loop operation that resulted in HoneySat successfully communicating with an in-orbit, operational SmallSat mission.

cs.CR↗