arXiv subjects

Maneesha Papireddygari

Publications and source records attributed to Maneesha Papireddygari.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

A General Theory of Liquidity Provisioning for Prediction Markets

Liquidity provisioning in automated market makers is the practice of recruiting third-party liquidity providers (LPs) to contribute assets to the market in exchange for fees skimmed off of trades. This paper introduces a general framework for liquidity provisioning in cost function prediction markets. Our most general protocol allows LPs to submit or update an arbitrary cost function that specifies their liquidity over the entire price space. We show that our protocol encapsulates several notions of running market makers in parallel, which we prove to be equivalent. We also recover existing protocols from decentralized finance as special cases. In our protocol, liquidity can be expressed as a matrix-valued function, which we argue is necessary with three or more securities. Due to this inherent multidimensionality, the design of trading fees with three or more securities is nontrivial: we show that natural axioms on the design of these fees are incompatible.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Efficiency of Constant Log Utility Market Makers

Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are used to provide liquidity for combinatorial prediction markets that would otherwise be too thinly traded. They offer both buy and sell prices for any of the doubly exponential many possible securities that the market can offer. The problem of setting those prices is known to be #P-hard for the original and most well-known AMM, the logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR) market maker [Chen et al., 2008]. We focus on another natural AMM, the Constant Log Utility Market Maker (CLUM). Unlike LMSR, whose worst-case loss bound grows with the number of outcomes, CLUM has constant worst-case loss, allowing the market to add outcomes on the fly and even operate over countably infinite many outcomes, among other features. Simpler versions of CLUM underpin several Decentralized Finance (DeFi) mechanisms including the Uniswap protocol that handles billions of dollars of cryptocurrency trades daily. We first establish the computational complexity of the problem: we prove that pricing securities is #P-hard for CLUM, via a reduction from the model counting 2-SAT problem. In order to make CLUM more practically viable, we propose an approximation algorithm for pricing securities that works with high probability. This algorithm assumes access to an oracle capable of determining the maximum shares purchased of any one outcome and the total number of outcomes that has that maximum amount purchased. We then show that this oracle can be implemented in polynomial time when restricted to interval securities, which are used in designing financial options.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

An Axiomatic Characterization of CFMMs and Equivalence to Prediction Markets

Constant-function market makers (CFMMs), such as Uniswap, are automated exchanges offering trades among a set of assets. We study their technical relationship to another class of automated market makers, cost-function prediction markets. We first introduce axioms for market makers and show that CFMMs with concave potential functions characterize "good" market makers according to these axioms. We then show that every such CFMM on $n$ assets is equivalent to a cost-function prediction market for events with $n$ outcomes. Our construction directly converts a CFMM into a prediction market and vice versa. Conceptually, our results show that desirable market-making axioms are equivalent to desirable information-elicitation axioms, i.e., markets are good at facilitating trade if and only if they are good at revealing beliefs. For example, we show that every CFMM implicitly defines a proper scoring rule for eliciting beliefs; the scoring rule for Uniswap is unusual, but known. From a technical standpoint, our results show how tools for prediction markets and CFMMs can interoperate. We illustrate this interoperability by showing how liquidity strategies from both literatures transfer to the other, yielding new market designs.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Contracts with Information Acquisition, via Scoring Rules

We consider a principal-agent problem where the agent may privately choose to acquire relevant information prior to taking a hidden action. This model generalizes two special cases: a classic moral hazard setting, and a more recently studied problem of incentivizing information acquisition (IA). We show that all of these problems can be reduced to the design of a proper scoring rule. Under a limited liability condition, we consider the special cases separately and then the general problem. We give novel results for the special case of IA, giving a closed form "pointed polyhedral cone" solution for the general multidimensional problem. We also describe a geometric, scoring-rules based solution to the case of the classic contracts problem. Finally, we give an efficient algorithm for the general problem of Contracts with Information Acquisition.

cs.GT↗