arXiv subjects

Manish Bhatt

Publications and source records attributed to Manish Bhatt.

18 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

World-Time Compute with Verified Code World Models

LLMs generalize across a domain only after seeing many real, labeled examples, which most domains lack. We study a way to manufacture it cheaply. When a domain's dynamics can be written as code, one template instantiates into many world models: executable, verifiable programs over symbolic state, each an inexhaustible source of exactly-labeled trajectories. Fine-tuning an LLM on trajectories through many such worlds, which we call world-time compute, a training-time analogue of test-time compute, lifts generalization to held-out worlds it never trained on (synthesized world families). Gains are largest where capability is scarcest: +29 points at 0.5B; the largest model's lift is within noise, consistent with saturation. Labels can be trusted because the worlds are verified code: synthesized-then-checked dynamics are exact over 20-step rollouts and answer 10x out-of-distribution probes exactly (100%), whereas per-step LLM and MLP predictors compound error and collapse. Unlike domain randomization, each world is independently authored and verified; a corrupted-label control shows label exactness, not task variety, drives the gains. On real benchmarks (ARC-AGI grids, List Functions, CLRS) the same lever holds as per-world test-time training. On List Functions the harder cross-world form holds: one adapter trained on 128 disjoint worlds reaches 40% on held-out worlds versus 6% for a corrupted-label control (+34 points, CI [29, 39]). The gain is a saturating regularity, not a law: largest for few-step reasoning and small/weak models, fading for long chains, perception-induced tasks, and saturated tasks; cross-task transfer is weak without shared skill. Worlds are authored and served by OpenWorld, a zero-dependency framework (companion paper). Scope: symbolic state; pixel-native domains remain territory of learned models. All code, recipes, and this manuscript regenerate from one repository.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

ARES-LSHADE: Autoresearch-Enhanced LSHADE with Memetic Polish for the GNBG Benchmark

We present ARES-LSHADE, a memetic differential-evolution variant submitted to the GECCO 2026 competition on LLM-designed evolutionary algorithms for the Generalized Numerical Benchmark Generator (GNBG). The algorithm builds on the LLM-LSHADE 2025 winner, contributing two new components: (a) a scout-augmented mutation operator with adaptive CMA-ES integration, produced by an autonomous research loop across approximately thirty LLM-driven design experiments, and (b) a multi-start L-BFGS-B polish phase that respects strict blackbox treatment of the benchmark. On the official 31-run-per-function evaluation with the competition-specified function-evaluation budgets, ARES-LSHADE obtains 510 of 744 wins (per-function gap below 1e-8), reaching machine precision on 18 of 24 functions. The remaining six functions exhibit characteristic plateau signatures consistent with GNBG's compositional structure, and were independently identified by the autoresearch loop as the hardest of the suite. Beyond the result itself, this report documents two methodological observations: (i) an LLM-driven research loop with operator-only edit surface and fitness-only observation space converges to a characteristic plateau on this benchmark; (ii) when we initially widened the observation space to include the benchmark's compositional metadata, the resulting algorithm trivially solved all 24 functions but violated the competition's blackbox rule, which we identified before submission. We discuss this tension between LLM capability and benchmark integrity as a design consideration for future LLM-driven optimization-algorithm research. Code and reproducibility artifacts are available at https://github.com/anaeem1/ARES-LSHADE.

cs.NE↗

arXiv2026

The Defense Trilemma: Why Prompt Injection Defense Wrappers Fail?

We prove that no continuous, utility-preserving wrapper defense-a function $D: X\to X$ that preprocesses inputs before the model sees them-can make all outputs strictly safe for a language model with connected prompt space, and we characterize exactly where every such defense must fail. We establish three results under successively stronger hypotheses: boundary fixation-the defense must leave some threshold-level inputs unchanged; an $\epsilon$-robust constraint-under Lipschitz regularity, a positive-measure band around fixed boundary points remains near-threshold; and a persistent unsafe region under a transversality condition, a positive-measure subset of inputs remains strictly unsafe. These constitute a defense trilemma: continuity, utility preservation, and completeness cannot coexist. We prove parallel discrete results requiring no topology, and extend to multi-turn interactions, stochastic defenses, and capacity-parity settings. The results do not preclude training-time alignment, architectural changes, or defenses that sacrifice utility. The full theory is mechanically verified in Lean 4 and validated empirically on three LLMs.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

LAAF: Logic-layer Automated Attack Framework A Systematic Red-Teaming Methodology for LPCI Vulnerabilities in Agentic Large Language Model Systems

Agentic LLM systems equipped with persistent memory, RAG pipelines, and external tool connectors face a class of attacks - Logic-layer Prompt Control Injection (LPCI) - for which no automated red-teaming instrument existed. We present LAAF (Logic-layer Automated Attack Framework), the first automated red-teaming framework to combine an LPCI-specific technique taxonomy with stage-sequential seed escalation - two capabilities absent from existing tools: Garak lacks memory-persistence and cross-session triggering; PyRIT supports multi-turn testing but treats turns independently, without seeding each stage from the prior breakthrough. LAAF provides: (i) a 49-technique taxonomy spanning six attack categories (Encoding~11, Structural~8, Semantic~8, Layered~5, Trigger~12, Exfiltration~5; see Table 1), combinable across 5 variants per technique and 6 lifecycle stages, yielding a theoretical maximum of 2,822,400 unique payloads ($49 \times 5 \times 1{,}920 \times 6$; SHA-256 deduplicated at generation time); and (ii) a Persistent Stage Breaker (PSB) that drives payload mutation stage-by-stage: on each breakthrough, the PSB seeds the next stage with a mutated form of the winning payload, mirroring real adversarial escalation. Evaluation on five production LLM platforms across three independent runs demonstrates that LAAF achieves higher stage-breakthrough efficiency than single-technique random testing, with a mean aggregate breakthrough rate of 84\% (range 83--86\%) and platform-level rates stable within 17 percentage points across runs. Layered combinations and semantic reframing are the highest-effectiveness technique categories, with layered payloads outperforming encoding on well-defended platforms.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Manifold of Failure: Behavioral Attraction Basins in Language Models

While prior work has focused on projecting adversarial examples back onto the manifold of natural data to restore safety, we argue that a comprehensive understanding of AI safety requires characterizing the unsafe regions themselves. This paper introduces a framework for systematically mapping the Manifold of Failure in Large Language Models (LLMs). We reframe the search for vulnerabilities as a quality diversity problem, using MAP-Elites to illuminate the continuous topology of these failure regions, which we term behavioral attraction basins. Our quality metric, Alignment Deviation, guides the search towards areas where the model's behavior diverges most from its intended alignment. Across three LLMs: Llama-3-8B, GPT-OSS-20B, and GPT-5-Mini, we show that MAP-Elites achieves up to 63% behavioral coverage, discovers up to 370 distinct vulnerability niches, and reveals dramatically different model-specific topological signatures: Llama-3-8B exhibits a near-universal vulnerability plateau (mean Alignment Deviation 0.93), GPT-OSS-20B shows a fragmented landscape with spatially concentrated basins (mean 0.73), and GPT-5-Mini demonstrates strong robustness with a ceiling at 0.50. Our approach produces interpretable, global maps of each model's safety landscape that no existing attack method (GCG, PAIR, or TAP) can provide, shifting the paradigm from finding discrete failures to understanding their underlying structure.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

Predictive Coding and Information Bottleneck for Hallucination Detection in Large Language Models

Hallucinations in Large Language Models (LLMs) -- generations that are plausible but factually unfaithful -- remain a critical barrier to high-stakes deployment. Current detection methods typically rely on computationally expensive external retrieval loops or opaque black-box LLM judges requiring 70B+ parameters. In this work, we introduce [Model Name], a hybrid detection framework that combines neuroscience-inspired signal design with supervised machine learning. We extract interpretable signals grounded in Predictive Coding (quantifying surprise against internal priors) and the Information Bottleneck (measuring signal retention under perturbation). Through systematic ablation, we demonstrate three key enhancements: Entity-Focused Uptake (concentrating on high-value tokens), Context Adherence (measuring grounding strength), and Falsifiability Score (detecting confident but contradictory claims). Evaluating on HaluBench (n=200, perfectly balanced), our theory-guided baseline achieves 0.8017 AUROC. BASE supervised models reach 0.8274 AUROC, while IMPROVED features boost performance to 0.8669 AUROC (4.95% gain), demonstrating consistent improvements across architectures. This competitive performance is achieved while using 75x less training data than Lynx (200 vs 15,000 samples), 1000x faster inference (5ms vs 5s), and remaining fully interpretable. Crucially, we report a negative result: the Rationalization signal fails to distinguish hallucinations, suggesting that LLMs generate coherent reasoning for false premises ("Sycophancy"). This work demonstrates that domain knowledge encoded in signal architecture provides superior data efficiency compared to scaling LLM judges, achieving strong performance with lightweight (less than 1M parameter), explainable models suitable for production deployment.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Large Empirical Case Study: Go-Explore adapted for AI Red Team Testing

Production LLM agents with tool-using capabilities require security testing despite their safety training. We adapt Go-Explore to evaluate GPT-4o-mini across 28 experimental runs spanning six research questions. We find that random-seed variance dominates algorithmic parameters, yielding an 8x spread in outcomes; single-seed comparisons are unreliable, while multi-seed averaging materially reduces variance in our setup. Reward shaping consistently harms performance, causing exploration collapse in 94% of runs or producing 18 false positives with zero verified attacks. In our environment, simple state signatures outperform complex ones. For comprehensive security testing, ensembles provide attack-type diversity, whereas single agents optimize coverage within a given attack type. Overall, these results suggest that seed variance and targeted domain knowledge can outweigh algorithmic sophistication when testing safety-trained models.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

MAIF: Enforcing AI Trust and Provenance with an Artifact-Centric Agentic Paradigm

The AI trustworthiness crisis threatens to derail the artificial intelligence revolution, with regulatory barriers, security vulnerabilities, and accountability gaps preventing deployment in critical domains. Current AI systems operate on opaque data structures that lack the audit trails, provenance tracking, or explainability required by emerging regulations like the EU AI Act. We propose an artifact-centric AI agent paradigm where behavior is driven by persistent, verifiable data artifacts rather than ephemeral tasks, solving the trustworthiness problem at the data architecture level. Central to this approach is the Multimodal Artifact File Format (MAIF), an AI-native container embedding semantic representations, cryptographic provenance, and granular access controls. MAIF transforms data from passive storage into active trust enforcement, making every AI operation inherently auditable. Our production-ready implementation demonstrates ultra-high-speed streaming (2,720.7 MB/s), optimized video processing (1,342 MB/s), and enterprise-grade security. Novel algorithms for cross-modal attention, semantic compression, and cryptographic binding achieve up to 225 compression while maintaining semantic fidelity. Advanced security features include stream-level access control, real-time tamper detection, and behavioral anomaly analysis with minimal overhead. This approach directly addresses the regulatory, security, and accountability challenges preventing AI deployment in sensitive domains, offering a viable path toward trustworthy AI systems at scale.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Logic layer Prompt Control Injection (LPCI): A Novel Security Vulnerability Class in Agentic Systems

The integration of large language models (LLMs) into enterprise systems has introduced a new class of covert security vulnerabilities, particularly within logic execution layers and persistent memory contexts. This paper introduces Logic-layer Prompt Control Injection (LPCI), a novel category of attacks that embeds encoded, delayed, and conditionally triggered payloads within memory, vector stores, or tool outputs. These payloads can bypass conventional input filters and trigger unauthorised behaviour across sessions.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Bhatt Conjectures: On Necessary-But-Not-Sufficient Benchmark Tautology for Human Like Reasoning

The Bhatt Conjectures framework introduces rigorous, hierarchical benchmarks for evaluating AI reasoning and understanding, moving beyond pattern matching to assess representation invariance, robustness, and metacognitive self-awareness. The agentreasoning-sdk demonstrates practical implementation, revealing that current AI models struggle with complex reasoning tasks and highlighting the need for advanced evaluation protocols to distinguish genuine cognitive abilities from statistical inference. https://github.com/mbhatt1/agentreasoning-sdk

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

ETDI: Mitigating Tool Squatting and Rug Pull Attacks in Model Context Protocol (MCP) by using OAuth-Enhanced Tool Definitions and Policy-Based Access Control

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) plays a crucial role in extending the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) by enabling integration with external tools and data sources. However, the standard MCP specification presents significant security vulnerabilities, notably Tool Poisoning and Rug Pull attacks. This paper introduces the Enhanced Tool Definition Interface (ETDI), a security extension designed to fortify MCP. ETDI incorporates cryptographic identity verification, immutable versioned tool definitions, and explicit permission management, often leveraging OAuth 2.0. We further propose extending MCP with fine-grained, policy-based access control, where tool capabilities are dynamically evaluated against explicit policies using a dedicated policy engine, considering runtime context beyond static OAuth scopes. This layered approach aims to establish a more secure, trustworthy, and controllable ecosystem for AI applications interacting with LLMs and external tools.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

COALESCE: Economic and Security Dynamics of Skill-Based Task Outsourcing Among Team of Autonomous LLM Agents

The meteoric rise and proliferation of autonomous Large Language Model (LLM) agents promise significant capabilities across various domains. However, their deployment is increasingly constrained by substantial computational demands, specifically for Graphics Processing Unit (GPU) resources. This paper addresses the critical problem of optimizing resource utilization in LLM agent systems. We introduce COALESCE (Cost-Optimized and Secure Agent Labour Exchange via Skill-based Competence Estimation), a novel framework designed to enable autonomous LLM agents to dynamically outsource specific subtasks to specialized, cost-effective third-party LLM agents. The framework integrates mechanisms for hybrid skill representation, dynamic skill discovery, automated task decomposition, a unified cost model comparing internal execution costs against external outsourcing prices, simplified market-based decision-making algorithms, and a standardized communication protocol between LLM agents. Comprehensive validation through 239 theoretical simulations demonstrates 41.8\% cost reduction potential, while large-scale empirical validation across 240 real LLM tasks confirms 20.3\% cost reduction with proper epsilon-greedy exploration, establishing both theoretical viability and practical effectiveness. The emergence of proposed open standards like Google's Agent2Agent (A2A) protocol further underscores the need for frameworks like COALESCE that can leverage such standards for efficient agent interaction. By facilitating a dynamic market for agent capabilities, potentially utilizing protocols like A2A for communication, COALESCE aims to significantly reduce operational costs, enhance system scalability, and foster the emergence of specialized agent economies, making complex LLM agent functionalities more accessible and economically viable.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2024

CYBERSECEVAL 3: Advancing the Evaluation of Cybersecurity Risks and Capabilities in Large Language Models

We are releasing a new suite of security benchmarks for LLMs, CYBERSECEVAL 3, to continue the conversation on empirically measuring LLM cybersecurity risks and capabilities. CYBERSECEVAL 3 assesses 8 different risks across two broad categories: risk to third parties, and risk to application developers and end users. Compared to previous work, we add new areas focused on offensive security capabilities: automated social engineering, scaling manual offensive cyber operations, and autonomous offensive cyber operations. In this paper we discuss applying these benchmarks to the Llama 3 models and a suite of contemporaneous state-of-the-art LLMs, enabling us to contextualize risks both with and without mitigations in place.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

CyberSecEval 2: A Wide-Ranging Cybersecurity Evaluation Suite for Large Language Models

Large language models (LLMs) introduce new security risks, but there are few comprehensive evaluation suites to measure and reduce these risks. We present BenchmarkName, a novel benchmark to quantify LLM security risks and capabilities. We introduce two new areas for testing: prompt injection and code interpreter abuse. We evaluated multiple state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs, including GPT-4, Mistral, Meta Llama 3 70B-Instruct, and Code Llama. Our results show that conditioning away risk of attack remains an unsolved problem; for example, all tested models showed between 26% and 41% successful prompt injection tests. We further introduce the safety-utility tradeoff: conditioning an LLM to reject unsafe prompts can cause the LLM to falsely reject answering benign prompts, which lowers utility. We propose quantifying this tradeoff using False Refusal Rate (FRR). As an illustration, we introduce a novel test set to quantify FRR for cyberattack helpfulness risk. We find many LLMs able to successfully comply with "borderline" benign requests while still rejecting most unsafe requests. Finally, we quantify the utility of LLMs for automating a core cybersecurity task, that of exploiting software vulnerabilities. This is important because the offensive capabilities of LLMs are of intense interest; we quantify this by creating novel test sets for four representative problems. We find that models with coding capabilities perform better than those without, but that further work is needed for LLMs to become proficient at exploit generation. Our code is open source and can be used to evaluate other LLMs.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

Rainbow Teaming: Open-Ended Generation of Diverse Adversarial Prompts

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly prevalent across many real-world applications, understanding and enhancing their robustness to adversarial attacks is of paramount importance. Existing methods for identifying adversarial prompts tend to focus on specific domains, lack diversity, or require extensive human annotations. To address these limitations, we present Rainbow Teaming, a novel black-box approach for producing a diverse collection of adversarial prompts. Rainbow Teaming casts adversarial prompt generation as a quality-diversity problem and uses open-ended search to generate prompts that are both effective and diverse. Focusing on the safety domain, we use Rainbow Teaming to target various state-of-the-art LLMs, including the Llama 2 and Llama 3 models. Our approach reveals hundreds of effective adversarial prompts, with an attack success rate exceeding 90% across all tested models. Furthermore, we demonstrate that prompts generated by Rainbow Teaming are highly transferable and that fine-tuning models with synthetic data generated by our method significantly enhances their safety without sacrificing general performance or helpfulness. We additionally explore the versatility of Rainbow Teaming by applying it to question answering and cybersecurity, showcasing its potential to drive robust open-ended self-improvement in a wide range of applications.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2023

Purple Llama CyberSecEval: A Secure Coding Benchmark for Language Models

This paper presents CyberSecEval, a comprehensive benchmark developed to help bolster the cybersecurity of Large Language Models (LLMs) employed as coding assistants. As what we believe to be the most extensive unified cybersecurity safety benchmark to date, CyberSecEval provides a thorough evaluation of LLMs in two crucial security domains: their propensity to generate insecure code and their level of compliance when asked to assist in cyberattacks. Through a case study involving seven models from the Llama 2, Code Llama, and OpenAI GPT large language model families, CyberSecEval effectively pinpointed key cybersecurity risks. More importantly, it offered practical insights for refining these models. A significant observation from the study was the tendency of more advanced models to suggest insecure code, highlighting the critical need for integrating security considerations in the development of sophisticated LLMs. CyberSecEval, with its automated test case generation and evaluation pipeline covers a broad scope and equips LLM designers and researchers with a tool to broadly measure and enhance the cybersecurity safety properties of LLMs, contributing to the development of more secure AI systems.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2023

Code Llama: Open Foundation Models for Code

We release Code Llama, a family of large language models for code based on Llama 2 providing state-of-the-art performance among open models, infilling capabilities, support for large input contexts, and zero-shot instruction following ability for programming tasks. We provide multiple flavors to cover a wide range of applications: foundation models (Code Llama), Python specializations (Code Llama - Python), and instruction-following models (Code Llama - Instruct) with 7B, 13B, 34B and 70B parameters each. All models are trained on sequences of 16k tokens and show improvements on inputs with up to 100k tokens. 7B, 13B and 70B Code Llama and Code Llama - Instruct variants support infilling based on surrounding content. Code Llama reaches state-of-the-art performance among open models on several code benchmarks, with scores of up to 67% and 65% on HumanEval and MBPP, respectively. Notably, Code Llama - Python 7B outperforms Llama 2 70B on HumanEval and MBPP, and all our models outperform every other publicly available model on MultiPL-E. We release Code Llama under a permissive license that allows for both research and commercial use.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2020

Deep Learning in Ultrasound Elastography Imaging

It is known that changes in the mechanical properties of tissues are associated with the onset and progression of certain diseases. Ultrasound elastography is a technique to characterize tissue stiffness using ultrasound imaging either by measuring tissue strain using quasi-static elastography or natural organ pulsation elastography, or by tracing a propagated shear wave induced by a source or a natural vibration using dynamic elastography. In recent years, deep learning has begun to emerge in ultrasound elastography research. In this review, several common deep learning frameworks in the computer vision community, such as multilayer perceptron, convolutional neural network, and recurrent neural network are described. Then, recent advances in ultrasound elastography using such deep learning techniques are revisited in terms of algorithm development and clinical diagnosis. Finally, the current challenges and future developments of deep learning in ultrasound elastography are prospected.

eess.IV↗