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Manisha Padala

Publications and source records attributed to Manisha Padala.

13 recordsLinked to original sources

GF-Score: Certified Class-Conditional Robustness Evaluation with Fairness Guarantees

Adversarial robustness is essential for deploying neural networks in safety-critical applications, yet standard evaluation methods either require expensive adversarial attacks or report only a single aggregate score that obscures how robustness is distributed across classes. We introduce the \emph{GF-Score} (GREAT-Fairness Score), a framework that decomposes the certified GREAT Score into per-class robustness profiles and quantifies their disparity through four metrics grounded in welfare economics: the Robustness Disparity Index (RDI), the Normalized Robustness Gini Coefficient (NRGC), Worst-Case Class Robustness (WCR), and a Fairness-Penalized GREAT Score (FP-GREAT). The framework further eliminates the original method's dependence on adversarial attacks through a self-calibration procedure that tunes the temperature parameter using only clean accuracy correlations. Evaluating 22 models from RobustBench across CIFAR-10 and ImageNet, we find that the decomposition is exact, that per-class scores reveal consistent vulnerability patterns (e.g., ``cat'' is the weakest class in 76\% of CIFAR-10 models), and that more robust models tend to exhibit greater class-level disparity. These results establish a practical, attack-free auditing pipeline for diagnosing where certified robustness guarantees fail to protect all classes equally. We release our code on \href{https://github.com/aryashah2k/gf-score}{GitHub}.

cs.LG

Truthful Reverse Auctions for Adaptive Selection via Contextual Multi-Armed Bandits

We study the problem of selecting large language models (LLMs) for user queries in settings where multiple LLM providers submit the cost of solving a query. From the users' perspective, choosing an optimal model is a sequential, query-dependent decision problem: high-capacity models offer more reliable outputs but are costlier, while lightweight models are faster and cheaper. We formalize this interaction as a reverse auction design problem with contextual online learning, where the user adaptively discovers which model performs best while eliciting costs from competing LLM providers. Existing multi-armed bandit (MAB) mechanisms focus on forward auctions and social welfare, leaving open the challenges of reverse auctions, provider-optimal outcomes, and contextual adaptation. We address these gaps by designing a resampling-based procedure that generalizes truthful forward MAB mechanisms to reverse auctions and prove that any monotone allocation rule with this procedure is truthful. Using this, we propose a contextual MAB algorithm that learns query-dependent model quality with sublinear regret. Our framework unifies mechanism design and adaptive learning, enabling efficient, truthful, and query-aware LLM selection.

cs.GT

Tab-Shapley: Identifying Top-k Tabular Data Quality Insights

We present an unsupervised method for aggregating anomalies in tabular datasets by identifying the top-k tabular data quality insights. Each insight consists of a set of anomalous attributes and the corresponding subsets of records that serve as evidence to the user. The process of identifying these insight blocks is challenging due to (i) the absence of labeled anomalies, (ii) the exponential size of the subset search space, and (iii) the complex dependencies among attributes, which obscure the true sources of anomalies. Simple frequency-based methods fail to capture these dependencies, leading to inaccurate results. To address this, we introduce Tab-Shapley, a cooperative game theory based framework that uses Shapley values to quantify the contribution of each attribute to the data's anomalous nature. While calculating Shapley values typically requires exponential time, we show that our game admits a closed-form solution, making the computation efficient. We validate the effectiveness of our approach through empirical analysis on real-world tabular datasets with ground-truth anomaly labels.

cs.LG

Designing Redistribution Mechanisms for Reducing Transaction Fees in Blockchains

Blockchains deploy Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs) to determine which user transactions to include in blocks and determine their payments (i.e., transaction fees). Increasing demand and scarce block resources have led to high user transaction fees. As these blockchains are a public resource, it may be preferable to reduce these transaction fees. To this end, we introduce Transaction Fee Redistribution Mechanisms (TFRMs) -- redistributing VCG payments collected from such TFM as rebates to minimize transaction fees. Classic redistribution mechanisms (RMs) achieve this while ensuring Allocative Efficiency (AE) and User Incentive Compatibility (UIC). Our first result shows the non-triviality of applying RM in TFMs. More concretely, we prove that it is impossible to reduce transaction fees when (i) transactions that are not confirmed do not receive rebates and (ii) the miner can strategically manipulate the mechanism. Driven by this, we propose \emph{Robust} TFRM (\textsf{R-TFRM}): a mechanism that compromises on an honest miner's individual rationality to guarantee strictly positive rebates to the users. We then introduce \emph{robust} and \emph{rational} TFRM (\textsf{R}$^2$\textsf{-TFRM}) that uses trusted on-chain randomness that additionally guarantees miner's individual rationality (in expectation) and strictly positive rebates. Our results show that TFRMs provide a promising new direction for reducing transaction fees in public blockchains.

cs.GT

Fair Allocation of goods and chores -- Tutorial and Survey of Recent Results

Fair resource allocation is an important problem in many real-world scenarios, where resources such as goods and chores must be allocated among agents. In this survey, we delve into the intricacies of fair allocation, focusing specifically on the challenges associated with indivisible resources. We define fairness and efficiency within this context and thoroughly survey existential results, algorithms, and approximations that satisfy various fairness criteria, including envyfreeness, proportionality, MMS, and their relaxations. Additionally, we discuss algorithms that achieve fairness and efficiency, such as Pareto Optimality and Utilitarian Welfare. We also study the computational complexity of these algorithms, the likelihood of finding fair allocations, and the price of fairness for each fairness notion. We also cover mixed instances of indivisible and divisible items and investigate different valuation and allocation settings. By summarizing the state-of-the-art research, this survey provides valuable insights into fair resource allocation of indivisible goods and chores, highlighting computational complexities, fairness guarantees, and trade-offs between fairness and efficiency. It serves as a foundation for future advancements in this vital field.

cs.GT

Combinatorial Civic Crowdfunding with Budgeted Agents: Welfare Optimality at Equilibrium and Optimal Deviation

Civic Crowdfunding (CC) uses the ``power of the crowd'' to garner contributions towards public projects. As these projects are non-excludable, agents may prefer to ``free-ride,'' resulting in the project not being funded. For single project CC, researchers propose to provide refunds to incentivize agents to contribute, thereby guaranteeing the project's funding. These funding guarantees are applicable only when agents have an unlimited budget. This work focuses on a combinatorial setting, where multiple projects are available for CC and agents have a limited budget. We study certain specific conditions where funding can be guaranteed. Further, funding the optimal social welfare subset of projects is desirable when every available project cannot be funded due to budget restrictions. We prove the impossibility of achieving optimal welfare at equilibrium for any monotone refund scheme. We then study different heuristics that the agents can use to contribute to the projects in practice. Through simulations, we demonstrate the heuristics' performance as the average-case trade-off between welfare obtained and agent utility.

cs.GT

Coordinating Monetary Contributions in Participatory Budgeting

We formalize a framework for coordinating funding and selecting projects, the costs of which are shared among agents with quasi-linear utility functions and individual budgets. Our model contains the classical discrete participatory budgeting model as a special case, while capturing other useful scenarios. We propose several important axioms and objectives and study how well they can be simultaneously satisfied. We show that whereas welfare maximization admits an FPTAS, welfare maximization subject to a natural and very weak participation requirement leads to a strong inapproximability. This result is bypassed if we consider some natural restricted valuations, namely laminar single-minded valuations and symmetric valuations. Our analysis for the former restriction leads to the discovery of a new class of tractable instances for the Set Union Knapsack problem, a classical problem in combinatorial optimization.

cs.GT

Fair Allocation with Special Externalities

Most of the existing algorithms for fair division do not consider externalities. Under externalities, the utility an agent obtains depends not only on its allocation but also on the allocation of other agents. An agent has a positive (negative) value for the assigned goods (chores). This work focuses on a special case of externality, i.e., an agent receives positive or negative value for unassigned items independent of which other agent gets it. We show that it is possible to adapt existing algorithms using a transformation to ensure certain fairness and efficiency notions in this setting. Despite the positive results, fairness notions like proportionality need to be re-defined. Further, we prove that maximin share (MMS) may not have any multiplicative approximation in this setting. Studying this domain is a stepping stone towards full externalities where ensuring fairness is much more challenging.

cs.GT

Mechanism Design without Money for Fair Allocations

Fairness is well studied in the context of resource allocation. Researchers have proposed various fairness notions like envy-freeness (EF), and its relaxations, proportionality and max-min share (MMS). There is vast literature on the existential and computational aspects of such notions. While computing fair allocations, any algorithm assumes agents' truthful reporting of their valuations towards the resources. Whereas in real-world web-based applications for fair division, the agents involved are strategic and may manipulate for individual utility gain. In this paper, we study strategy-proof mechanisms without monetary transfer, which satisfies the various fairness criteria. We know that for additive valuations, designing truthful mechanisms for EF, MMS and proportionality is impossible. Here we show that there cannot be a truthful mechanism for EFX and the existing algorithms for EF1 are manipulable. We then study the particular case of single-minded agents. For this case, we provide a Serial Dictatorship Mechanism that is strategy-proof and satisfies all the fairness criteria except EF.

cs.GT

EEF1-NN: Efficient and EF1 allocations through Neural Networks

Neural networks have shown state-of-the-art performance in designing auctions, where the network learns the optimal allocations and payment rule to ensure desirable properties. Motivated by the same, we focus on learning fair division of resources, with no payments involved. Our goal is to allocate the items, goods and/or chores efficiently among the fair allocations. By fair, we mean an allocation that is Envy-free (EF). However, such an allocation may not always exist for indivisible resources. Therefore, we consider the relaxed notion, Envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) that is guaranteed to exist. However, it is not enough to guarantee EF1 since the allocation of empty bundles is also EF1. Hence, we add the further constraint of efficiency, maximum utilitarian social welfare (USW). In general finding, USW allocations among EF1 is an NP-Hard problem even when valuations are additive. In this work, we design a network for this task which we refer to as EEF1-NN. We propose an UNet inspired architecture, Lagrangian loss function, and training procedure to obtain desired results. We show that EEF1-NN finds allocation close to optimal USW allocation and ensures EF1 with a high probability for different distributions over input valuations. Compared to existing approaches EEF1-NN empirically guarantees higher USW. Moreover, EEF1-NN is scalable and determines the allocations much faster than solving it as a constrained optimization problem.

cs.GT

F3: Fair and Federated Face Attribute Classification with Heterogeneous Data

Fairness across different demographic groups is an essential criterion for face-related tasks, Face Attribute Classification (FAC) being a prominent example. Apart from this trend, Federated Learning (FL) is increasingly gaining traction as a scalable paradigm for distributed training. Existing FL approaches require data homogeneity to ensure fairness. However, this assumption is too restrictive in real-world settings. We propose F3, a novel FL framework for fair FAC under data heterogeneity. F3 adopts multiple heuristics to improve fairness across different demographic groups without requiring data homogeneity assumption. We demonstrate the efficacy of F3 by reporting empirically observed fairness measures and accuracy guarantees on popular face datasets. Our results suggest that F3 strikes a practical balance between accuracy and fairness for FAC.

cs.LG

Federated Learning Meets Fairness and Differential Privacy

Deep learning's unprecedented success raises several ethical concerns ranging from biased predictions to data privacy. Researchers tackle these issues by introducing fairness metrics, or federated learning, or differential privacy. A first, this work presents an ethical federated learning model, incorporating all three measures simultaneously. Experiments on the Adult, Bank and Dutch datasets highlight the resulting ``empirical interplay" between accuracy, fairness, and privacy.

cs.LG

Effect of Input Noise Dimension in GANs

Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) are by far the most successful generative models. Learning the transformation which maps a low dimensional input noise to the data distribution forms the foundation for GANs. Although they have been applied in various domains, they are prone to certain challenges like mode collapse and unstable training. To overcome the challenges, researchers have proposed novel loss functions, architectures, and optimization methods. In our work here, unlike the previous approaches, we focus on the input noise and its role in the generation. We aim to quantitatively and qualitatively study the effect of the dimension of the input noise on the performance of GANs. For quantitative measures, typically \emph{Fréchet Inception Distance (FID)} and \emph{Inception Score (IS)} are used as performance measure on image data-sets. We compare the FID and IS values for DCGAN and WGAN-GP. We use three different image data-sets -- each consisting of different levels of complexity. Through our experiments, we show that the right dimension of input noise for optimal results depends on the data-set and architecture used. We also observe that the state of the art performance measures does not provide enough useful insights. Hence we conclude that we need further theoretical analysis for understanding the relationship between the low dimensional distribution and the generated images. We also require better performance measures.

cs.LG