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Manon Revel

Publications and source records attributed to Manon Revel.

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Architecting Trust in Artificial Epistemic Agents

Large language models increasingly function as epistemic agents -- entities that can 1) autonomously pursue epistemic goals and 2) actively shape our shared knowledge environment. They curate the information we receive, often supplanting traditional search-based methods, and are frequently used to generate both personal and deeply specialized advice. How they perform these functions, including whether they are reliable and properly calibrated to both individual and collective epistemic norms, is therefore highly consequential for the choices we make. We argue that the potential impact of epistemic AI agents on practices of knowledge creation, curation and synthesis, particularly in the context of complex multi-agent interactions, creates new informational interdependencies that necessitate a fundamental shift in evaluation and governance of AI. While a well-calibrated ecosystem could augment human judgment and collective decision-making, poorly aligned agents risk causing cognitive deskilling and epistemic drift, making the calibration of these models to human norms a high-stakes necessity. To ensure a beneficial human-AI knowledge ecosystem, we propose a framework centered on building and cultivating the trustworthiness of epistemic AI agents; aligning AI these agents with human epistemic goals; and reinforcing the surrounding socio-epistemic infrastructure. In this context, trustworthy AI agents must demonstrate epistemic competence, robust falsifiability, and epistemically virtuous behaviors, supported by technical provenance systems and "knowledge sanctuaries" designed to protect human resilience. This normative roadmap provides a path toward ensuring that future AI systems act as reliable partners in a robust and inclusive knowledge ecosystem.

cs.AI

Full-Stack Alignment: Co-Aligning AI and Institutions with Thick Models of Value

Beneficial societal outcomes cannot be guaranteed by aligning individual AI systems with the intentions of their operators or users. Even an AI system that is perfectly aligned to the intentions of its operating organization can lead to bad outcomes if the goals of that organization are misaligned with those of other institutions and individuals. For this reason, we need full-stack alignment, the concurrent alignment of AI systems and the institutions that shape them with what people value. This can be done without imposing a particular vision of individual or collective flourishing. We argue that current approaches for representing values, such as utility functions, preference orderings, or unstructured text, struggle to address these and other issues effectively. They struggle to distinguish values from other signals, to support principled normative reasoning, and to model collective goods. We propose thick models of value will be needed. These structure the way values and norms are represented, enabling systems to distinguish enduring values from fleeting preferences, to model the social embedding of individual choices, and to reason normatively, applying values in new domains. We demonstrate this approach in five areas: AI value stewardship, normatively competent agents, win-win negotiation systems, meaning-preserving economic mechanisms, and democratic regulatory institutions.

cs.LG

Cultivating Pluralism In Algorithmic Monoculture: The Community Alignment Dataset

How can large language models (LLMs) serve users with varying preferences that may conflict across cultural, political, or other dimensions? To advance this challenge, this paper establishes four key results. First, we demonstrate, through a large-scale multilingual human study with representative samples from five countries (N=15,000), that humans exhibit substantially more variation in preferences than the responses of 21 state-of-the-art LLMs. Second, we show that existing methods for preference dataset collection are insufficient for learning the diversity of human preferences even along two of the most salient dimensions of variability in global values, due to the underlying homogeneity of candidate responses. Third, we argue that this motivates the need for negatively-correlated sampling when generating candidate sets, and we show that simple prompt-based techniques for doing so greatly enhance the performance of alignment methods in learning heterogeneous preferences. Fourth, based on this novel candidate sampling approach, we collect and open-source Community Alignment} the largest and most representative multilingual and multi-turn preference dataset to date, featuring 233,319 comparisons from annotators spanning five countries. Overall, we hope that the Community Alignment dataset will be a valuable resource for improving the effectiveness of LLMs for a diverse global population.

cs.LG

Scaling Human Judgment in Community Notes with LLMs

This paper argues for a new paradigm for Community Notes in the LLM era: an open ecosystem where both humans and LLMs can write notes, and the decision of which notes are helpful enough to show remains in the hands of humans. This approach can accelerate the delivery of notes, while maintaining trust and legitimacy through Community Notes' foundational principle: A community of diverse human raters collectively serve as the ultimate evaluator and arbiter of what is helpful. Further, the feedback from this diverse community can be used to improve LLMs' ability to produce accurate, unbiased, broadly helpful notes--what we term Reinforcement Learning from Community Feedback (RLCF). This becomes a two-way street: LLMs serve as an asset to humans--helping deliver context quickly and with minimal effort--while human feedback, in turn, enhances the performance of LLMs. This paper describes how such a system can work, its benefits, key new risks and challenges it introduces, and a research agenda to solve those challenges and realize the potential of this approach.

cs.CY

Arbiters of Ambivalence: Challenges of Using LLMs in No-Consensus Tasks

The increasing use of LLMs as substitutes for humans in ``aligning'' LLMs has raised questions about their ability to replicate human judgments and preferences, especially in ambivalent scenarios where humans disagree. This study examines the biases and limitations of LLMs in three roles: answer generator, judge, and debater. These roles loosely correspond to previously described alignment frameworks: preference alignment (judge) and scalable oversight (debater), with the answer generator reflecting the typical setting with user interactions. We develop a ``no-consensus'' benchmark by curating examples that encompass a variety of a priori ambivalent scenarios, each presenting two possible stances. Our results show that while LLMs can provide nuanced assessments when generating open-ended answers, they tend to take a stance on no-consensus topics when employed as judges or debaters. These findings underscore the necessity for more sophisticated methods for aligning LLMs without human oversight, highlighting that LLMs cannot fully capture human disagreement even on topics where humans themselves are divided.

cs.CL

Representative Ranking for Deliberation in the Public Sphere

Online comment sections, such as those on news sites or social media, have the potential to foster informal public deliberation, However, this potential is often undermined by the frequency of toxic or low-quality exchanges that occur in these settings. To combat this, platforms increasingly leverage algorithmic ranking to facilitate higher-quality discussions, e.g., by using civility classifiers or forms of prosocial ranking. Yet, these interventions may also inadvertently reduce the visibility of legitimate viewpoints, undermining another key aspect of deliberation: representation of diverse views. We seek to remedy this problem by introducing guarantees of representation into these methods. In particular, we adopt the notion of justified representation (JR) from the social choice literature and incorporate a JR constraint into the comment ranking setting. We find that enforcing JR leads to greater inclusion of diverse viewpoints while still being compatible with optimizing for user engagement or other measures of conversational quality.

cs.SI

AI-Enhanced Deliberative Democracy and the Future of the Collective Will

This article unpacks the design choices behind longstanding and newly proposed computational frameworks aimed at finding common grounds across collective preferences and examines their potential future impacts, both technically and normatively. It begins by situating AI-assisted preference elicitation within the historical role of opinion polls, emphasizing that preferences are shaped by the decision-making context and are seldom objectively captured. With that caveat in mind, we explore AI-based democratic innovations as discovery tools for fostering reasonable representations of a collective will, sense-making, and agreement-seeking. At the same time, we caution against dangerously misguided uses, such as enabling binding decisions, fostering gradual disempowerment or post-rationalizing political outcomes.

cs.CY

Democratic AI is Possible. The Democracy Levels Framework Shows How It Might Work

This position paper argues that effectively "democratizing AI" requires democratic governance and alignment of AI, and that this is particularly valuable for decisions with systemic societal impacts. Initial steps -- such as Meta's Community Forums and Anthropic's Collective Constitutional AI -- have illustrated a promising direction, where democratic processes could be used to meaningfully improve public involvement and trust in critical decisions. To more concretely explore what increasingly democratic AI might look like, we provide a "Democracy Levels" framework and associated tools that: (i) define milestones toward meaningfully democratic AI, which is also crucial for substantively pluralistic, human-centered, participatory, and public-interest AI, (ii) can help guide organizations seeking to increase the legitimacy of their decisions on difficult AI governance and alignment questions, and (iii) support the evaluation of such efforts.

cs.CY

SEAL: Systematic Error Analysis for Value ALignment

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) aims to align language models (LMs) with human values by training reward models (RMs) on binary preferences and using these RMs to fine-tune the base LMs. Despite its importance, the internal mechanisms of RLHF remain poorly understood. This paper introduces new metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of modeling and aligning human values, namely feature imprint, alignment resistance and alignment robustness. We categorize alignment datasets into target features (desired values) and spoiler features (undesired concepts). By regressing RM scores against these features, we quantify the extent to which RMs reward them - a metric we term feature imprint. We define alignment resistance as the proportion of the preference dataset where RMs fail to match human preferences, and we assess alignment robustness by analyzing RM responses to perturbed inputs. Our experiments, utilizing open-source components like the Anthropic/hh-rlhf preference dataset and OpenAssistant RMs, reveal significant imprints of target features and a notable sensitivity to spoiler features. We observed a 26% incidence of alignment resistance in portions of the dataset where LM-labelers disagreed with human preferences. Furthermore, we find that misalignment often arises from ambiguous entries within the alignment dataset. These findings underscore the importance of scrutinizing both RMs and alignment datasets for a deeper understanding of value alignment.

cs.LG

Enabling the Digital Democratic Revival: A Research Program for Digital Democracy

This white paper outlines a long-term scientific vision for the development of digital-democracy technology. We contend that if digital democracy is to meet the ambition of enabling a participatory renewal in our societies, then a comprehensive multi-methods research effort is required that could, over the years, support its development in a democratically principled, empirically and computationally informed way. The paper is co-authored by an international and interdisciplinary team of researchers and arose from the Lorentz Center Workshop on ``Algorithmic Technology for Democracy'' (Leiden, October 2022).

cs.CY

Selecting Representative Bodies: An Axiomatic View

As the world's democratic institutions are challenged by dissatisfied citizens, political scientists and also computer scientists have proposed and analyzed various (innovative) methods to select representative bodies, a crucial task in every democracy. However, a unified framework to analyze and compare different selection mechanisms is missing, resulting in very few comparative works. To address this gap, we advocate employing concepts and tools from computational social choice in order to devise a model in which different selection mechanisms can be formalized. Such a model would allow for desirable representation axioms to be conceptualized and evaluated. We make the first step in this direction by proposing a unifying mathematical formulation of different selection mechanisms as well as various social-choice-inspired axioms such as proportionality and monotonicity.

cs.MA

Tracking Truth with Liquid Democracy

The dynamics of random transitive delegations on a graph are of particular interest when viewed through the lens of an emerging voting paradigm, liquid democracy. This paradigm allows voters to choose between directly voting and transitively delegating their votes to other voters, so that those selected cast a vote weighted by the number of delegations they received. In the epistemic setting, where voters decide on a binary issue for which there is a ground truth, previous work showed that a few voters may amass such a large amount of influence that liquid democracy is less likely to identify the ground truth than direct voting. We quantify the amount of permissible concentration of power and examine more realistic delegation models, showing they behave well by ensuring that (with high probability) there is a permissible limit on the maximum number of delegations received. Our theoretical results demonstrate that the delegation process is similar to well-known processes on random graphs that are sufficiently bounded for our purposes. Along the way, we prove new bounds on the size of the largest component in an infinite P\'olya urn process, which may be of independent interest. In addition, we empirically validate the theoretical results, running six experiments (for a total of $N=168$ participants, $62$ delegation graphs and over $11k$ votes collected). We find that empirical delegation behaviors meet the conditions for our positive theoretical guarantees. Overall, our work alleviates concerns raised about liquid democracy and bolsters the case for the applicability of this emerging paradigm.

cs.DM

The Optimal Size of an Epistemic Congress

We analyze the optimal size of a congress in a representative democracy. We take an epistemic view where voters decide on a binary issue with one ground truth outcome, and each voter votes correctly according to their competence levels in $[0, 1]$. Assuming that we can sample the best experts to form an epistemic congress, we find that the optimal congress size should be linear in the population size. This result is striking because it holds even when allowing the top representatives to be accurate with arbitrarily high probabilities. We then analyze real world data, finding that the actual sizes of congresses are much smaller than the optimal size our theoretical results suggest. We conclude by analyzing under what conditions congresses of sub-optimal sizes would still outperform direct democracy, in which all voters vote.

cs.AI