arXiv subjects

Marcel Nutz

Publications and source records attributed to Marcel Nutz.

At least 55 records · Page 3Linked to original sources

arXiv2021

Reward Design in Risk-Taking Contests

Following the risk-taking model of Seel and Strack, $n$ players decide when to stop privately observed Brownian motions with drift and absorption at zero. They are then ranked according to their level of stopping and paid a rank-dependent reward. We study the problem of a principal who aims to induce a desirable equilibrium performance of the players by choosing how much reward is attributed to each rank. Specifically, we determine optimal reward schemes for principals interested in the average performance and the performance at a given rank. While the former can be related to reward inequality in the Lorenz sense, the latter can have a surprising shape.

math.OC↗

arXiv2021

Entropic Optimal Transport: Convergence of Potentials

We study the potential functions that determine the optimal density for $\varepsilon$-entropically regularized optimal transport, the so-called Schrödinger potentials, and their convergence to the counterparts in classical optimal transport, the Kantorovich potentials. In the limit $\varepsilon\to0$ of vanishing regularization, strong compactness holds in $L^{1}$ and cluster points are Kantorovich potentials. In particular, the Schrödinger potentials converge in $L^{1}$ to the Kantorovich potentials as soon as the latter are unique. These results are proved for all continuous, integrable cost functions on Polish spaces. In the language of Schrödinger bridges, the limit corresponds to the small-noise regime.

math.AP↗

arXiv2021

The Directional Optimal Transport

We introduce a constrained optimal transport problem where origins $x$ can only be transported to destinations $y\geq x$. Our statistical motivation is to describe the sharp upper bound for the variance of the treatment effect $Y-X$ given marginals when the effect is monotone, or $Y\geq X$. We thus focus on supermodular costs (or submodular rewards) and introduce a coupling $P_{*}$ that is optimal for all such costs and yields the sharp bound. This coupling admits manifold characterizations -- geometric, order-theoretic, as optimal transport, through the cdf, and via the transport kernel -- that explain its structure and imply useful bounds. When the first marginal is atomless, $P_{*}$ is concentrated on the graphs of two maps which can be described in terms of the marginals, the second map arising due to the binding constraint.

math.OC↗

arXiv2021

Mean Field Contest with Singularity

We formulate a mean field game where each player stops a privately observed Brownian motion with absorption. Players are ranked according to their level of stopping and rewarded as a function of their relative rank. There is a unique mean field equilibrium and it is shown to be the limit of associated $n$-player games. Conversely, the mean field strategy induces $n$-player $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibria for any continuous reward function -- but not for discontinuous ones. In a second part, we study the problem of a principal who can choose how to distribute a reward budget over the ranks and aims to maximize the performance of the median player. The optimal reward design (contract) is found in closed form, complementing the merely partial results available in the $n$-player case. We then analyze the quality of the mean field design when used as a proxy for the optimizer in the $n$-player game. Surprisingly, the quality deteriorates dramatically as $n$ grows. We explain this with an asymptotic singularity in the induced $n$-player equilibrium distributions.

math.OC↗

arXiv2020

Fine Properties of the Optimal Skorokhod Embedding Problem

We study the problem of stopping a Brownian motion at a given distribution $ν$ while optimizing a reward function that depends on the (possibly randomized) stopping time and the Brownian motion. Our first result establishes that the set $\mathcal{T}(ν)$ of stopping times embedding $ν$ is weakly dense in the set $\mathcal{R}(ν)$ of randomized embeddings. In particular, the optimal Skorokhod embedding problem over $\mathcal{T}(ν)$ has the same value as the relaxed one over $\mathcal{R}(ν)$ when the reward function is semicontinuous, which parallels a fundamental result about Monge maps and Kantorovich couplings in optimal transport. A second part studies the dual optimization in the sense of linear programming. While existence of a dual solution failed in previous formulations, we introduce a relaxation of the dual problem that exploits a novel compactness property and yields existence of solutions as well as absence of a duality gap, even for irregular reward functions. This leads to a monotonicity principle which complements the key theorem of Beiglböck, Cox and Huesmann [Optimal transport and Skorokhod embedding, Invent. Math., 208:327-400, 2017]. We show that these results can be applied to characterize the geometry of optimal embeddings through a variational condition.

math.PR↗

arXiv2020

Asset Pricing with Heterogeneous Beliefs and Illiquidity

This paper studies the equilibrium price of an asset that is traded in continuous time between N agents who have heterogeneous beliefs about the state process underlying the asset's payoff. We propose a tractable model where agents maximize expected returns under quadratic costs on inventories and trading rates. The unique equilibrium price is characterized by a weakly coupled system of linear parabolic equations which shows that holding and liquidity costs play dual roles. We derive the leading-order asymptotics for small transaction and holding costs which give further insight into the equilibrium and the consequences of illiquidity.

q-fin.MF↗

arXiv2019

Conditional Optimal Stopping: A Time-Inconsistent Optimization

Inspired by recent work of P.-L. Lions on conditional optimal control, we introduce a problem of optimal stopping under bounded rationality: the objective is the expected payoff at the time of stopping, conditioned on another event. For instance, an agent may care only about states where she is still alive at the time of stopping, or a company may condition on not being bankrupt. We observe that conditional optimization is time-inconsistent due to the dynamic change of the conditioning probability and develop an equilibrium approach in the spirit of R. H. Strotz' work for sophisticated agents in discrete time. Equilibria are found to be essentially unique in the case of a finite time horizon whereas an infinite horizon gives rise to non-uniqueness and other interesting phenomena. We also introduce a theory which generalizes the classical Snell envelope approach for optimal stopping by considering a pair of processes with Snell-type properties.

math.OC↗

arXiv2019

Shorting in Speculative Markets

We propose a continuous-time model of trading with heterogeneous beliefs. Risk-neutral agents face quadratic costs-of-carry on positions and thus their marginal valuations decrease with the size of their position, as it would be the case for risk-averse agents. In the equilibrium models of heterogeneous beliefs that followed Harrison-Kreps, investors are risk-neutral, short-selling is prohibited and agents face constant marginal costs of carrying positions. The resulting resale option guarantees that the price exceeds the price of the asset when speculation is ruled out; the difference is identified as a bubble. In our model increasing marginal costs entail that the price depends on asset supply. Second, agents also value an option to delay, and this may cause the market to equilibrate below the buy-and-hold price. Third, we introduce the possibility of short-selling. A Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation of a novel form quantifies precisely the influence of the costs-of-carry on the price. An unexpected decrease in shorting costs may lead to the collapse of a bubble; this links the financial innovations that facilitated shorting of MBSs to the subsequent collapse of prices.

q-fin.MF↗

arXiv2019

Convergence to the Mean Field Game Limit: A Case Study

We study the convergence of Nash equilibria in a game of optimal stopping. If the associated mean field game has a unique equilibrium, any sequence of $n$-player equilibria converges to it as $n\to\infty$. However, both the finite and infinite player versions of the game often admit multiple equilibria. We show that mean field equilibria satisfying a transversality condition are limit points of $n$-player equilibria, but we also exhibit a remarkable class of mean field equilibria that are not limits, thus questioning their interpretation as "large $n$" equilibria.

math.OC↗

arXiv2019

Multiperiod Martingale Transport

Consider a multiperiod optimal transport problem where distributions $μ_{0},\dots,μ_{n}$ are prescribed and a transport corresponds to a scalar martingale $X$ with marginals $X_{t}\simμ_{t}$. We introduce particular couplings called left-monotone transports; they are characterized equivalently by a no-crossing property of their support, as simultaneous optimizers for a class of bivariate transport cost functions with a Spence--Mirrlees property, and by an order-theoretic minimality property. Left-monotone transports are unique if $μ_{0}$ is atomless, but not in general. In the one-period case $n=1$, these transports reduce to the Left-Curtain coupling of Beiglböck and Juillet. In the multiperiod case, the bivariate marginals for dates $(0,t)$ are of Left-Curtain type, if and only if $μ_{0},\dots,μ_{n}$ have a specific order property. The general analysis of the transport problem also gives rise to a strong duality result and a description of its polar sets. Finally, we study a variant where the intermediate marginals $μ_{1},\dots,μ_{n-1}$ are not prescribed.

math.PR↗

arXiv2018

A Risk-Neutral Equilibrium Leading to Uncertain Volatility Pricing

We study the formation of derivative prices in equilibrium between risk-neutral agents with heterogeneous beliefs about the dynamics of the underlying. Under the condition that the derivative cannot be shorted, we prove the existence of a unique equilibrium price and show that it incorporates the speculative value of possibly reselling the derivative. This value typically leads to a bubble; that is, the price exceeds the autonomous valuation of any given agent. Mathematically, the equilibrium price operator is of the same nonlinear form that is obtained in single-agent settings with strong aversion against model uncertainty. Thus, our equilibrium leads to a novel interpretation of this price.

q-fin.MF↗

arXiv2017

A Mean Field Game of Optimal Stopping

We formulate a stochastic game of mean field type where the agents solve optimal stopping problems and interact through the proportion of players that have already stopped. Working with a continuum of agents, typical equilibria become functions of the common noise that all agents are exposed to, whereas idiosyncratic randomness can be eliminated by an Exact Law of Large Numbers. Under a structural monotonicity assumption, we can identify equilibria with solutions of a simple equation involving the distribution function of the idiosyncratic noise. Solvable examples allow us to gain insight into the uniqueness of equilibria and the dynamics in the population.

math.OC↗

arXiv2017

Canonical Supermartingale Couplings

Two probability distributions $μ$ and $ν$ in second stochastic order can be coupled by a supermartingale, and in fact by many. Is there a canonical choice? We construct and investigate two couplings which arise as optimizers for constrained Monge-Kantorovich optimal transport problems where only supermartingales are allowed as transports. Much like the Hoeffding-Fréchet coupling of classical transport and its symmetric counterpart, the antitone coupling, these can be characterized by order-theoretic minimality properties, as simultaneous optimal transports for certain classes of reward (or cost) functions, and through no-crossing conditions on their supports; however, our two couplings have asymmetric geometries. Remarkably, supermartingale optimal transport decomposes into classical and martingale transport in several ways.

math.PR↗

arXiv2017

A Mean Field Competition

We introduce a mean field game with rank-based reward: competing agents optimize their effort to achieve a goal, are ranked according to their completion time, and paid a reward based on their relative rank. First, we propose a tractable Poissonian model in which we can describe the optimal effort for a given reward scheme. Second, we study the principal--agent problem of designing an optimal reward scheme. A surprising, explicit design is found to minimize the time until a given fraction of the population has reached the goal.

math.OC↗

arXiv2017

Bounds for VIX Futures given S&P 500 Smiles

We derive sharp bounds for the prices of VIX futures using the full information of S&P 500 smiles. To that end, we formulate the model-free sub/superreplication of the VIX by trading in the S&P 500 and its vanilla options as well as the forward-starting log-contracts. A dual problem of minimizing/maximizing certain risk-neutral expectations is introduced and shown to yield the same value. The classical bounds for VIX futures given the smiles only use a calendar spread of log-contracts on the S&P 500. We analyze for which smiles the classical bounds are sharp and how they can be improved when they are not. In particular, we introduce a family of functionally generated portfolios which often improves the classical bounds while still being tractable; more precisely, determined by a single concave/convex function on the line. Numerical experiments on market data and SABR smiles show that the classical lower bound can be improved dramatically, whereas the upper bound is often close to optimal.

q-fin.PR↗

arXiv2016

Complete Duality for Martingale Optimal Transport on the Line

We study the optimal transport between two probability measures on the real line, where the transport plans are laws of one-step martingales. A quasi-sure formulation of the dual problem is introduced and shown to yield a complete duality theory for general marginals and measurable reward (cost) functions: absence of a duality gap and existence of dual optimizers. Both properties are shown to fail in the classical formulation. As a consequence of the duality result, we obtain a general principle of cyclical monotonicity describing the geometry of optimal transports.

math.PR↗

arXiv2016

Robust Utility Maximization with Lévy Processes

We study a robust portfolio optimization problem under model uncertainty for an investor with logarithmic or power utility. The uncertainty is specified by a set of possible Lévy triplets; that is, possible instantaneous drift, volatility and jump characteristics of the price process. We show that an optimal investment strategy exists and compute it in semi-closed form. Moreover, we provide a saddle point analysis describing a worst-case model.

q-fin.MF↗

arXiv2015

Optimal stopping under adverse nonlinear expectation and related games

We study the existence of optimal actions in a zero-sum game $\inf_τ\sup_PE^P[X_τ]$ between a stopper and a controller choosing a probability measure. This includes the optimal stopping problem $\inf_τ\mathcal{E}(X_τ)$ for a class of sublinear expectations $\mathcal{E}(\cdot)$ such as the $G$-expectation. We show that the game has a value. Moreover, exploiting the theory of sublinear expectations, we define a nonlinear Snell envelope $Y$ and prove that the first hitting time $\inf\{t:Y_t=X_t\}$ is an optimal stopping time. The existence of a saddle point is shown under a compactness condition. Finally, the results are applied to the subhedging of American options under volatility uncertainty.

math.OC↗