arXiv subjects

Marcello Di Bello

Publications and source records attributed to Marcello Di Bello.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Profiling vs. Case-specific Evidence: A Probabilistic Analysis

The use of profiling evidence in criminal trials is a longstanding controversy in legal epistemology and evidence law theory. Many scholars, even when they oppose its use at trial, still assume that profiling evidence can be probative of guilt. We reject that assumption. Profiling evidence may support a generic hypothesis, but is not evidence that the defendant is guilty of the specific crime of which they are accused. We contrast profiling evidence with case-specific evidence, which speaks more directly to the facts of the case. Our critique departs from others by grounding the argument in a probabilistic analysis of evidentiary value. We also explore the implications of our account for debates about stereotyping.

stat.OT↗

arXiv2025

Evidence Without Injustice: A New Counterfactual Test for Fair Algorithms

The growing philosophical literature on algorithmic fairness has examined statistical criteria such as equalized odds and calibration, causal and counterfactual approaches, and the role of structural and compounding injustices. Yet an important dimension has been overlooked: whether the evidential value of an algorithmic output itself depends on structural injustice. We contrast a predictive policing algorithm, which relies on historical crime data, with a camera-based system that records ongoing offenses, where both are designed to guide police deployment. In evaluating the moral acceptability of acting on a piece of evidence, we must ask not only whether the evidence is probative in the actual world, but also whether it would remain probative in nearby worlds without the relevant injustices. The predictive policing algorithm fails this test, but the camera-based system passes it. When evidence fails the test, it is morally problematic to use it punitively, more so than evidence that passes the test.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2025

Causal Equal Protection as Algorithmic Fairness

By combining the philosophical literature on statistical evidence and the interdisciplinary literature on algorithmic fairness, we revisit recent objections against classification parity in light of causal analyses of algorithmic fairness and the distinction between predictive and diagnostic evidence. We focus on trial proceedings as a black-box classification algorithm in which defendants are sorted into two groups by convicting or acquitting them. We defend a novel principle, causal equal protection, that combines classification parity with the causal approach. In the do-calculus, causal equal protection requires that individuals should not be subject to uneven risks of classification error because of their protected or socially salient characteristics. The explicit use of protected characteristics, however, may be required if it equalizes these risks.

cs.CY↗