arXiv subjects

Marcelo Gallardo

Publications and source records attributed to Marcelo Gallardo.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

The Market and the Jungle

We study how different institutions governing property rights and economic transactions shape occupational choices and welfare. Individuals in our society choose occupations that determine their production and consumption opportunities, anticipating either anonymous, voluntary market exchange supported by public enforcement (the market), or allocations through a random coercive hierarchy (the jungle) without monetary compensation. We establish conditions for occupational equilibria to exist in the market and in the jungle, and compare their performance. At a common occupational profile, the market maximizes aggregate surplus, whereas allocations in the jungle are Pareto efficient with monetary holdings fixed but need not maximize surplus. Endogenous occupational choices introduce an additional source of institutional differences. We find that a market occupational equilibrium outperforms a jungle occupational equilibrium, in aggregate terms, under two conditions: (i) every occupation in the jungle is available in the market, and (ii) the market is perfectly competitive, in the sense that prices cannot be manipulated by unilateral changes in occupations. We also establish an individual welfare comparison without this price-invariance condition: among identical individuals, everyone weakly prefers an occupational equilibrium in the market to a symmetric occupational equilibrium in the jungle. Our analysis places the institutional foundations of exchange at the center of the welfare comparison and provides a framework for studying coercive institutions that survive alongside markets.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Information and voting: Evidence from Peru's 2026 general elections

Logistical failures during Peru's 2026 general elections postponed voting at thirteen locations in Lima Sur, so that roughly 55,000 registered electors cast ballots after election-night estimates and partial official returns had become public. We exploit this natural experiment to study whether public signals about candidate viability reshape choices on simultaneous presidential and legislative ballots. In our model of joint electoral choice, voters update beliefs about runoff qualification and legislative prospects and trade off candidate affinity, office-specific preferences, and the value of aligned representation. Upward revisions to perceived viability raise a candidate's presidential support and, through aligned representation, that of its legislative list, while office-specific preferences can generate divergent responses across ballots. Using cardinality matching, we compare delayed locations to election-day locations balanced on prior electoral preferences, demographics, and socioeconomic conditions. Estimates, as shares of the registered electorate, reveal substantial reallocation of presidential support: Nieto, López Aliaga, and Sánchez gain 11.2, 3.9, and 1.2 percentage points; Álvarez, López Chau, and Belmont lose 4.4, 2.9, and 2.8; the remaining parties jointly lose 9.9; blank and invalid ballots fall by 2.9; and Fujimori's estimate is indistinguishable from zero. Legislative support moves in the same direction for every party, but by smaller magnitudes. The results are consistent with perceived viability shaping choice across offices, with distinct presidential and legislative responses, and underscore the stakes of rules governing the release of election-night estimates and partial results while some electors have yet to vote.

econ.EM↗

arXiv2025

Congestion and Penalization in Optimal Transport

We introduce a novel model based on the discrete optimal transport problem that incorporates congestion costs and replaces traditional constraints with weighted penalization terms. This approach better captures real-world scenarios characterized by demand-supply imbalances and heterogeneous congestion costs. We develop an analytical method for computing interior solutions, which proves particularly useful under specific conditions. Additionally, we propose an $O((N+L)N^2 L^2)$ algorithm to compute the optimal interior solution. For certain cases, we derive a closed-form solution and conduct a comparative statics analysis. Finally, we present examples demonstrating how our model yields solutions distinct from classical approaches, leading to more accurate outcomes in specific contexts, such as Peru's health and education sectors.

math.OC↗