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Marcin Łyczak

Publications and source records attributed to Marcin Łyczak.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

First-order Logic with Being a Thesis Modal Operator

We introduce syntactic modal operator $\BOX$ for \textit{being a thesis} into first-order logic. This logic is a modern realization of R. Carnap's old ideas on modality, as logical necessity (J. Symb. Logic, 1946) \cite{Ca46}. We place it within the modern framework of quantified modal logic with a variant of possible world semantics with variable domains. We prove completeness using a kind of normal form and show that in the canonical frame, the relation on all maximal consistent sets, $R = \{\langle Γ, Δ\rangle : \forall A (\BOX A \in Γ\Longrightarrow A \in Δ)\}$, is a universal relation. The strength of the $\BOX$ operator is a proper extension of modal logic $\mathsf{S5}$. Using completeness, we prove that satisfiability in a model of $\BOX A$ under arbitrary valuation implies that $A$ is a thesis of formulated logic. So we can syntactically define logical entailment and consistency. Our semantics differ from S. Kripke's standard one \cite{Kr63} in syntax, semantics, and interpretation of the necessity operator. We also have free variables, contrary to Kripke's and Carnap's approaches, but our notion of substitution is non-standard (variables inside modalities are not free). All $\BOX$-free first-order theses are provable, as well as the Barcan formula and its converse. Our specific theses are \linebreak[4] $\BOX A \to \forall x A$, $\neg \BOX (x = y)$, $\neg \BOX \neg (x = y)$, $\neg \BOX P(x)$, $\neg \BOX \neg P(x)$. We also have $\POS \exists x A(x) \to \POS A(^{y}/_{x})$, and $\forall x \BOX A(x) \to \BOX A(^{y}/_{x})$, if $A$ is a $\BOX$-free formula.

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Classical Mereology is Axiomatizable Using Primitive Fusion in Two Sorted Logic

\textit{Mereological fusion}, also known as \textit{composition} and \textit{sum}, was originally used by me as a primitive notion to axiomatize \textit{Extensional Mereology} wih \textit{atoms} in \cite{Ly22}. Here, I extend this idea to axiomatize \textit{General Extensional Mereology}, also called \textit{Classical Mereology}, which is neutral regarding the existence of atoms. I give a proof that classical mereology is axiomatizable using primitive mereological fusion within the framework of two-sorted logic, as I announced in \cite{Ly22}. The use of the primitive notion of fusion instead of primitive notion of \textit{part} was considered by G. Leibniz \cite[50]{CoVa21}, S. Leśniewski \cite[CCLXIV, CCLXIV]{Le92}, K. Fine \cite{Fi10}, J. Ketland, and T. Schindler \cite{KeSh16}, and S. Kleishmid \cite{Kl17}. C. Lejewski formulated mereology using a single axiom with primitive mereological sum \cite[222]{Sb84}. However, Lejewski's theory is formulated in non-classical language of Leśniewski's ontology and contains complicated quantification over function symbols, including quantification on \textit{part of} and \textit{sum of}. Lejewski's approach is not expressible in modern mereologies. The presented theory is the first contemporary axiomatization of classical mereology in two-sorted logic with primitive mereological fusion.

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Atomism Axiomatised Using Mereological Composition as a Primitive Notion

Atomism is the view that everything is composed of atoms. The view within the framework of the contemporary formal approach is expressed on the ground of mereology with the use of the primitive notion of being a part as every object has at least one atomic part [2, 48], [3, 145], [17, 42], or using mereological fusion [16, 24] which is defined by being a part. We will briefly present a discussion between A. Varzi and A. Shiver concerning the two approaches and propose a new intuitive axiomatic characterization of atomism. We build a system with a primitive notion of composition that holds between individuals and pluralities. We assume only two specific axioms: each object is a unique composition of unique atoms, and being a composition of some objects is equivalent to being the composition of all atoms of these objects. In our approach, notions of part, and atom, are secondary to composition: atom is defined as an object that cannot be a composition of two or more objects, and part is defined as inclusion between atoms. We will show that the theory, with only these two specific axioms, is sufficient to adequately express atomism as we prove that the theory is definitionally equivalent to atomistic extensional mereology with plural quantification allowed and mereological fusion defined. Our theory requires neither full comprehension schema nor the existence of any specific compositions (there are models with only atoms). Therefore, it may constitute the basis on which atomistic concepts of reality are further strengthened, specifically those in which the notion of being a part is not used. To the best of our knowledge, our proposal is the only formal theory of atomism using the primitive notion of composition.

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