arXiv subjects

Marco Alberto Javarone

Publications and source records attributed to Marco Alberto Javarone.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2017

Conformity-Driven Agents Support Ordered Phases in the Spatial Public Goods Game

We investigate the spatial Public Goods Game in the presence of fitness-driven and conformity-driven agents. This framework usually considers only the former type of agents, i.e., agents that tend to imitate the strategy of their fittest neighbors. However, whenever we study social systems, the evolution of a population might be affected also by social behaviors as conformism, stubbornness, altruism, and selfishness. Although the term evolution can assume different meanings depending on the considered domain, here it corresponds to the set of processes that lead a system towards an equilibrium or a steady-state. We map fitness to the agents' payoff so that richer agents are those most imitated by fitness-driven agents, while conformity-driven agents tend to imitate the strategy assumed by the majority of their neighbors. Numerical simulations aim to identify the nature of the transition, on varying the amount of the relative density of conformity-driven agents in the population, and to study the nature of related equilibria. Remarkably, we find that conformism generally fosters ordered cooperative phases and may also lead to bistable behaviors.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2017

The Beneficial Role of Mobility for the Emergence of Innovation

Innovation is a key ingredient for the evolution of several systems, including social and biological ones. Focused investigations and lateral thinking may lead to innovation, as well as serendipity and other random discovery processes. Some individuals are talented at proposing innovation (say innovators), while others at deeply exploring proposed novelties, at getting further insights on a theory, or at developing products, services, and so on (say developers). This separation in terms of innovators and developers raises an issue of paramount importance: under which conditions a system is able to maintain innovators? According to a simple model, this work investigates the evolutionary dynamics that characterize the emergence of innovation. In particular, we consider a population of innovators and developers, in which agents form small groups whose composition is crucial for their payoff. The latter depends on the heterogeneity of the formed groups, on the amount of innovators they include, and on an award-factor that represents the policy of the system for promoting innovation. Under the hypothesis that a "mobility" effect may support the emergence of innovation, we compare the equilibria reached by our population in different cases. Results confirm the beneficial role of "mobility", and the emergence of further interesting phenomena.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2016

Evolutionary Dynamics of Group Formation

We introduce a model, based on the Evolutionary Game Theory, for studying the dynamics of group formation. The latter constitutes a relevant phenomenon observed in different animal species, whose individuals tend to cluster together forming groups of different size. Results of previous investigations suggest that this phenomenon might have similar reasons across different species, such as improving the individual safety (e.g. from predators), and increasing the probability to get food resources. Remarkably, the group size might strongly vary from species to species, and sometimes even within the same species. In the proposed model, an agent population tries to form homogeneous groups. The homogeneity of a group is computed according to a spin vector, that characterizes each agent, and represents a set a features (e.g. physical traits). We analyze the formation of groups of different size, on varying a parameter named 'individual payoff'. The latter represents the gain one agent would receive acting individually. In particular, the agents choose whether to form a group (receiving a 'group payoff'), or if to play individually (receiving an 'individual payoff'). The phase diagram representing the equilibria of our population shows a sharp transition between the 'group phase' and the 'individual phase', in correspondence of a critical 'individual payoff'. In addition, we found that forming (homogeneous) small groups is easier than forming big groups. To conclude, we deem that our model and the related results supports the hypothesis that the phenomenon of group formation has evolutionary roots.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2016

An Evolutionary Strategy based on Partial Imitation for Solving Optimization Problems

In this work we introduce an evolutionary strategy to solve combinatorial optimization tasks, i.e. problems characterized by a discrete search space. In particular, we focus on the Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP), i.e. a famous problem whose search space grows exponentially, increasing the number of cities, up to becoming NP-hard. The solutions of the TSP can be codified by arrays of cities, and can be evaluated by fitness, computed according to a cost function (e.g. the length of a path). Our method is based on the evolution of an agent population by means of an imitative mechanism, we define `partial imitation'. In particular, agents receive a random solution and then, interacting among themselves, may imitate the solutions of agents with a higher fitness. Since the imitation mechanism is only partial, agents copy only one entry (randomly chosen) of another array (i.e. solution). In doing so, the population converges towards a shared solution, behaving like a spin system undergoing a cooling process, i.e. driven towards an ordered phase. We highlight that the adopted `partial imitation' mechanism allows the population to generate solutions over time, before reaching the final equilibrium. Results of numerical simulations show that our method is able to find, in a finite time, both optimal and suboptimal solutions, depending on the size of the considered search space.

cond-mat.dis-nn↗

arXiv2016

Is Poker a Skill Game? New Insights from Statistical Physics

During last years poker has gained a lot of prestige in several countries and, beyond to be one of the most famous card games, it represents a modern challenge for scientists belonging to different communities, spanning from artificial intelligence to physics and from psychology to mathematics. Unlike games like chess, the task of classifying the nature of poker (i.e., as 'skill game' or gambling) seems really hard and it also constitutes a current problem, whose solution has several implications. In general, gambling offers equal winning probabilities both to rational players (i.e., those that use a strategy) and to irrational ones (i.e., those without a strategy). Therefore, in order to uncover the nature of poker, a viable way is comparing performances of rational versus irrational players during a series of challenges. Recently, a work on this topic revealed that rationality is a fundamental ingredient to succeed in poker tournaments. In this study we analyze a simple model of poker challenges by a statistical physics approach, with the aim to uncover the nature of this game. As main result we found that, under particular conditions, few irrational players can turn poker into gambling. Therefore, although rationality is a key ingredient to succeed in poker, also the format of challenges has an important role in these dynamics, as it can strongly influence the underlying nature of the game. The importance of our results lies on related implications, as for instance in identifying the limits poker can be considered as a `skill game' and, as a consequence, which kind of format must be chosen to devise algorithms able to face humans.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2016

Fermionic Networks: Modeling Adaptive Complex Networks with Fermionic Gases

We study the structure of Fermionic networks, i.e., a model of networks based on the behavior of fermionic gases, and we analyze dynamical processes over them. In this model, particle dynamics have been mapped to the domain of networks, hence a parameter representing the temperature controls the evolution of the system. In doing so, it is possible to generate adaptive networks, i.e., networks whose structure varies over time. As shown in previous works, networks generated by quantum statistics can undergo critical phenomena as phase transitions and, moreover, they can be considered as thermodynamic systems. In this study, we analyze Fermionic networks and opinion dynamics processes over them, framing this network model as a computational model useful to represent complex and adaptive systems. Results highlight that a strong relation holds between the gas temperature and the structure of the achieved networks. Notably, both the degree distribution and the assortativity vary as the temperature varies, hence we can state that fermionic networks behave as adaptive networks. On the other hand, it is worth to highlight that we did not find relation between outcomes of opinion dynamics processes and the gas temperature. Therefore, although the latter plays a fundamental role in gas dynamics, on the network domain its importance is related only to structural properties of fermionic networks.

cond-mat.dis-nn↗

arXiv2016

Poker as a Skill Game: Rational vs Irrational Behaviors

In many countries poker is one of the most popular card games. Although each variant of poker has its own rules, all involve the use of money to make the challenge meaningful. Nowadays, in the collective consciousness, some variants of poker are referred to as games of skill, others as gambling. A poker table can be viewed as a psychology lab, where human behavior can be observed and quantified. This work provides a preliminary analysis of the role of rationality in poker games, using a stylized version of Texas Hold'em. In particular, we compare the performance of two different kinds of players, i.e., rational vs irrational players, during a poker tournament. Results show that these behaviors (i.e., rationality and irrationality) affect both the outcomes of challenges and the way poker should be classified.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2016

The Role of Noise in the Spatial Public Goods Game

In this work we aim to analyze the role of noise in the spatial Public Goods Game, one of the most famous games in Evolutionary Game Theory. The dynamics of this game is affected by a number of parameters and processes, namely the topology of interactions among the agents, the synergy factor, and the strategy revision phase. The latter is a process that allows agents to change their strategy. Notably, rational agents tend to imitate richer neighbors, in order to increase the probability to maximize their payoff. By implementing a stochastic revision process, it is possible to control the level of noise in the system, so that even irrational updates may occur. In particular, in this work we study the effect of noise on the macroscopic behavior of a finite structured population playing the Public Goods Game. We consider both the case of a homogeneous population, where the noise in the system is controlled by tuning a parameter representing the level of stochasticity in the strategy revision phase, and a heterogeneous population composed of a variable proportion of rational and irrational agents. In both cases numerical investigations show that the Public Goods Game has a very rich behavior which strongly depends on the amount of noise in the system and on the value of the synergy factor. To conclude, our study sheds a new light on the relations between the microscopic dynamics of the Public Goods Game and its macroscopic behavior, strengthening the link between the field of Evolutionary Game Theory and statistical physics.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2016

Modeling Evolutionary Dynamics of Lurking in Social Networks

Lurking is a complex user-behavioral phenomenon that occurs in all large-scale online communities and social networks. It generally refers to the behavior characterizing users that benefit from the information produced by others in the community without actively contributing back to the production of social content. The amount and evolution of lurkers may strongly affect an online social environment, therefore understanding the lurking dynamics and identifying strategies to curb this trend are relevant problems. In this regard, we introduce the Lurker Game, i.e., a model for analyzing the transitions from a lurking to a non-lurking (i.e., active) user role, and vice versa, in terms of evolutionary game theory. We evaluate the proposed Lurker Game by arranging agents on complex networks and analyzing the system evolution, seeking relations between the network topology and the final equilibrium of the game. Results suggest that the Lurker Game is suitable to model the lurking dynamics, showing how the adoption of rewarding mechanisms combined with the modeling of hypothetical heterogeneity of users' interests may lead users in an online community towards a cooperative behavior.

cs.SI↗

arXiv2016

Network Strategies in Election Campaigns

This study considers a simple variation of the voter model with two competing parties. In particular, we represent the case of political elections, where people can choose to support one of the two candidates or to remain neutral. People operate within a social network and their opinions depend on those of the people with whom they interact. Therefore, they may change their opinions over time, which may mean supporting one particular candidate or none. Candidates attempt to gain people's support by interacting with them, whether they are in the same social circle (i.e. neighbors) or not. In particular, candidates follow a strategy of interacting for a time with people they do not know (that is, people who are not their neighbors). Our analysis of the proposed model sought to establish which network strategies are the most effective for candidates to gain popular support. We found that the most suitable strategy depends on the topology of the social network. Finally, we investigated the role of charisma in these dynamics. Charisma is relevant in several social contexts, since charismatic people usually exercise a strong influence over others. Our results showed that candidates' charisma is an important contributory factor to a successful network strategy in election campaigns.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2016

Modeling Radicalization Phenomena in Heterogeneous Populations

The phenomenon of radicalization is investigated within a mixed population composed of core and sensitive subpopulations. The latest includes first to third generation immigrants. Respective ways of life may be partially incompatible. In case of a conflict core agents behave as inflexible about the issue. In contrast, sensitive agents can decide either to live peacefully adjusting their way of life to the core one, or to oppose it with eventually joining violent activities. The interplay dynamics between peaceful and opponent sensitive agents is driven by pairwise interactions. These interactions occur both within the sensitive population and by mixing with core agents. The update process is monitored using a Lotka-Volterra-like Ordinary Differential Equation. Given an initial tiny minority of opponents that coexist with both inflexible and peaceful agents, we investigate implications on the emergence of radicalization. Opponents try to turn peaceful agents to opponents driving radicalization. However, inflexible core agents may step in to bring back opponents to a peaceful choice thus weakening the phenomenon. The required minimum individual core involvement to actually curb radicalization is calculated.It is found to be a function of both the majority or minority status of the sensitive subpopulation with respect to the core subpopulation and the degree of activeness of opponents. The results highlight the instrumental role core agents can have to hinder radicalization within the sensitive subpopulation. Some hints are outlined to favor novel public policies towards social integration.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2016

Statistical Physics of the Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma with Memory-Aware Agents

We introduce an analytical model to study the evolution towards equilibrium in spatial games, with `memory-aware' agents, i.e., agents that accumulate their payoff over time. In particular, we focus our attention on the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma, as it constitutes an emblematic example of a game whose Nash equilibrium is defection. Previous investigations showed that, under opportune conditions, it is possible to reach, in the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma, an equilibrium of cooperation. Notably, it seems that mechanisms like motion may lead a population to become cooperative. In the proposed model, we map agents to particles of a gas so that, on varying the system temperature, they randomly move. In doing so, we are able to identify a relation between the temperature and the final equilibrium of the population, explaining how it is possible to break the classical Nash equilibrium in the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma when considering agents able to increase their payoff over time. Moreover, we introduce a formalism to study order-disorder phase transitions in these dynamics. As result, we highlight that the proposed model allows to explain analytically how a population, whose interactions are based on the Prisoner's Dilemma, can reach an equilibrium far from the expected one; opening also the way to define a direct link between evolutionary game theory and statistical physics.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2015

Emerging heterogeneities in Italian customs and comparison with nearby countries

In this work we apply techniques and modus operandi typical of Statistical Mechanics to a large dataset about key social quantifiers and compare the resulting behaviours of five European nations, namely France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Switzerland. The social quantifiers considered are $i.$ the evolution of the number of autochthonous marriages (i.e. between two natives) within a given territorial district and $ii.$ the evolution of the number of mixed marriages (i.e. between a native and an immigrant) within a given territorial district. Our investigations are twofold. From a theoretical perspective, we develop novel techniques, complementary to classical methods (e.g. historical series and logistic regression), in order to detect possible collective features underlying the empirical behaviours; from an experimental perspective, we evidence a clear outline for the evolution of the social quantifiers considered. The comparison between experimental results and theoretical predictions is excellent and allows speculating that France, Italy and Spain display a certain degree of {\em internal heterogeneity}, that is not found in Germany and Switzerland; such heterogeneity, quite mild in France and in Spain, is not negligible in Italy and highlights quantitative differences in the customs of Northern and Southern regions. These findings may suggest the persistence of two culturally distinct communities, long-term lasting heritages of different and well-established cultures.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2015

Poker Cash Game: a Thermodynamic Description

Poker is one of the most popular card games, whose rational investigation represents also one of the major challenges in several scientific areas, spanning from information theory and artificial intelligence to game theory and statistical physics. In principle, several variants of Poker can be identified, although all of them make use of money to make the challenge meaningful and, moreover, can be played in two different formats: tournament and cash game. An important issue when dealing with Poker is its classification, i.e., as a `skill game' or as gambling. Nowadays, its classification still represents an open question, having a long list of implications (e.g., legal and healthcare) that vary from country to country. In this study, we analyze Poker challenges, considering the cash game format, in terms of thermodynamics systems. Notably, we propose a framework to represent a cash game Poker challenge that, although based on a simplified scenario, allows both to obtain useful information for rounders (i.e., Poker players), and to evaluate the role of Poker room in this context. Finally, starting from a model based on thermodynamics, we show the evolution of a Poker challenge, making a direct connection with the probability theory underlying its dynamics and finding that, even if we consider these games as `skill games', to take a real profit from Poker is really hard.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2015

Conformism-driven phases of opinion formation on heterogeneous networks: the q-voter model case

The q-voter model, a variant of the classic voter model, has been analyzed by several authors: while allowing to study opinion dynamics, this model is also believed to be one of the most representative among the many defined in the wide field of sociophysics. Here, we investigate the consequences of conformity on the consensus reaching process, by numerically simulating a q-voter model with agents behaving either as conformists or non-conformists, embedded on heterogeneous network topologies (as small-world and scale-free). In fact, although it is already known that conformity enhances the reaching of consensus, the related process is often studied only on fully-connected networks, thus strongly limiting our full understanding of it. This paper represents a first step in the direction of analyzing more realistic social models, showing that different opinion formation-phases, driven by the conformist agents density, are observable. As a result, we identify threshold values of the density of conformist agents, varying across different topologies and separating different regimes of our system, ranging from a disordered phase, where different opinions coexist, to a gradually more ordered phase, where consensus is eventually reached.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2014

Social Influences in Opinion Dynamics: the Role of Conformity

We study the effects of social influences in opinion dynamics. In particular, we define a simple model, based on the majority rule voting, in order to consider the role of conformity. Conformity is a central issue in social psychology as it represents one of people's behaviors that emerges as a result of their interactions. The proposed model represents agents, arranged in a network and provided with an individual behavior, that change opinion in function of those of their neighbors. In particular, agents can behave as conformists or as nonconformists. In the former case, agents change opinion in accordance with the majority of their social circle (i.e., their neighbors); in the latter case, they do the opposite, i.e., they take the minority opinion. Moreover, we investigate the nonconformity both on a global and on a local perspective, i.e., in relation to the whole population and to the social circle of each nonconformist agent, respectively. We perform a computational study of the proposed model, with the aim to observe if and how the conformity affects the related outcomes. Moreover, we want to investigate whether it is possible to achieve some kind of equilibrium, or of order, during the evolution of the system. Results highlight that the amount of nonconformist agents in the population plays a central role in these dynamics. In particular, conformist agents play the role of stabilizers in fully-connected networks, whereas the opposite happens in complex networks. Furthermore, by analyzing complex topologies of the agent network, we found that in the presence of radical nonconformist agents the topology of the system has a prominent role; otherwise it does not matter since we observed that a conformist behavior is almost always more convenient. Finally, we analyze the results of the model by considering that agents can change also their behavior over time.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2014

Quantum-Classical Transitions in Complex Networks

The inherent properties of specific physical systems can be used as metaphors for investigation of the behavior of complex networks. This insight has already been put into practice in previous work, e.g., studying the network evolution in terms of phase transitions of quantum gases or representing distances among nodes as if they were particle energies. This paper shows that the emergence of different structures in complex networks, such as the scale-free and the winner-takes-all networks, can be represented in terms of a quantum-classical transition for quantum gases. In particular, we propose a model of fermionic networks that allows us to investigate the network evolution and its dependence on the system temperature. Simulations, performed in accordance with the cited model, clearly highlight the separation between classical random and winner-takes-all networks, in full correspondence with the separation between classical and quantum regions for quantum gases. We deem this model useful for the analysis of synthetic and real complex networks.

cond-mat.dis-nn↗

arXiv2014

Competitive dynamics of lexical innovations in multi-layer networks

We study the introduction of lexical innovations into a community of language users. Lexical innovations, i.e., new terms added to people's vocabulary, play an important role in the process of language evolution. Nowadays, information is spread through a variety of networks, including, among others, online and offline social networks and the World Wide Web. The entire system, comprising networks of different nature, can be represented as a multi-layer network. In this context, lexical innovations diffusion occurs in a peculiar fashion. In particular, a lexical innovation can undergo three different processes: its original meaning is accepted; its meaning can be changed or misunderstood (e.g., when not properly explained), hence more than one meaning can emerge in the population; lastly, in the case of a loan word, it can be translated into the population language (i.e., defining a new lexical innovation or using a synonym) or into a dialect spoken by part of the population. Therefore, lexical innovations cannot be considered simply as information. We develop a model for analyzing this scenario using a multi-layer network comprising a social network and a media network. The latter represents the set of all information systems of a society, e.g., television, the World Wide Web and radio. Furthermore, we identify temporal directed edges between the nodes of these two networks. In particular, at each time step, nodes of the media network can be connected to randomly chosen nodes of the social network and vice versa. In so doing, information spreads through the whole system and people can share a lexical innovation with their neighbors or, in the event they work as reporters, by using media nodes. Lastly, we use the concept of "linguistic sign" to model lexical innovations, showing its fundamental role in the study of these dynamics. Many numerical simulations have been performed.

physics.soc-ph↗