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Marcos Curty

Publications and source records attributed to Marcos Curty.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Phase-error estimation for quantum key distribution with leaky receivers

Practical quantum key distribution (QKD) receivers may leak information about their measurement outcomes and settings to the channel (e.g., through detector backflashes or back-reflected Trojan-horse light) that could compromise the protocol's security. Here we present a simple finite-key security proof based on phase-error estimation for prepare-and-measure QKD in the presence of either a priori information leakage about the basis choices and/or a posteriori information leakage about the measurement outcomes. The proof requires only a bound on the distinguishability of the side-channel states. Furthermore, the analysis is modular and compatible with existing security proofs that address detector and source imperfections, making it applicable to a wide range of practical QKD implementations.

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Deterministic QKD source robust against side-channel attacks

Quantum key distribution (QKD) is secure in principle, but practical security can be undermined by discrepancies between real devices and the idealized models assumed in security proofs. Source side channels, including those exploited by Trojan-horse attacks, are particularly detrimental: neglecting them compromises implementation security, whereas accounting for them reduces performance. Here we propose a QKD source that is intrinsically robust against side-channel attacks. Unlike existing passive and modulator-free schemes, it requires neither post-selection of the emitted pulses nor devices with a perfect extinction ratio to suppress side channels, and it does not introduce correlations between the intensity and the encoded bit or basis. Consequently, under idealized source assumptions commonly adopted in proposals for existing schemes, conventional decoy-state security analyses apply directly, yielding substantially higher key rates. Our proposal appears to be within reach of current technology and therefore provides a clear and practical path toward implementation-secure QKD.

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Quantum Key Distribution Beyond Stationary Channels

Quantum key distribution (QKD) over non-stationary channels, such as satellite links, is characterized by short, high-loss, and strongly fluctuating transmission windows that produce sparse detection events. In many QKD protocols, these data must be analyzed using non-IID statistical inequalities, yet existing methods either become loose for small sample sizes or heavily rely on fine-tuning, yielding poor estimates when the optical channel is mis-modeled. Using mixture martingale techniques, we introduce tight concentration inequalities that retain sharpness when the channel model is accurate, while remaining robust to model mismatch. In realistic simulations of satellite QKD with fluctuating loss, the resulting bounds can reduce the minimum required number of transmitted signals by more than $70\%$.

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Finite-key security analysis of decoy-state QKD with source and detector imperfections

Decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) is the most widely adopted approach for overcoming the limitations of imperfect single-photon sources. However, existing security proofs typically either neglect important device imperfections or rely on assumptions that are difficult to justify in realistic high-speed implementations, such as the independent and identically distributed nature of the emitted signals. In this work, we combine and extend several recent theoretical advances to provide a comprehensive analytical finite-key security proof for decoy-state QKD that simultaneously incorporates multiple practically relevant transmitter and receiver imperfections, including state-preparation flaws, bit and basis side-channel leakage and correlations, setting-independent intensity fluctuations, and detection-efficiency mismatches.

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Phase-correlation-free quantum key distribution source operating at gigahertz rates

Phase randomization is essential for the security of practical decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. Commonly, implementations rely on laser sources which are either actively phase-randomized, or gain-switched. However, at high repetition rates these show correlations, which can ultimately compromise security and performance. We present a 1.25 GHz phase-randomized QKD source based on a super-luminescent light emitting diode (SLED) operating in the C-band as a compact and cost-effective alternative. The source generates $\sim100$ ps optical pulses with $400$ ps pulse-to-pulse separation, compatible with high-speed time-bin encoding. Interferometric measurements demonstrate $>99\%$ visibility between adjacent time bins, confirming strong first-order coherence within the same quantum signals, while the spontaneous-emission-driven nature of the SLED ensures intrinsic global phase randomization between adjacent signals. This work establishes a scalable SLED-based platform for high-speed prepare-and-measure QKD systems.

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Finite-key feasibility of geostationary quantum key distribution

Quantum key distribution (QKD) via geostationary Earth orbit (GEO) satellites offers a compelling route to continuous, continental-scale secure communications. However, operation in this regime entails extreme channel loss and significant background noise, particularly if daylight operation is desired. We present a comprehensive end-to-end feasibility study of a decoy-state BB84 protocol in a GEO downlink configuration, incorporating variable-length finite-key security and tight statistical bounds to expand the achievable positive-key regime. Our analysis encompasses the principal receiver architectures relevant to downlink QKD and employs a physically realistic channel model that captures the dominant loss and noise mechanisms. We evaluate performance across rural, urban, and coastal environments at multiple wavelengths, including visible Fraunhofer absorption minima and the telecom band. Using historical cloud data across Europe, we forecast the annual secret-key yield across the continent. Through a systematic exploration of the high-dimensional parameter space, we identify key trade-offs and performance bottlenecks that determine feasibility. These results establish practical operating thresholds and provide actionable design guidelines for future GEO-QKD missions.

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Numerical security analysis for practical quantum key distribution

Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises information-theoretic security based on quantum mechanics and idealized device models. Practical implementations, however, deviate from these models due to unavoidable device imperfections, and existing security proofs fall short of capturing the complexity of real-world systems. Here we introduce a versatile numerical finite-key security framework valid against general coherent attacks and applicable to a broad class of practical QKD setups. It accommodates most relevant imperfections at both transmitter and receiver, including non-independent-and-identically-distributed (non-IID) signals arising in high-speed QKD systems due to the limited bandwidth of optical modulators, while requiring only partial characterization of the apparatuses. We demonstrate the power of our framework by proving the security of a realistic decoy-state QKD implementation with laser sources, providing a practical route towards rigorous security certification of real-world QKD setups.

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Security of decoy-state quantum key distribution with correlated bit-and-basis encoders

Practical quantum key distribution (QKD) modulators inevitably introduce correlations, causing the state emitted in a given round to depend on the setting choices made in previous rounds. These correlations break the round-by-round independence structure on which many widely used security proof techniques rely, leaving a significant gap between available theoretical guarantees and the reality of practical implementations. In this work, we develop a fully analytical finite-key security proof for decoy-state BB84 against general coherent attacks that rigorously incorporates correlations introduced by Alice's bit-and-basis encoder, while requiring only partial characterization of such correlations. Crucially, it does so without requiring the round partitioning of the data used for phase-error estimation introduced in previous works, showing that this technique is not indispensable for dealing with correlated encoders, and resulting in improved finite-key performance. Moreover, we also analyze the case of ideal single-photon sources, and our results reveal a counterintuitive effect: in the presence of strong encoding correlations, decoy-state BB84 can outperform single-photon implementations.

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Device-independent quantum cryptography with input leakage

Device-independence is the gold standard of quantum cryptography. To meet this standard, a central assumption is that no information leakage occurs during protocol execution. We relax this assumption by analyzing CHSH-based randomness certification and key distribution with partial leakage of the inputs, modeled in terms of a noisy channel. Our results quantify the certifiable local randomness and the secret key rate as a function of the magnitude of the input leakage.

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Rigorous phase-error-estimation security framework for QKD with correlated sources

Practical QKD modulators introduce correlations between consecutively emitted pulses due to bandwidth limitations, violating key assumptions underlying many security proof techniques. Here, we address this problem by introducing a simple yet powerful mathematical framework to directly extend phase-error-estimation-based security proofs for imperfect but uncorrelated sources to also incorporate encoding correlations. Our framework overcomes important limitations of previous approaches in terms of generality and rigor, significantly narrowing the gap between theoretical security guarantees and real-world QKD implementations.

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Fault-Tolerant Quantum Key Distribution: Enabling Overclocked Modulation

Implementation security, higher generation rate, and lower cost are primary missions in the domain of quantum key distributions in recent years. However, simultaneously achieving robust security, high speed, and low cost often resembles an ``impossible triangle''. This is largely because the modulation system imposes a strict bandwidth limitation. Pushing a low-cost modulator to a high repetition frequency inevitably introduces correlations and misalignment, which can create security loopholes. Conversely, operating at a conservative rate fails to exploit the system's potential, while adopting ultra-high-bandwidth components is often expensive for practical implementation, forcing a perpetual trade-off among implementation security, key rate, and cost. In this work, we propose a comprehensive countermeasure to overcome this modulation bandwidth bottleneck. We present a protocol specifically designed to address the security loopholes arising from modulation imperfections, ensuring security even in overclocked modulation systems. Furthermore, we develop two practical techniques to characterize and mitigate the detrimental correlations. Our experimental setup demonstrates that the proposed method achieves the lowest correlated deviation reported in similar studies, while maintaining a high secret key rate using a bandwidth-limited modulation system. By simultaneously enhancing security, performance, and practicality, this work releases QKD systems from the traditional performance-cost trade-off in the near term, paving the way for widespread deployment. In the long run, this work can be readily integrated with high-bandwidth components to further push the boundaries of system performance.

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Reference-Beam Attacks against Twin-Field Quantum Key Distribution using Optical Injection Locking

Twin-Field Quantum Key Distribution (TF-QKD) has become a leading protocol to bring quantum communications to the national scale. The protocol requires the establishment of a shared phase and frequency reference between distant parties, which is commonly achieved by using an external reference laser in an Optical Injection Locking (OIL) architecture. In this work, we analyze the side channels in OIL-based TF-QKD that may arise from adversarial manipulation of the various degrees of freedom of this untrusted reference beam. We experimentally demonstrate two realistic attack scenarios: fast intensity modulation of the reference laser, and additional signals embedded in the reference light exploiting wavelengths undetectable by conventional monitoring techniques. These attacks can allow a potential eavesdropper to deterministically increase the mean photon number of the sources, or circumvent the decoy-state technique, respectively. To counter these vulnerabilities, we propose practical and highly effective countermeasures that reinforce the security of TF-QKD systems without significant additional complexity or performance degradation.

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Modeling and Characterization of Arbitrary Order Pulse Correlations for Quantum Key Distribution

In quantum key distribution (QKD) implementations, memory effects caused by the limited bandwidth of modulators and/or other active devices can leak information about previous setting choices. Security proofs addressing this imperfection require the characterization of pulse correlations, which, in principle, can be of an arbitrary order, even unbounded. Experimentally, this is very hard (if not impossible) to achieve. Here, we solve this pressing problem by introducing a simple linear model to explain pulse correlations. In so doing, we can derive upper bounds on the correlation strength of arbitrary order from the study of the step response of the system. Importantly, this is what is needed to ensure the security of QKD in the presence of pulse correlations of unbounded length. We experimentally characterize short-range correlations and apply the proposed method to account for long-range correlations to an infinite order.

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Geometrical constructions of purity testing protocols and their applications to quantum communication

Purity testing protocols (PTPs), i.e., protocols that decide with high probability whether or not a distributed bipartite quantum state is maximally entangled, have been proven to be a useful tool in many quantum communication applications. In this paper, we provide geometrical constructions for such protocols that originate directly from classical linear error correcting codes (LECCs), in a way that the properties of the resulting PTPs are completely determined from those of the LECCs used in the construction. We investigate the implications of our results in various tasks, including error detection, entanglement purification for general quantum error models and quantum message authentication.

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Numerical security analysis for quantum key distribution with partial state characterization

Numerical security proofs offer a versatile approach for evaluating the secret-key generation rate of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols. However, existing methods typically require perfect source characterization, which is unrealistic in practice due to the presence of inevitable encoding imperfections and side channels. In this paper, we introduce a novel security proof technique based on semidefinite programming that can evaluate the secret-key rate for both prepare-and-measure and measurement-device-independent QKD protocols when only partial information about the emitted states is available, significantly improving the applicability and practical relevance compared to existing numerical techniques. We demonstrate that our method can outperform current analytical approaches addressing partial state characterization in terms of achievable secret-key rates, particularly for protocols with non-qubit encoding spaces. This represents a significant step towards bridging the gap between theoretical security proofs and practical QKD implementations.

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Quantum key distribution overcoming practical correlated intensity fluctuations

Intensity correlations between neighboring pulses open a prevalent yet often overlooked security loophole in decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD). As a solution, we present and experimentally demonstrate an intensity-correlation-tolerant QKD protocol that mitigates the negative effect that this phenomenon has on the secret key rate according to existing security analyses. Compared to previous approaches, our method significantly enhances the robustness against correlations, notably improving both the maximum transmission distances and the achievable secret key rates across different scenarios. By relaxing constraints on correlation parameters, our protocol enables practical devices to counter intensity correlations. We experimentally demonstrate this first practical solution that directly overcomes this security vulnerability, establish the feasibility and efficacy of our proposal, taking a major step towards loophole-free and high-performance QKD.

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Loss-tolerant quantum key distribution with detection efficiency mismatch

Current implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD) typically rely on prepare-and-measure (P&M) schemes. Unfortunately, these implementations are not completely secure, unless security proofs fully incorporate all imperfections of real devices. So far, existing proofs have primarily focused on imperfections of either the light source or the measurement device. In this paper, we establish a security proof for the loss-tolerant P&M QKD protocol that incorporates imperfections in both the source and the detectors. Specifically, we demonstrate the security of this scheme when the emitted states deviate from the ideal ones and Bob's measurement device does not meet the basis-independent detection efficiency condition. Furthermore, we conduct an experiment to characterise the detection efficiency mismatch of commercial single-photon detectors as a function of the polarisation state of the input light, and determine the expected secret key rate in the presence of state preparation flaws when using such detectors. Our work provides a way towards guaranteeing the security of actual implementations of widely deployed P&M QKD.

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