arXiv subjects

Marcus Williams

Publications and source records attributed to Marcus Williams.

7 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Predicting LLM Safety Before Release by Simulating Deployment

Pre-deployment safety evaluations aim to inform the downstream risks of releasing a new AI model. Yet most evaluations provide limited evidence about how often undesired model behavior will occur in deployment: they generally have insufficient coverage, are unrepresentative, and are generally recognizable as tests. To address these concerns, we study a simple way to simulate a model deployment: starting from de-identified conversations from a previous model deployment, we hold fixed the initial conversation prefix and regenerate the next response using a candidate model. The resulting responses can then both be audited for novel misalignments and used to estimate the prevalence of model misbehavior before deployment. We evaluate deployment simulation across four GPT-5-series deployments, using registered, outcome-blinded predictions for GPT-5.4 and retrospective analyses of three earlier releases. We find that deployment simulation produces informative estimates of post-deployment misbehavior rates and outperforms baselines based on adversarially selected production data; its evaluation-awareness point estimates were also much closer to production traffic than those from traditional evaluations. We also identify the realism of tool resampling as a central challenge for further improving predictions and share results suggesting that this challenge is surmountable even in complex tool-use settings. Finally, we show that deployment simulation can be seeded from public chat datasets and remain informative about production misbehavior rates, suggesting a path for external researchers to run deployment-grounded evaluations without access to private production logs. Overall, deployment simulation helps evaluators forecast how language models will behave in the real world and supports more quantitative assessment of deployment risk.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Monitoring Monitorability

Observability into the decision making of modern AI systems may be required to safely deploy increasingly capable agents. Monitoring the chain-of-thought (CoT) of today's reasoning models has proven effective for detecting misbehavior. However, this "monitorability" may be fragile under different training procedures, data sources, or even continued system scaling. To measure and track monitorability, we propose three evaluation archetypes (intervention, process, and outcome-property) and a new monitorability metric, and introduce a broad evaluation suite. We demonstrate that these evaluations can catch simple model organisms trained to have obfuscated CoTs, and that CoT monitoring is more effective than action-only monitoring in practical settings. We compare the monitorability of various frontier models and find that most models are fairly, but not perfectly, monitorable. We also evaluate how monitorability scales with inference-time compute, reinforcement learning optimization, and pre-training model size. We find that longer CoTs are generally more monitorable and that RL optimization does not materially decrease monitorability even at the current frontier scale. Notably, we find that for a model at a low reasoning effort, we could instead deploy a smaller model at a higher reasoning effort (thereby matching capabilities) and obtain a higher monitorability, albeit at a higher overall inference compute cost. We further investigate agent-monitor scaling trends and find that scaling a weak monitor's test-time compute when monitoring a strong agent increases monitorability. Giving the weak monitor access to CoT not only improves monitorability, but it steepens the monitor's test-time compute to monitorability scaling trend. Finally, we show we can improve monitorability by asking models follow-up questions and giving their follow-up CoT to the monitor.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

CTRL-Rec: Controlling Recommender Systems With Natural Language

When users are dissatisfied with recommendations from a recommender system, they often lack fine-grained controls for changing them. Large language models (LLMs) offer a solution by allowing users to guide their recommendations through natural language requests (e.g., "I want to see respectful posts with a different perspective than mine"). We propose a method, CTRL-Rec, that allows for natural language control of traditional recommender systems in real-time with computational efficiency. Specifically, at training time, we use an LLM to simulate whether users would approve of items based on their language requests, and we train embedding models that approximate such simulated judgments. We then integrate these user-request-based predictions into the standard weighting of signals that traditional recommender systems optimize. At deployment time, we require only a single LLM embedding computation per user request, allowing for real-time control of recommendations. In experiments with the MovieLens dataset, our method consistently allows for fine-grained control across a diversity of requests. In a study with 19 Letterboxd users, we find that CTRL-Rec was positively received by users and significantly enhanced users' sense of control and satisfaction with recommendations compared to traditional controls.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Stress Testing Deliberative Alignment for Anti-Scheming Training

Highly capable AI systems could secretly pursue misaligned goals -- what we call "scheming". Because a scheming AI would deliberately try to hide its misaligned goals and actions, measuring and mitigating scheming requires different strategies than are typically used in ML. We propose that assessing anti-scheming interventions requires at least (1) testing propensity to scheme on far out-of-distribution (OOD) tasks, (2) evaluating whether lack of scheming is driven by situational awareness, and (3) checking for robustness to pre-existing misaligned goals. We use a broad category of "covert actions" -- such as secretly breaking rules or intentionally underperforming in tests -- as a proxy for scheming, and design evaluations for covert actions. We then stress-test deliberative alignment as a case study for anti-scheming. Across 26 OOD evaluations (180+ environments), deliberative alignment reduces covert action rates (OpenAI o3: 13%->0.4%) but does not fully eliminate them. Our mitigation is also able to largely stop agents from pursuing a hidden goal previously trained into the model, but we still find misbehavior after additional red-teaming. We find that models' chain-of-thought (CoT) often demonstrates awareness of being evaluated for alignment, and show causal evidence that this awareness decreases covert behavior, while unawareness increases it. Therefore, we cannot exclude that the observed reductions in covert action rates are at least partially driven by situational awareness. While we rely on human-legible CoT for training, studying situational awareness, and demonstrating clear evidence of misalignment, our ability to rely on this degrades as models continue to depart from reasoning in standard English. We encourage research into alignment mitigations for scheming and their assessment, especially for the adversarial case of deceptive alignment, which this paper does not address.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2024

On Targeted Manipulation and Deception when Optimizing LLMs for User Feedback

As LLMs become more widely deployed, there is increasing interest in directly optimizing for feedback from end users (e.g. thumbs up) in addition to feedback from paid annotators. However, training to maximize human feedback creates a perverse incentive structure for the AI to resort to manipulative or deceptive tactics to obtain positive feedback from users who are vulnerable to such strategies. We study this phenomenon by training LLMs with Reinforcement Learning with simulated user feedback in environments of practical LLM usage. In our settings, we find that: 1) Extreme forms of "feedback gaming" such as manipulation and deception are learned reliably; 2) Even if only 2% of users are vulnerable to manipulative strategies, LLMs learn to identify and target them while behaving appropriately with other users, making such behaviors harder to detect; 3) To mitigate this issue, it may seem promising to leverage continued safety training or LLM-as-judges during training to filter problematic outputs. Instead, we found that while such approaches help in some of our settings, they backfire in others, sometimes even leading to subtler manipulative behaviors. We hope our results can serve as a case study which highlights the risks of using gameable feedback sources -- such as user feedback -- as a target for RL.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Multi-objective Reinforcement learning from AI Feedback

This paper presents Multi-Objective Reinforcement Learning from AI Feedback (MORLAIF), a novel approach to improving the alignment and performance of language models trained using reinforcement learning from AI feedback (RLAIF). In contrast to standard approaches that train a single preference model to represent all human preferences, MORLAIF decomposes this task into multiple simpler principles, such as toxicity, factuality, and sycophancy. Separate preference models are trained for each principle using feedback from GPT-3.5-Turbo. These preference model scores are then combined using different scalarization functions to provide a reward signal for Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) training of the target language model. Our experiments indicate that MORLAIF outperforms the standard RLAIF baselines and that MORLAIF can be used to align larger language models using smaller ones. Surprisingly, the choice of scalarization function does not appear to significantly impact the results.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

On The Expressivity of Objective-Specification Formalisms in Reinforcement Learning

Most algorithms in reinforcement learning (RL) require that the objective is formalised with a Markovian reward function. However, it is well-known that certain tasks cannot be expressed by means of an objective in the Markov rewards formalism, motivating the study of alternative objective-specification formalisms in RL such as Linear Temporal Logic and Multi-Objective Reinforcement Learning. To date, there has not yet been any thorough analysis of how these formalisms relate to each other in terms of their expressivity. We fill this gap in the existing literature by providing a comprehensive comparison of 17 salient objective-specification formalisms. We place these formalisms in a preorder based on their expressive power, and present this preorder as a Hasse diagram. We find a variety of limitations for the different formalisms, and argue that no formalism is both dominantly expressive and straightforward to optimise with current techniques. For example, we prove that each of Regularised RL, (Outer) Nonlinear Markov Rewards, Reward Machines, Linear Temporal Logic, and Limit Average Rewards can express a task that the others cannot. The significance of our results is twofold. First, we identify important expressivity limitations to consider when specifying objectives for policy optimization. Second, our results highlight the need for future research which adapts reward learning to work with a greater variety of formalisms, since many existing reward learning methods assume that the desired objective takes a Markovian form. Our work contributes towards a more cohesive understanding of the costs and benefits of different RL objective-specification formalisms.

cs.LG↗