arXiv subjects

Mariëlle Stoelinga

Publications and source records attributed to Mariëlle Stoelinga.

29 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2023

Attack time analysis in dynamic attack trees via integer linear programming

Attack trees (ATs) are an important tool in security analysis, and an important part of AT analysis is computing metrics. However, metric computation is NP-complete in general. In this paper, we showcase the use of mixed integer linear programming (MILP) as a tool for quantitative analysis. Specifically, we use MILP to solve the open problem of calculating the min time metric of dynamic ATs, i.e., the minimal time to attack a system. We also present two other tools to further improve our MILP method: First, we show how the computation can be sped up by identifying the modules of an AT, i.e. subtrees connected to the rest of the AT via only one node. Second, we define a general semantics for dynamic ATs that significantly relaxes the restrictions on attack trees compared to earlier work, allowing us to apply our methods to a wide variety of ATs. Experiments on a synthetic testing set of large ATs verify that both the integer linear programming approach and modular analysis considerably decrease the computation time of attack time analysis.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2023

Cost-damage analysis of attack trees

Attack trees (ATs) are a widely deployed modelling technique to categorize potential attacks on a system. An attacker of such a system aims at doing as much damage as possible, but might be limited by a cost budget. The maximum possible damage for a given cost budget is an important security metric of a system. In this paper, we find the maximum damage given a cost budget by modelling this problem with ATs, both in deterministic and probabilistic settings. We show that the general problem is NP-complete, and provide heuristics to solve it. For general ATs these are based on integer linear programming. However when the AT is tree-structured, then one can instead use a faster bottom-up approach. We also extend these methods to other problems related to the cost-damage tradeoff, such as the cost-damage Pareto front.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2022

Efficient and Generic Algorithms for Quantitative Attack Tree Analysis

Numerous analysis methods for quantitative attack tree analysis have been proposed. These algorithms compute relevant security metrics, i.e. performance indicators that quantify how good the security of a system is; typical metrics being the most likely attack, the cheapest, or the most damaging one. However, existing methods are only geared towards specific metrics or do not work on general attack trees. This paper classifies attack trees in two dimensions: proper trees vs. directed acyclic graphs (i.e. with shared subtrees); and static vs. dynamic gates. For three out of these four classes, we propose novel algorithms that work over a generic attribute domain, encompassing a large number of concrete security metrics defined on the attack tree semantics; dynamic attack trees with directed acyclic graph structure are left as an open problem. We also analyse the computational complexity of our methods.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2021

Efficient Algorithms for Quantitative Attack Tree Analysis

Numerous analysis methods for quantitative attack tree analysis have been proposed. These algorithms compute relevant security metrics, i.e. performance indicators that quantify how good the security of a system is, such as the most likely attack, the cheapest, or the most damaging one. This paper classifies attack trees in two dimensions: proper trees vs. directed acyclic graphs (i.e. with shared subtrees); and static vs. dynamic gates. For each class, we propose novel algorithms that work over a generic attribute domain, encompassing a large number of concrete security metrics defined on the attack tree semantics. We also analyse the computational complexity of our methods.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2019

Rare Event Simulation for non-Markovian repairable Fault Trees

Dynamic Fault Trees (DFT) are widely adopted in industry to assess the dependability of safety-critical equipment. Since many systems are too large to be studied numerically, DFTs dependability is often analysed using Monte Carlo simulation. A bottleneck here is that many simulation samples are required in the case of rare events, e.g. in highly reliable systems where components fail seldomly. Rare Event Simulation (RES) provides techniques to reduce the number of samples in the case of rare events. We present a RES technique based on importance splitting, to study failures in highly reliable DFTs. Whereas RES usually requires meta-information from an expert, our method is fully automatic: by cleverly exploiting the fault tree structure we extract the so-called importance function. We handle DFTs with Markovian and non-Markovian failure and repair distributions (for which no numerical methods exist) and show the efficiency of our approach on several case studies.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2019

Hackers vs. Security: Attack-Defence Trees as Asynchronous Multi-Agent Systems

Attack-Defence Trees (ADTs) are well-suited to assess possible attacks to systems and the efficiency of counter-measures. In this paper, we first enrich the available constructs with reactive patterns that cover further security scenarios, and equip all constructs with attributes such as time and cost to allow quantitative analyses. Then, ADTs are modelled as (an extension of) Asynchronous Multi-Agents Systems--EAMAS. The ADT-EAMAS transformation is performed in a systematic manner that ensures correctness. The transformation allows us to quantify the impact of different agents configurations on metrics such as attack time. Using EAMAS also permits parametric verification: we derive constraints for property satisfaction. Our approach is exercised on several case studies using the Uppaal and IMITATOR tools.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2019

Parametric analyses of attack-fault trees

Risk assessment of cyber-physical systems, such as power plants, connected devices and IT-infrastructures has always been challenging: safety (i.e. absence of unintentional failures) and security (i.e. no disruptions due to attackers) are conditions that must be guaranteed. One of the traditional tools used to help considering these problems is attack trees, a tree-based formalism inspired by fault trees, a well-known formalism used in safety engineering. In this paper we define and implement the translation of attack-fault trees (AFTs) to a new extension of timed automata, called parametric weighted timed automata. This allows us to parametrize constants such as time and discrete costs in an AFT and then, using the model-checker IMITATOR, to compute the set of parameter values such that a successful attack is possible. Using the different sets of parameter values computed, different attack and fault scenarios can be deduced depending on the budget, time or computation power of the attacker, providing helpful data to select the most efficient counter-measure.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2015

Ioco Theory for Probabilistic Automata

Model-based testing (MBT) is a well-known technology, which allows for automatic test case generation, execution and evaluation. To test non-functional properties, a number of test MBT frameworks have been developed to test systems with real-time, continuous behaviour, symbolic data and quantitative system aspects. Notably, a lot of these frameworks are based on Tretmans' classical input/output conformance (ioco) framework. However, a model-based test theory handling probabilistic behaviour does not exist yet. Probability plays a role in many different systems: unreliable communication channels, randomized algorithms and communication protocols, service level agreements pinning down up-time percentages, etc. Therefore, a probabilistic test theory is of great practical importance. We present the ingredients for a probabilistic variant of ioco and define the πoco relation, show that it conservatively extends ioco and define the concepts of test case, execution and evaluation.

cs.LO↗

arXiv2012

Talking quiescence: a rigorous theory that supports parallel composition, action hiding and determinisation

The notion of quiescence - the absence of outputs - is vital in both behavioural modelling and testing theory. Although the need for quiescence was already recognised in the 90s, it has only been treated as a second-class citizen thus far. This paper moves quiescence into the foreground and introduces the notion of quiescent transition systems (QTSs): an extension of regular input-output transition systems (IOTSs) in which quiescence is represented explicitly, via quiescent transitions. Four carefully crafted rules on the use of quiescent transitions ensure that our QTSs naturally capture quiescent behaviour. We present the building blocks for a comprehensive theory on QTSs supporting parallel composition, action hiding and determinisation. In particular, we prove that these operations preserve all the aforementioned rules. Additionally, we provide a way to transform existing IOTSs into QTSs, allowing even IOTSs as input that already contain some quiescent transitions. As an important application, we show how our QTS framework simplifies the fundamental model-based testing theory formalised around ioco.

cs.SE↗

arXiv2010

Confluence Reduction for Probabilistic Systems (extended version)

This paper presents a novel technique for state space reduction of probabilistic specifications, based on a newly developed notion of confluence for probabilistic automata. We prove that this reduction preserves branching probabilistic bisimulation and can be applied on-the-fly. To support the technique, we introduce a method for detecting confluent transitions in the context of a probabilistic process algebra with data, facilitated by an earlier defined linear format. A case study demonstrates that significant reductions can be obtained.

cs.LO↗

arXiv2008

Game Refinement Relations and Metrics

We consider two-player games played over finite state spaces for an infinite number of rounds. At each state, the players simultaneously choose moves; the moves determine a successor state. It is often advantageous for players to choose probability distributions over moves, rather than single moves. Given a goal, for example, reach a target state, the question of winning is thus a probabilistic one: what is the maximal probability of winning from a given state? On these game structures, two fundamental notions are those of equivalences and metrics. Given a set of winning conditions, two states are equivalent if the players can win the same games with the same probability from both states. Metrics provide a bound on the difference in the probabilities of winning across states, capturing a quantitative notion of state similarity. We introduce equivalences and metrics for two-player game structures, and we show that they characterize the difference in probability of winning games whose goals are expressed in the quantitative mu-calculus. The quantitative mu-calculus can express a large set of goals, including reachability, safety, and omega-regular properties. Thus, we claim that our relations and metrics provide the canonical extensions to games, of the classical notion of bisimulation for transition systems. We develop our results both for equivalences and metrics, which generalize bisimulation, and for asymmetrical versions, which generalize simulation.

cs.LO↗