arXiv subjects

Maria Chli

Publications and source records attributed to Maria Chli.

8 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Strategic Infrastructure Design via Multi-Agent Congestion Games with Joint Placement and Pricing

Real-world infrastructure planning increasingly involves strategic interactions among autonomous agents competing over congestible, limited resources. Applications such as Electric Vehicle (EV) charging, emergency response, and intelligent transportation require coordinated resource placement and pricing decisions, while anticipating the adaptive behaviour of decentralised, self-interested agents. We propose a novel multi-agent framework for joint placement and pricing under such interactions, formalised as a bi-level optimisation model. The upper level represents a central planner, while the lower level captures agent responses via coupled non-atomic congestion games. Motivated by the EV charging domain, we study a setting where a central planner provisions chargers and road capacity under budget and profitability constraints. The agent population includes both EV drivers and non-charging drivers (NCDs), who respond to congestion, delays, and costs. To solve the resulting NP-hard problem, we introduce ABO-MPN, a double-layer approximation framework that decouples agent types, applies integer adjustment and rounding, and targets high-impact placement and pricing decisions. Experiments on benchmark networks show that our model reduces social cost by up to 40% compared to placement- or pricing-only baselines, and generalises to other MAS-relevant domains.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2026

A Game-Theoretic Framework for Intelligent EV Charging Network Optimisation in Smart Cities

The transition to Electric Vehicles (EVs) demands intelligent, congestion-aware infrastructure planning to balance user convenience, economic viability, and traffic efficiency. We present a joint optimisation framework for EV Charging Station (CS) placement and pricing, explicitly capturing strategic driver behaviour through coupled non-atomic congestion games over road networks and charging facilities. From a Public Authority (PA) perspective, the model minimises social cost, travel times, queuing delays and charging expenses, while ensuring infrastructure profitability. To solve the resulting Mixed-Integer Nonlinear Programme, we propose a scalable two-level approximation method, Joint Placement and Pricing Optimisation under Driver Equilibrium (JPPO-DE), combining driver behaviour decomposition with integer relaxation. Experiments on the benchmark Sioux Falls Transportation Network (TN) demonstrate that our method consistently outperforms single-parameter baselines, effectively adapting to varying budgets, EV penetration levels, and station capacities. It achieves performance improvements of at least 16% over state-of-the-art approaches. A generalisation procedure further extends scalability to larger networks. By accurately modelling traffic equilibria and enabling adaptive, efficient infrastructure design, our framework advances key intelligent transportation system goals for sustainable urban mobility.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2026

Strategic Interactions in Multi-Level Stackelberg Games with Non-Follower Agents and Heterogeneous Leaders

Strategic interaction in congested systems is commonly modelled using Stackelberg games, where competing leaders anticipate the behaviour of self-interested followers. A key limitation of existing models is that they typically ignore agents who do not directly participate in market competition, yet both contribute to and adapt to congestion. Although such non-follower agents do not generate revenue or respond to market incentives, their behaviour reshapes congestion patterns, which in turn affects the decisions of leaders and followers through shared resources. We argue that overlooking non-followers leads to systematically distorted equilibrium predictions in congestion-coupled markets. To address this, we introduce a three-level Stackelberg framework with heterogeneous leaders differing in decision horizons and feasible actions, strategic followers, and non-follower agents that captures bidirectional coupling between infrastructure decisions, competition, and equilibrium congestion. We instantiate the framework in the context of electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure, where charging providers compete with rivals, while EV and non-EV traffic jointly shape congestion. The model illustrates how explicitly accounting for non-followers and heterogeneous competitors qualitatively alters strategic incentives and equilibrium outcomes. Beyond EV charging, the framework applies to a broad class of congestion-coupled multi-agent systems in mobility, energy, and computing markets.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2026

Robust Information Design for Multi-Agent Systems with Complementarities: Smallest-Equilibrium Threshold Policies

We study information design in multi-agent systems (MAS) with binary actions and strategic complementarities, where an external designer influences behavior only through signals. Agents play the smallest-equilibrium of the induced Bayesian game, reflecting conservative, coordination-averse behavior typical in distributed systems. We show that when utilities admit a convex potential and welfare is convex, the robustly implementable optimum has a remarkably simple form: perfect coordination at each state: either everyone acts or no one does. We provide a constructive threshold rule: compute a one-dimensional score for each state, sort states, and pick a single threshold (with a knife-edge lottery for at most one state). This rule is an explicit optimal vertex of a linear program (LP) characterized by feasibility and sequential obedience constraints. Empirically, in both vaccination and technology-adoption domains, our constructive policy matches LP optima, scales as $O(|\Theta|\log|\Theta|)$, and avoids the inflated welfare predicted by obedience-only designs that assume the designer can dictate the (best) equilibrium. The result is a general, scalable recipe for robust coordination in MAS with complementarities.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Synthesizing Traffic Datasets using Graph Neural Networks

Traffic congestion in urban areas presents significant challenges, and Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) have sought to address these via automated and adaptive controls. However, these systems often struggle to transfer simulated experiences to real-world scenarios. This paper introduces a novel methodology for bridging this `sim-real' gap by creating photorealistic images from 2D traffic simulations and recorded junction footage. We propose a novel image generation approach, integrating a Conditional Generative Adversarial Network with a Graph Neural Network (GNN) to facilitate the creation of realistic urban traffic images. We harness GNNs' ability to process information at different levels of abstraction alongside segmented images for preserving locality data. The presented architecture leverages the power of SPADE and Graph ATtention (GAT) network models to create images based on simulated traffic scenarios. These images are conditioned by factors such as entity positions, colors, and time of day. The uniqueness of our approach lies in its ability to effectively translate structured and human-readable conditions, encoded as graphs, into realistic images. This advancement contributes to applications requiring rich traffic image datasets, from data augmentation to urban traffic solutions. We further provide an application to test the model's capabilities, including generating images with manually defined positions for various entities.

cs.CV↗

arXiv2021

Optimal Auction Design for the Gradual Procurement of Strategic Service Provider Agents

We consider an outsourcing problem where a software agent procures multiple services from providers with uncertain reliabilities to complete a computational task before a strict deadline. The service consumer requires a procurement strategy that achieves the optimal balance between success probability and invocation cost. However, the service providers are self-interested and may misrepresent their private cost information if it benefits them. For such settings, we design a novel procurement auction that provides the consumer with the highest possible revenue, while giving sufficient incentives to providers to tell the truth about their costs. This auction creates a contingent plan for gradual service procurement that suggests recruiting a new provider only when the success probability of the already hired providers drops below a time-dependent threshold. To make this auction incentive compatible, we propose a novel weighted threshold payment scheme which pays the minimum among all truthful mechanisms. Using the weighted payment scheme, we also design a low-complexity near-optimal auction that reduces the computational complexity of the optimal mechanism by 99% with only marginal performance loss (less than 1%). We demonstrate the effectiveness and strength of our proposed auctions through both game theoretical and numerical analysis. The experiment results confirm that the proposed auctions exhibit 59% improvement in performance over the current state-of-the-art, by increasing success probability up to 79% and reducing invocation cost by up to 11%.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2018

Domain Adaptation for Reinforcement Learning on the Atari

Deep reinforcement learning agents have recently been successful across a variety of discrete and continuous control tasks; however, they can be slow to train and require a large number of interactions with the environment to learn a suitable policy. This is borne out by the fact that a reinforcement learning agent has no prior knowledge of the world, no pre-existing data to depend on and so must devote considerable time to exploration. Transfer learning can alleviate some of the problems by leveraging learning done on some source task to help learning on some target task. Our work presents an algorithm for initialising the hidden feature representation of the target task. We propose a domain adaptation method to transfer state representations and demonstrate transfer across domains, tasks and action spaces. We utilise adversarial domain adaptation ideas combined with an adversarial autoencoder architecture. We align our new policies' representation space with a pre-trained source policy, taking target task data generated from a random policy. We demonstrate that this initialisation step provides significant improvement when learning a new reinforcement learning task, which highlights the wide applicability of adversarial adaptation methods; even as the task and label/action space also changes.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2006

The emergence of knowledge exchange: an agent-based model of a software market

We investigate knowledge exchange among commercial organisations, the rationale behind it and its effects on the market. Knowledge exchange is known to be beneficial for industry, but in order to explain it, authors have used high level concepts like network effects, reputation and trust. We attempt to formalise a plausible and elegant explanation of how and why companies adopt information exchange and why it benefits the market as a whole when this happens. This explanation is based on a multi-agent model that simulates a market of software providers. Even though the model does not include any high-level concepts, information exchange naturally emerges during simulations as a successful profitable behaviour. The conclusions reached by this agent-based analysis are twofold: (1) A straightforward set of assumptions is enough to give rise to exchange in a software market. (2) Knowledge exchange is shown to increase the efficiency of the market.

cs.MA↗