Non-obvious Manipulability in the Additively Separable Group Activity Selection Problem
In this work, we study the additively separable Group Activity Selection Problem (AS-GASP) in an imperfect information setting, where agents have private preferences over activities and weights over other agents. Our goal is to design mechanisms that assign agents to activities based on their declared preferences and weights, with the objective of maximizing social welfare while ensuring truthful reporting. We, therefore, focus on the notion of non-obvious manipulability (NOM), a form of resilience to manipulation. We first investigate the relationship between NOM and social welfare optimality. In this regard, our main result shows that, when preferences and weights are arbitrary or non-negative, any optimal mechanism is non-obviously manipulable. In contrast, when either preferences or weights are binary, we show that optimality and NOM may be incompatible. We then turn to computational aspects. While it is known that computing an optimal outcome for the AS-GASP is NP-hard even in restricted settings, we establish a strong inapproximability result showing that no polynomial-time algorithm can guarantee a bounded approximation ratio when preferences and weights may take arbitrary values. In turn, when preferences are non-negative, we show that a bounded approximation is possible, and we present two asymptotically optimal approximation mechanisms that are also guaranteed to satisfy NOM.