arXiv subjects

Maria Serna

Publications and source records attributed to Maria Serna.

18 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2024

Rainbow connectivity of multilayered random geometric graphs

An edge-colored multigraph $G$ is rainbow connected if every pair of vertices is joined by at least one rainbow path, i.e., a path where no two edges are of the same color. In the context of multilayered networks we introduce the notion of multilayered random geometric graphs, from $h\ge 2$ independent random geometric graphs $G(n,r)$ on the unit square. We define an edge-coloring by coloring the edges according to the copy of $G(n,r)$ they belong to and study the rainbow connectivity of the resulting edge-colored multigraph. We show that $r(n)=\left(\frac{\log n}{n}\right)^{\frac{h-1}{2h}}$ is a threshold of the radius for the property of being rainbow connected. This complements the known analogous results for the multilayerd graphs defined on the Erd\H{o}s-R\' enyi random model.

math.CO↗

arXiv2022

On Vertex Bisection Width of Random $d$-Regular Graphs

Vertex bisection is a graph partitioning problem in which the aim is to find a partition into two equal parts that minimizes the number of vertices in one partition set that have a neighbor in the other set. We are interested in giving upper bounds on the vertex bisection width of random $d$-regular graphs for constant values of $d$. Our approach is based on analyzing a greedy algorithm by using the Differential Equations Method. In this way, we obtain the first known upper bounds for the vertex bisection width in random regular graphs. The results are compared with experimental ones and with lower bounds obtained by Kolesnik and Wormald, (Lower Bounds for the Isoperimetric Numbers of Random Regular Graphs, SIAM J. on Disc. Math. 28(1), 553-575, 2014).

cs.DS↗

arXiv2022

Playing with Thresholds on the Forward Linear Threshold Rank

Social networks are the natural space for the spreading of information and influence and have become a media themselves. Several models capturing that diffusion process have been proposed, most of them based on the Independent Cascade (IC) model or on the Linear Threshold (LT) model. The IC model is probabilistic while the LT model relies on the knowledge of an actor to be convinced, reflected in an associated individual threshold. Although the LT-based models contemplate an individual threshold for each actor in the network, the existing studies so far have always considered a threshold of 0.5 equal in all actors (i.e., a simple majority activation criterion). Our main objective in this work is to start the study on how the dissemination of information on networks behaves when we consider other options for setting those thresholds and how many network actors end up being influenced by this dissemination. For doing so, we consider a recently introduced centrality measure based on the LT model, the Forward Linear Threshold Rank (FLTR). We analyze experimentally the ranking properties for several networks in which the influence resistance threshold follows different schemes. Here we consider three different schemes: (1) uniform, in which all players have the same value; (2) random, where each player is assigned a threshold u.a.r. in a prescribed interval; and (3) determined by the value of another centrality measure on the actor. Our results show that the selection has a clear impact on the ranking, even quite significant and abrupt in some cases. We conclude that the social networks ranks that provide the best assignments for the individual thresholds are PageRank and FLTR.

cs.SI↗

arXiv2021

The Multicolored Graph Realization Problem

We introduce the Multicolored Graph Realization problem (MGRP). The input to the problem is a colored graph $(G,\varphi)$, i.e., a graph together with a coloring on its vertices. We can associate to each colored graph a cluster graph ($G_\varphi)$ in which, after collapsing to a node all vertices with the same color, we remove multiple edges and self-loops. A set of vertices $S$ is multicolored when $S$ has exactly one vertex from each color class. The problem is to decide whether there is a multicolored set $S$ such that, after identifying each vertex in $S$ with its color class, $G[S]$ coincides with $G_\varphi$. The MGR problem is related to the class of generalized network problems, most of which are NP-hard. For example the generalized MST problem. MGRP is a generalization of the Multicolored Clique Problem, which is known to be W[1]-hard when parameterized by the number of colors. Thus MGRP remains W[1]-hard, when parameterized by the size of the cluster graph and when parameterized by any graph parameter on $G_\varphi$, among those for treewidth. We look to instances of the problem in which both the number of color classes and the treewidth of $G_\varphi$ are unbounded. We show that MGRP is NP-complete when $G_\varphi$ is either chordal, biconvex bipartite, complete bipartite or a 2-dimensional grid. Our hardness results follows from suitable reductions from the 1-in-3 monotone SAT problem. Our reductions show that the problem remains hard even when the maximum number of vertices in a color class is 3. In the case of the grid, the hardness holds also graphs with bounded degree. We complement those results by showing combined parameterizations under which the MGR problem became tractable.

cs.CC↗

arXiv2020

On List k-Coloring Convex Bipartite Graphs

List k-Coloring (Li k-Col) is the decision problem asking if a given graph admits a proper coloring compatible with a given list assignment to its vertices with colors in {1,2,..,k}. The problem is known to be NP-hard even for k=3 within the class of 3-regular planar bipartite graphs and for k=4 within the class of chordal bipartite graphs. In 2015, Huang, Johnson and Paulusma asked for the complexity of Li 3-Col in the class of chordal bipartite graphs. In this paper we give a partial answer to this question by showing that Li k-Col is polynomial in the class of convex bipartite graphs. We show first that biconvex bipartite graphs admit a multichain ordering, extending the classes of graphs where a polynomial algorithm of Enright, Stewart and Tardos (2014) can be applied to the problem. We provide a dynamic programming algorithm to solve the Li k-Col in the calss of convex bipartite graphs. Finally we show how our algorithm can be modified to solve the more general Li H-Col problem on convex bipartite graphs.

cs.CC↗

arXiv2018

Data-compression for Parametrized Counting Problems on Sparse graphs

We study the concept of \emph{compactor}, which may be seen as a counting-analogue of kernelization in counting parameterized complexity. For a function $F:\Sigma^*\to \Bbb{N}$ and a parameterization $\kappa: \Sigma^*\to \Bbb{N}$, a compactor $({\sf P},{\sf M})$ consists of a polynomial-time computable function ${\sf P}$, called \emph{condenser}, and a computable function ${\sf M}$, called \emph{extractor}, such that $F={\sf M}\circ {\sf P}$, and the condensing ${\sf P}(x)$ of $x$ has length at most $s(\kappa(x))$, for any input $x\in \Sigma^*.$ If $s$ is a polynomial function, then the compactor is said to be of polynomial-size. Although the study on counting-analogue of kernelization is not unprecedented, it has received little attention so far. We study a family of vertex-certified counting problems on graphs that are MSOL-expressible; that is, for an MSOL-formula $\phi$ with one free set variable to be interpreted as a vertex subset, we want to count all $A\subseteq V(G)$ where $|A|=k$ and $(G,A)\models \phi.$ In this paper, we prove that every vertex-certified counting problems on graphs that is \emph{MSOL-expressible} and \emph{treewidth modulable}, when parameterized by $k$, admits a polynomial-size compactor on $H$-topological-minor-free graphs with condensing time $O(k^2n^2)$ and decoding time $2^{O(k)}.$ This implies the existence of an {\sf FPT}-algorithm of running time $O(n^2k^2)+2^{O(k)}.$ All aforementioned complexities are under the Uniform Cost Measure (UCM) model where numbers can be stored in constant space and arithmetic operations can be done in constant time.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2016

Uncertainty Analysis of Simple Macroeconomic Models Using Angel-Daemon Games

We propose the use of an angel-daemon framework to perform an uncertainty analysis of short-term macroeconomic models with exogenous components. An uncertainty profile $\mathcal U$ is a short and macroscopic description of a potentially perturbed situation. The angel-daemon framework uses $\mathcal U$ to define a strategic game where two agents, the angel and the daemon, act selfishly having different goals. The Nash equilibria of those games provide the stable strategies in perturbed situations, giving a natural estimation of uncertainty. In this initial work we apply the framework in order to get an uncertainty analysis of linear versions of the IS-LM and the IS-MP models. In those models, by considering uncertainty profiles, we can capture different economical situations. Some of them can be described in terms of macroeconomic policy coordination. In other cases we just analyse the results of the system under some possible perturbation level. Besides providing examples of application we analyse the structure of the Nash equilibria in some particular cases of interest.

cs.CE↗

arXiv2016

Measuring satisfaction in societies with opinion leaders and mediators

An opinion leader-follower model (OLF) is a two-action collective decision-making model for societies, in which three kinds of actors are considered: "opinion leaders", "followers", and "independent actors". In OLF the initial decision of the followers can be modified by the influence of the leaders. Once the final decision is set, a collective decision is taken applying the simple majority rule. We consider a generalization of \OLF, the gOLF models which allow collective decision taken by rules different from the single majority rule. Inspired in this model we define two new families of collective decision-making models associated with cooperative influence games. We define the "oblivious" and "non-oblivious" influence models. We show that gOLF models are non-oblivious influence models played on a two layered bipartite influence graph. Together with OLF models, the Satisfaction measure was introduced and studied. We analyze the computational complexity of the satisfaction measure for gOLF models and the other collective decision-making models introduced in the paper. We show that computing the satisfaction measure is #P-hard in all the considered models except for the basic OLF inwhich the complexity remains open. On the other hand, we provide two subfamilies of decision models in which the satisfaction measure can be computed in polynomial time. Exploiting the relationship with influence games, we can relate the satisfaction measure with the Rae index of an associated simple game. The Rae index is closely related to the Banzhaf value. Thus, our results also extend the families of simple games for which computing the Rae index and the Banzhaf value is computationally hard.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2016

Dimension and codimension of simple games

This paper studies the complexity of computing a representation of a simple game as the intersection (union) of weighted majority games, as well as, the dimension or the codimension. We also present some examples with linear dimension and exponential codimension with respect to the number of players.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2015

Stars and Celebrities: A Network Creation Game

Celebrity games, a new model of network creation games is introduced. The specific features of this model are that players have different celebrity weights and that a critical distance is taken into consideration. The aim of any player is to be close (at distance less than critical) to the others, mainly to those with high celebrity weights. The cost of each player depends on the cost of establishing direct links to other players and on the sum of the weights of those players at a distance greater than the critical distance. We show that celebrity games always have pure Nash equilibria and we characterize the family of subgames having connected Nash equilibria, the so called star celebrity games. We provide exact bounds for the PoA of celebrity games. The PoA can be tightened when restricted to particular classes of Nash equilibria graphs, in particular for trees.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2013

Absorption Time of the Moran Process

The Moran process models the spread of mutations in populations on graphs. We investigate the absorption time of the process, which is the time taken for a mutation introduced at a randomly chosen vertex to either spread to the whole population, or to become extinct. It is known that the expected absorption time for an advantageous mutation is O(n^4) on an n-vertex undirected graph, which allows the behaviour of the process on undirected graphs to be analysed using the Markov chain Monte Carlo method. We show that this does not extend to directed graphs by exhibiting an infinite family of directed graphs for which the expected absorption time is exponential in the number of vertices. However, for regular directed graphs, we show that the expected absorption time is Omega(n log n) and O(n^2). We exhibit families of graphs matching these bounds and give improved bounds for other families of graphs, based on isoperimetric number. Our results are obtained via stochastic dominations which we demonstrate by establishing a coupling in a related continuous-time model. The coupling also implies several natural domination results regarding the fixation probability of the original (discrete-time) process, resolving a conjecture of Shakarian, Roos and Johnson.

cs.DM↗

arXiv2013

On the Stability of Generalized Second Price Auctions with Budgets

The Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction used typically to model sponsored search auctions does not include the notion of budget constraints, which is present in practice. Motivated by this, we introduce the different variants of GSP auctions that take budgets into account in natural ways. We examine their stability by focusing on the existence of Nash equilibria and envy-free assignments. We highlight the differences between these mechanisms and find that only some of them exhibit both notions of stability. This shows the importance of carefully picking the right mechanism to ensure stable outcomes in the presence of budgets

cs.GT↗

arXiv2013

Power indices of influence games and new centrality measures for social networks

In social network analysis, there is a common perception that influence is relevant to determine the global behavior of the society and thus it can be used to enforce cooperation by targeting an adequate initial set of individuals or to analyze global choice processes. Here we propose centrality measures that can be used to analyze the relevance of the actors in process related to spread of influence. In [39] it was considered a multiagent system in which the agents are eager to perform a collective task depending on the perception of the willingness to perform the task of other individuals. The setting is modeled using a notion of simple games called influence games. Those games are defined on graphs were the nodes are labeled by their influence threshold and the spread of influence between its nodes is used to determine whether a coalition is winning or not. Influence games provide tools to measure the importance of the actors of a social network by means of classic power indices and provide a framework to consider new centrality criteria. In this paper we consider two of the most classical power indices, i.e., Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices, as centrality measures for social networks in influence games. Although there is some work related to specific scenarios of game-theoretic networks, here we use such indices as centrality measures in any social network where the spread of influence phenomenon can be applied. Further, we define new centrality measures such as satisfaction and effort that, as far as we know, have not been considered so far. We also perform a comparison of the proposed measures with other three classic centrality measures, degree, closeness and betweenness, considering three social networks. We show that in some cases our measurements provide centrality hierarchies similar to those of other measures, while in other cases provide different hierarchies.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2012

Social Influence as a Voting System: a Complexity Analysis of Parameters and Properties

We consider a simple and altruistic multiagent system in which the agents are eager to perform a collective task but where their real engagement depends on the willingness to perform the task of other influential agents. We model this scenario by an influence game, a cooperative simple game in which a team (or coalition) of players succeeds if it is able to convince enough agents to participate in the task (to vote in favor of a decision). We take the linear threshold model as the influence model. We show first the expressiveness of influence games showing that they capture the class of simple games. Then we characterize the computational complexity of various problems on influence games, including measures (length and width), values (Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf) and properties (of teams and players). Finally, we analyze those problems for some particular extremal cases, with respect to the propagation of influence, showing tighter complexity characterizations.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2012

On the Fixation Probability of Superstars

The Moran process models the spread of genetic mutations through a population. A mutant with relative fitness $r$ is introduced into a population and the system evolves, either reaching fixation (in which every individual is a mutant) or extinction (in which none is). In a widely cited paper (Nature, 2005), Lieberman, Hauert and Nowak generalize the model to populations on the vertices of graphs. They describe a class of graphs (called "superstars"), with a parameter $k$. Superstars are designed to have an increasing fixation probability as $k$ increases. They state that the probability of fixation tends to $1-r^{-k}$ as graphs get larger but we show that this claim is untrue as stated. Specifically, for $k=5$, we show that the true fixation probability (in the limit, as graphs get larger) is at most $1-1/j(r)$ where $j(r)=\Theta(r^4)$, contrary to the claimed result. We do believe that the qualitative claim of Lieberman et al.\ --- that the fixation probability of superstars tends to 1 as $k$ increases --- is correct, and that it can probably be proved along the lines of their sketch. We were able to run larger computer simulations than the ones presented in their paper. However, simulations on graphs of around 40,000 vertices do not support their claim. Perhaps these graphs are too small to exhibit the limiting behaviour.

cs.CE↗

arXiv2011

Approximating Fixation Probabilities in the Generalized Moran Process

We consider the Moran process, as generalized by Lieberman, Hauert and Nowak (Nature, 433:312--316, 2005). A population resides on the vertices of a finite, connected, undirected graph and, at each time step, an individual is chosen at random with probability proportional to its assigned 'fitness' value. It reproduces, placing a copy of itself on a neighbouring vertex chosen uniformly at random, replacing the individual that was there. The initial population consists of a single mutant of fitness $r>0$ placed uniformly at random, with every other vertex occupied by an individual of fitness 1. The main quantities of interest are the probabilities that the descendants of the initial mutant come to occupy the whole graph (fixation) and that they die out (extinction); almost surely, these are the only possibilities. In general, exact computation of these quantities by standard Markov chain techniques requires solving a system of linear equations of size exponential in the order of the graph so is not feasible. We show that, with high probability, the number of steps needed to reach fixation or extinction is bounded by a polynomial in the number of vertices in the graph. This bound allows us to construct fully polynomial randomized approximation schemes (FPRAS) for the probability of fixation (when $r\geq 1$) and of extinction (for all $r>0$).

cs.CC↗

arXiv2011

Complexity of Metric Dimension on Planar Graphs

The metric dimension of a graph $G$ is the size of a smallest subset $L \subseteq V(G)$ such that for any $x,y \in V(G)$ with $x\not= y$ there is a $z \in L$ such that the graph distance between $x$ and $z$ differs from the graph distance between $y$ and $z$. Even though this notion has been part of the literature for almost 40 years, prior to our work the computational complexity of determining the metric dimension of a graph was still very unclear. In this paper, we show tight complexity boundaries for the Metric Dimension problem. We achieve this by giving two complementary results. First, we show that the Metric Dimension problem on planar graphs of maximum degree $6$ is NP-complete. Then, we give a polynomial-time algorithm for determining the metric dimension of outerplanar graphs.

cs.CC↗

arXiv2008

The Complexity of Testing Properties of Simple Games

Simple games cover voting systems in which a single alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo. A simple game or a yes-no voting system is a set of rules that specifies exactly which collections of ``yea'' votes yield passage of the issue at hand. A collection of ``yea'' voters forms a winning coalition. We are interested on performing a complexity analysis of problems on such games depending on the game representation. We consider four natural explicit representations, winning, loosing, minimal winning, and maximal loosing. We first analyze the computational complexity of obtaining a particular representation of a simple game from a different one. We show that some cases this transformation can be done in polynomial time while the others require exponential time. The second question is classifying the complexity for testing whether a game is simple or weighted. We show that for the four types of representation both problem can be solved in polynomial time. Finally, we provide results on the complexity of testing whether a simple game or a weighted game is of a special type. In this way, we analyze strongness, properness, decisiveness and homogeneity, which are desirable properties to be fulfilled for a simple game.

cs.GT↗