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Mario Paolucci

Publications and source records attributed to Mario Paolucci.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

A Policy-oriented Agent-based Model of Recruitment into Organized Crime

Criminal organizations exploit their presence on territories and local communities to recruit new workforce in order to carry out their criminal activities and business. The ability to attract individuals is crucial for maintaining power and control over the territories in which these groups are settled. This study proposes the formalization, development and analysis of an agent-based model (ABM) that simulates a neighborhood of Palermo (Sicily) with the aim to understand the pathways that lead individuals to recruitment into organized crime groups (OCGs). Using empirical data on social, economic and criminal conditions of the area under analysis, we use a multi-layer network approach to simulate this scenario. As the final goal, we test different policies to counter recruitment into OCGs. These scenarios are based on two different dimensions of prevention and intervention: (i) primary and secondary socialization and (ii) law enforcement targeting strategies.

cs.MA

Reducing individuals' risk sensitiveness can promote positive and non-alarmist views about catastrophic events in an agent-based simulation

We present a cognitive model of opinion dynamics which studies the behavior of a population of interacting individuals in the context of risk of natural disaster. In particular, we investigate the response of the individuals to the information received by institutional sources about the correct behaviors for prevention and harm reduction. The results of our study show that alarmist opinions are more likely to be adopted by populations, since worried people

physics.soc-ph

Partner selection supported by opaque reputation promotes cooperative behavior

Reputation plays a major role in human societies, and it has been proposed as an explanation for the evolution of cooperation. While the majority of previous studies equates reputation with a transparent and complete history of players' past decisions, in real life, reputations are often ambiguous and opaque. Using web-based experiments, we explore the extent to which opaque reputation works in isolating defectors, with and without partner selection opportunities. Our results show that low reputation works as a signal of untrustworthiness, whereas medium or high reputation are not taken into account by participants for orienting their choices. We also find that reputation without partner selection does not promote cooperative behavior; that is, defectors do not turn into cooperators only for the sake of getting a positive reputation. Finally, in a third study, we find that, when reputation is pivotal to selection, then a substantial proportion of would-be-defectors turn into cooperators. Taken together, these results provide insights on the characteristics of reputation and on the way in which humans make use of it when selecting partners but also when knowing that they will be selected.

physics.soc-ph

Partner selection supports reputation-based cooperation in a Public Goods Game

In dyadic models of indirect reciprocity, the receivers' history of giving has a significant impact on the donor's decision. When the interaction involves more than two agents things become more complicated, and in large groups cooperation can hardly emerge. In this work we use a Public Goods Game to investigate whether publicly available reputation scores may support the evolution of cooperation and whether this is affected by the kind of network structure adopted. Moreover, if agents interact on a bipartite graph with partner selection cooperation can thrive in large groups and in a small amount of time.

physics.soc-ph