arXiv subjects

Mariola Ndrio

Publications and source records attributed to Mariola Ndrio.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2021

Pricing Economic Dispatch with AC Power Flow via Local Multipliers and Conic Relaxation

We analyze pricing mechanisms in electricity markets with AC power flow equations that define a nonconvex feasible set for the economic dispatch problem. Specifically, we consider two possible pricing schemes. The first among these prices are derived from Lagrange multipliers that satisfy Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions for local optimality of the nonconvex market clearing problem. The second is derived from optimal dual multipliers of the convex semidefinite programming (SDP) based relaxation of the market clearing problem. Relationships between these prices, their revenue adequacy and market equilibrium properties are derived and compared. The SDP prices are shown to equal distribution locational marginal prices derived with second-order conic relaxations of power flow equations over radial distribution networks. We illustrate our theoretical findings through numerical experiments.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2021

Coordinated Transaction Scheduling in Multi-Area Electricity Markets: Equilibrium and Learning

Tie-line scheduling in multi-area power systems in the US largely proceeds through a market-based mechanism called Coordinated Transaction Scheduling (CTS). We analyze this market mechanism through a game-theoretic lens. Our analysis characterizes the effect of market liquidity, market participants' forecasts about inter-area price spreads, transactions fees and coupling of CTS markets with up-to-congestion virtual transactions. Using real data, we empirically verify that CTS bidders can employ simple learning algorithms to discover Nash equilibria that support the conclusions drawn from equilibrium analysis.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Quantifying Market Efficiency Impacts of Aggregated Distributed Energy Resources

We focus on the aggregation of distributed energy resources (DERs) through a profit-maximizing intermediary that enables participation of DERs in wholesale electricity markets. Particularly, we study the market efficiency brought in by the large-scale deployment of DERs and explore to what extent such benefits are offset by the profit-maximizing nature of the aggregator. We deploy a game-theoretic framework to study the strategic interactions between an aggregator and DER owners. The proposed model takes into account the stochastic nature of the DER supply. We explicitly characterize the equilibrium of the game and provide illustrative examples to quantify the efficiency loss due to the strategic incentives of the aggregator. Our numerical experiments illustrate the impact of uncertainty and amount of DER integration on the overall market efficiency.

math.OC↗

arXiv2020

A Scalar Parameterized Mechanism for Two-Sided Markets

We consider a market in which both suppliers and consumers compete for a product via scalar-parameterized supply offers and demand bids. Scalar-parameterized offers/bids are appealing due to their modeling simplicity and desirable mathematical properties with the most prominent being bounded efficiency loss and price markup under strategic interactions. Our model incorporates production capacity constraints and minimum inelastic demand requirements. Under perfect competition, the market mechanism yields allocations that maximize social welfare. When market participants are price-anticipating, we show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, and provide an efficient way to compute the resulting market allocation. Moreover, we explicitly characterize the bounds on the welfare loss and prices observed at the Nash equilibrium.

econ.GN↗