arXiv subjects

Marius Garbea

Publications and source records attributed to Marius Garbea.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Knapsack Secretary is not $1/e$-Competitive

We prove that no algorithm for the knapsack secretary problem can be $1/e$-competitive. The knapsack secretary problem was first introduced by Babaioff, Immorlica, Kempe, and Kleinberg (2007). There have been many improvements to the achievable competitive ratio since then, but the $1/e$ impossibility barrier has remained unchanged. Many combinatorial variants of the secretary problem, including knapsack secretary, inherit the $1/e$ impossibility by embedding the single-choice problem as a special case. We construct a family of hard instances for the $1$-$B$ knapsack secretary problem, which is a special case of the general knapsack secretary problem, to improve the existing impossibility result. We show in this special case that the competitive ratio is at most $0.36437 < \frac{1}{e} - 0.0035$. Our construction is similar to the one used by Abels, Ladewig, Schewior, and Stinzend\"orfer (2022), for which they show an impossibility of $1/(1+e)$ for ordinal algorithms, where only the relative ranks of the items are known. Our work resolves an open question of theirs by showing that $1/e$ cannot be achieved even in the cardinal case of the $1$-$B$ knapsack secretary problem. We complement our impossibility result with a simple algorithm for $1$-$B$ knapsack secretary that is $(1/5.10-o(1))$-competitive for every fixed $B \geq 2$. This improves the guarantee obtained by applying general-purpose random-order knapsack algorithms to this special case.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2025

Polynomial-Time Approximation Schemes via Utility Alignment: Unit-Demand Pricing and More

This paper derives polynomial-time approximation schemes for several NP-hard stochastic optimization problems from the algorithmic mechanism design and operations research literatures. The problems we consider involve a principal or seller optimizing with respect to a subsequent choice by an agent or buyer. These include posted pricing for a unit-demand buyer with independent values (Chawla et al., 2007, Cai and Daskalakis, 2011), assortment optimization with independent utilities (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004), and delegated choice (Khodabakhsh et al., 2024). Our results advance the state of the art for each of these problems. For unit-demand pricing with discrete distributions, our multiplicative PTAS improves on the additive PTAS of Cai and Daskalakis, and we additionally give a PTAS for the unbounded regular case, improving on the latter paper's QPTAS. For assortment optimization, no constant approximation was previously known. For delegated choice, we improve on both the $3$-approximation for the case with no outside option and the super-constant-approximation with an outside option. A key technical insight driving our results is an economically meaningful property we term utility alignment. Informally, a problem is utility aligned if, at optimality, the principal derives most of their utility from realizations where the agent's utility is also high. Utility alignment allows the algorithm designer to focus on maximizing performance on realizations with high agent utility, which is often an algorithmically simpler task. We prove utility alignment results for all the problems mentioned above, including strong results for unit-demand pricing and delegation, as well as a weaker but very broad guarantee that holds for many other problems under very mild conditions.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

EFx Budget-Feasible Allocations with High Nash Welfare

We study the problem of allocating indivisible items to budget-constrained agents, aiming to provide fairness and efficiency guarantees. Specifically, our goal is to ensure that the resulting allocation is envy-free up to any item (EFx) while minimizing the amount of inefficiency that this needs to introduce. We first show that there exist two-agent problem instances for which no EFx allocation is Pareto efficient. We, therefore, turn to approximation and use the Nash social welfare maximizing allocation as a benchmark. For two-agent instances, we provide a procedure that always returns an EFx allocation while achieving the best possible approximation of the optimal Nash social welfare that EFx allocations can achieve. For the more complicated case of three-agent instances, we provide a procedure that guarantees EFx, while achieving a constant approximation of the optimal Nash social welfare for any number of items.

cs.GT↗