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Marius Momeu

Publications and source records attributed to Marius Momeu.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Crustify: Repository-Level Generation of Safe Rust Bindings with LLM Agents and Coverage-Guided Testing

Wrapping C code in a safe Rust interface lets Rust applications use it without writing unsafe code, until the code itself is migrated to Rust. Such bindings are tedious and error-prone to write, however: their internals use unsafe code that the Rust compiler does not check, so a single mistake can introduce undefined behavior (UB), and they have so far been written mostly by hand. We present Crustify, an agentic co-translator that generates safe Rust bindings for repository-level C libraries. Crustify schedules a target's types and symbols into dependency-ordered waves of independent batches that agents bind concurrently. Its agents derive the ownership and lifecycle contract of every pointer and type they wrap, check each binding with coverage-guided equivalence and UB tests under sanitizers and Miri, and review every wave. They build on three tools that we contribute: (a) ffibox, Rust primitives for C/Rust interop that mirror Box, Arc, and Vec for C objects without ever forming a reference to memory that C may alias; (b) Wavefront, a neuro-symbolic static analyzer that orders a target's items by their dependencies, including those that casts and type-erased pointers hide; and (c) ffimap, a rustc-based analysis that maps the unsafe surface of bindings. On libgit2 and ffmpeg, with one developer in the loop, Crustify generated safe bindings for 41.9% and 42.8% of their public APIs in about 51.9 and 58.9 hours. On the interface consumers are expected to use, only 1.6% and 0.4% of the bindings' public functions are unsafe, and only 0.1% and 0.6% have a raw pointer in their signature. Their tests cover 98.92% and 99.07% of the Rust code and 45.95% and 67.20% of libgit2 and of ffmpeg's libavutil, and the reviewers fixed 8 and 13 defects that caused UB reachable from Rust. To our knowledge, this is the first work to automate the generation of safe Rust bindings for C libraries.

cs.PL↗

Revelio: Cost-Efficient Agentic Memory Safety Vulnerability Detection For Repository-Scale Codebases

Memory safety vulnerabilities remain a significant threat even for projects with extensive fuzzing and manual auditing. Recent results suggest that large language models hold great promise for detecting such vulnerabilities, but they are unreliable, at risk of hallucination, and challenging to scale to repository-size codebases. This paper presents Revelio, a cost-efficient end-to-end agentic framework for memory-safety vulnerability discovery. Revelio addresses the problem of hallucination by generating an executable Proof-of-Vulnerability, which is checked with a deterministic sanitizer. It reduces cost using inexpensive LLMs and lightweight static analysis to help generate and rank vulnerability hypotheses, reporting vulnerabilities only when they can be reproduced and confirmed by a sanitizer. We evaluated Revelio on seven production-quality projects that had been continuously fuzzed for five to eight years, as well as on 100 randomly selected Arvo projects from the CyberGym benchmark. With around one hour per project and a total cost of $300, Revelio discovered 19 previously unknown memory-safety vulnerabilities. On benchmarks, Revelio outperformed frontier coding agents across diverse backbone models at comparable token costs. Our results suggest that Revelio enables scalable and trustworthy end-to-end LLM-based memory-safety vulnerability detection.

cs.CR↗