Mark Ballard | Searcharxiv

arXiv2025

Chain Reactions in Space: Analyzing the Impact of Satellite Collisions and Debris Accumulation

The exponential increase in artificial satellites, growing from 852 in 2004 to over 9,000 in 2023, has intensified the risk of the Kessler Syndrome: a cascading chain reaction of orbital collisions. This paper analyzes the dynamics of space debris accumulation to identify the primary orbital features contributing to this systemic risk. We compiled and analyzed Two-Line Element (TLE) datasets from Space-Track.org and historical collision data using a Python-based data mining approach. Specifically, we derived satellite velocities using the Vis-Viva equation and evaluated the correlation of five key features, launch piece count, orbital period, apogee, perigee, and Radar Cross Section (RCS) size, with debris density. Our evaluation reveals that apogee and orbital period exhibit the strongest correlation with the risk of the Kessler Syndrome, indicating that satellites in higher orbits pose a disproportionately greater threat to long-term sustainability due to navigational constraints. Contrary to common assumptions, our data suggests that velocity and object size (RCS) show negligible direct correlation with collision incidence in the current dataset. Based on these findings, we propose mitigation strategies focusing on integrating AI-driven autonomous navigation systems and deploying advanced radiation-resistant shielding materials to enhance the resilience of high-orbit assets.

astro-ph.EP↗

arXiv2025

Satellite Cybersecurity Across Orbital Altitudes: Analyzing Ground-Based Threats to LEO, MEO, and GEO

The rapid proliferation of satellite constellations, particularly in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), has fundamentally altered the global space infrastructure, shifting the risk landscape from purely kinetic collisions to complex cyber-physical threats. While traditional safety frameworks focus on debris mitigation, ground-based adversaries increasingly exploit radio-frequency links, supply chain vulnerabilities, and software update pathways to degrade space assets. This paper presents a comparative analysis of satellite cybersecurity across LEO, Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), and Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) regimes. By synthesizing data from 60 publicly documented security incidents with key vulnerability proxies--including Telemetry, Tracking, and Command (TT&C) anomalies, encryption weaknesses, and environmental stressors--we characterize how orbital altitude dictates attack feasibility and impact. Our evaluation reveals distinct threat profiles: GEO systems are predominantly targeted via high-frequency uplink exposure, whereas LEO constellations face unique risks stemming from limited power budgets, hardware constraints, and susceptibility to thermal and radiation-induced faults. We further bridge the gap between security and sustainability, arguing that unmitigated cyber vulnerabilities accelerate hardware obsolescence and debris accumulation, undermining efforts toward carbon-neutral space operations. The results demonstrate that weak encryption and command path irregularities are the most consistent predictors of adversarial success across all orbits.

cs.CR↗