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Mark Esposito

Publications and source records attributed to Mark Esposito.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

The Benchmark Ceiling: Human Judgment, Evaluation Scarcity, and the Political Economy of AI Capability Measurement

Benchmarks are the primary instruments through which AI capability is measured, compared, and governed. This paper argues that the validity of frontier AI benchmarks is a function of the quality of human judgment embedded in their construction, and that this quality is structurally scarce in ways that standard scaling narratives obscure. As foundation models approach ceiling performance on existing evaluation suites, discriminating signal concentrates in the hardest benchmark items, precisely those requiring elite expert judgment to design. We term this the benchmark ceiling problem: the progressive exhaustion of evaluation signal as models saturate the easy majority of items while the difficult tail, authored by a thin stratum of highly expert evaluators, remains the only source of genuine discrimination. The paper develops this argument in three steps. First, we present a formal model of benchmark signal depreciation. Benchmark scores are public signals of latent model quality, but their precision depends endogenously on benchmark validity. As frontier capability rises and as contamination or strategic optimization increases, fixed benchmarks depreciate as measurement instruments. The model shows that valid signal concentrates in hard-tail items, that the replacement cost of such items rises convexly with frontier capability, and that private benchmark producers underinvest in validity relative to the social optimum. Second, drawing on platform data from micro1 covering over one thousand credentialed professionals, we document the scarcity premium associated with high-judgment, low-codifiability evaluation labor. Third, we develop the political economy and governance implications.

cs.CY

Prioritization of Risks from Artificial Intelligence: A Delphi Study of 272 International Experts

Artificial intelligence poses many risks, ranging from familiar present-day harms to unprecedented and potentially catastrophic ones. Effective risk management requires prioritization: we must understand which risks are most severe, who is most vulnerable, and who is most responsible for addressing them. We report results from a three-round Delphi study conducted late 2025 with 272 international AI experts. Experts rated 24 AI risks on harm probability and severity, sector and actor vulnerability, actor responsibility, and overall concern. Experts estimated the five most severe harms in the next 5 years were likely to come from dangerous capabilities, competitive dynamics, weapons & cyberattacks (including CBRNE), power centralization, and false information. In a business-as-usual scenario, experts judged 18 of 24 risks as having a more than 10% probability of catastrophic outcomes (e.g., more than 1 million deaths or more than USD 100B in financial loss) in the next 5 years (2025-2030). In a scenario where pragmatic mitigations are implemented, experts still judged five risks as having a more than 10% probability of catastrophic outcomes: dangerous capabilities, weapons & cyberattacks, environmental harm, inequality & unemployment, and power centralization. All 24 risks were judged as being more than 5% likely to cause catastrophic outcomes. AI users and the general public were judged the most vulnerable to these risks, but experts assigned the highest responsibility for addressing them to general-purpose AI developers and governance actors (including governments, regulators, and standards bodies). Across most risks, experts identified information, finance, and national security as the most vulnerable sectors. These findings can guide AI risk prioritization and clarify expert expectations about who should bear responsibility for mitigation.

cs.CY

No Last Mile: A Theory of the Human Data Market

The standard framing treats structured human-data work as transitional, a bridge between today's imperfect models and a future state where automation is complete. We challenge this view by modeling structured human data as a persistent production input: evaluation, rubric-based judgment, auditing, exception handling, and continual updates that convert raw model capability into dependable, deployable performance. These activities accumulate into a reusable AI capability stock that raises productivity by improving reliability on existing tasks and by expanding the frontier of task families for which AI can be used at high confidence. Crucially, this capability stock depreciates as tasks and contexts drift, standards evolve, and new edge cases emerge. In a tractable baseline model, an interior steady state implies a closed-form, strictly positive long-run labor share devoted to structured human-data work whenever depreciation is positive, a "no last mile" result in which maintenance demand persists even as models improve. We then microfound aggregate capability with a portfolio of task families featuring diminishing returns, frontier entry, and complementarity, generating reallocation toward low-maturity and bottleneck families and a Roy-style mechanism for within-structured wage dispersion. Finally, we map model objects to observable proxies using standard data layers, and provide a conservative calibration suggesting a 5-7% steady-state structured labor share in the long run.

econ.GN