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Martin Pinzger

Publications and source records attributed to Martin Pinzger.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Towards Cybersecurity SuperIntelligence (CSI): What's the best harness for cybersecurity?

What is the best harness for cybersecurity AI? Cybersecurity systems are converging on a single execution scaffold per agent, an iterative shell loop driven by a Large Language Model (LLM). However, scaffolds are not interchangeable, rarely interoperable, and no single scaffold dominates across all challenge types. In our path towards researching Cybersecurity SuperIntelligence (CSI), we present a meta-scaffold that unifies heterogeneous agent harnesses under a common orchestration layer, enabling any LLM-driven scaffold to be deployed, benchmarked, and composed within the same infrastructure. Using CSI, we benchmark five scaffolds (CSI::Claude, CSI::Codex, CSI::GCAI, CSI::Mistral, CSI::CAI) on the 33 cybench challenges, holding the model fixed at alias2-mini. The best individual scaffolds solve 15/33 (45.5%); the four-scaffold union solves 17/33 (51.5%), with the fifth (CSI::Mistral, 10/33) contributing one exclusive solve. We find that no single scaffold is the best harness: it is the combination of structurally heterogeneous scaffolds that yields the highest coverage. We validate this through CSI's blackboard-based multi-agent architecture, in which scaffold-specialised agents run in parallel and exchange intermediate findings via a shared substrate (a blackboard). The blackboard solves 19/33 (57.6%), a 27% relative gain over CSI::Claude, one of the best individual scaffolds (15/33, 45.5%), 25% faster (20.2 h vs. 26.8 h), at comparable cost ($5,480 vs. $5,122).

cs.CR

Security Incentivization: An Empirical Study of how Micropayments Impact Code Security

Security often receives insufficient developer attention because it does not directly generate visible value, leading to underinvestment in practice. We evaluate a countermeasure by team-level incentives tied to measurable security improvements over time. Our semi-automated mechanism aggregates static analysis findings from Bearer, Detekt, and mobsfscan, computes security issue density, and rewards teams based on the relative improvement ratio across sprints, enabling repeatable, scriptable reporting at scale. In a controlled course experiment with 84 students across 14 teams, we compared a security-incentivized condition, in which bonus points were linked to security scanner results, against a control condition with an otherwise identical grading scheme. The treatment group achieved significantly lower security issue density overall (beta regression: $\beta = -0.396, p = 0.0342$), indicating improved measurable security under incentivization. After controlling for platform, we observed a marked front-end/back-end disparity, with back-ends showing fewer issues and higher improvement ratios under incentives, highlighting heterogeneous effects across stack layers. Notably, these gains were not the byproduct of inflated code volume, as lines of code increased similarly across groups over time. The measurement pipeline and toolchain proved feasible for scripting and automation, supporting scalable adoption in practice. Our results suggest that aligning rewards with automated security metrics can measurably improve code security and merit follow-up in professional contexts and longer development lifecycles.

cs.CR

Towards Cybersecurity Superintelligence: from AI-guided humans to human-guided AI

Cybersecurity superintelligence -- artificial intelligence exceeding the best human capability in both speed and strategic reasoning -- represents the next frontier in security. This paper documents the emergence of such capability through three major contributions that have pioneered the field of AI Security. First, PentestGPT (2023) established LLM-guided penetration testing, achieving 228.6% improvement over baseline models through an architecture that externalizes security expertise into natural language guidance. Second, Cybersecurity AI (CAI, 2025) demonstrated automated expert-level performance, operating 3,600x faster than humans while reducing costs 156-fold, validated through #1 rankings at international competitions including the $50,000 Neurogrid CTF prize. Third, Generative Cut-the-Rope (G-CTR, 2026) introduces a neurosymbolic architecture embedding game-theoretic reasoning into LLM-based agents: symbolic equilibrium computation augments neural inference, doubling success rates while reducing behavioral variance 5.2x and achieving 2:1 advantage over non-strategic AI in Attack & Defense scenarios. Together, these advances establish a clear progression from AI-guided humans to human-guided game-theoretic cybersecurity superintelligence.

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A Dataset and Preliminary Study of Using GPT-5 for Code-change Impact Analysis

Understanding source code changes and their impact on other code entities is a crucial skill in software development. However, the analysis of code changes and their impact is often performed manually and therefore is time-consuming. Recent advancements in AI, and in particular large language models (LLMs) show promises to help developers in various code analysis tasks. However, the extent to which this potential can be utilized for understanding code changes and their impact is underexplored. To address this gap, we study the capabilities of GPT-5 and GPT-5-mini to predict the code entities impacted by given source code changes. We construct a dataset containing information about seed-changes, change pairs, and change types for each commit. Existing datasets lack crucial information about seed changes and impacted code entities. Our experiments evaluate the LLMs in two configurations: (1) seed-change information and the parent commit tree and (2) seed-change information, the parent commit tree, and the diff hunk of each seed change. We found that both LLMs perform poorly in the two experiments, whereas GPT-5 outperforms GPT-5-mini. Furthermore, the provision of the diff hunks helps both models to slightly improve their performance.

cs.SE

Teralizer: Semantics-Based Test Generalization from Conventional Unit Tests to Property-Based Tests

Conventional unit tests validate single input-output pairs, leaving most inputs of an execution path untested. Property-based testing addresses this shortcoming by generating multiple inputs satisfying properties but requires significant manual effort to define properties and their constraints. We propose a semantics-based approach that automatically transforms unit tests into property-based tests by extracting specifications from implementations via single-path symbolic analysis. We demonstrate this approach through Teralizer, a prototype for Java that transforms JUnit tests into property-based jqwik tests. Unlike prior work that generalizes from input-output examples, Teralizer derives specifications from program semantics. We evaluated Teralizer on three progressively challenging datasets. On EvoSuite-generated tests for EqBench and Apache Commons utilities, Teralizer improved mutation scores by 1-4 percentage points. Generalization of mature developer-written tests from Apache Commons utilities showed only 0.05-0.07 percentage points improvement. Analysis of 632 real-world Java projects from RepoReapers highlights applicability barriers: only 1.7% of projects completed the generalization pipeline, with failures primarily due to type support limitations in symbolic analysis and static analysis limitations in our prototype. Based on the results, we provide a roadmap for future work, identifying research and engineering challenges that need to be tackled to advance the field of test generalization. Artifacts available at: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17950381

cs.SE

Cybersecurity AI: Evaluating Agentic Cybersecurity in Attack/Defense CTFs

We empirically evaluate whether AI systems are more effective at attacking or defending in cybersecurity. Using CAI (Cybersecurity AI)'s parallel execution framework, we deployed autonomous agents in 23 Attack/Defense CTF battlegrounds. Statistical analysis reveals defensive agents achieve 54.3% unconstrained patching success versus 28.3% offensive initial access (p=0.0193), but this advantage disappears under operational constraints: when defense requires maintaining availability (23.9%) and preventing all intrusions (15.2%), no significant difference exists (p>0.05). Exploratory taxonomy analysis suggests potential patterns in vulnerability exploitation, though limited sample sizes preclude definitive conclusions. This study provides the first controlled empirical evidence challenging claims of AI attacker advantage, demonstrating that defensive effectiveness critically depends on success criteria, a nuance absent from conceptual analyses but essential for deployment. These findings underscore the urgency for defenders to adopt open-source Cybersecurity AI frameworks to maintain security equilibrium against accelerating offensive automation.

cs.CR

Lost in Translation? Converting RegExes for Log Parsing into Dynatrace Pattern Language

Log files provide valuable information for detecting and diagnosing problems in enterprise software applications and data centers. Several log analytics tools and platforms were developed to help filter and extract information from logs, typically using regular expressions (RegExes). Recent commercial log analytics platforms provide domain-specific languages specifically designed for log parsing, such as Grok or the Dynatrace Pattern Language (DPL). However, users who want to migrate to these platforms must manually convert their RegExes into the new pattern language, which is costly and error-prone. In this work, we present Reptile, which combines a rule-based approach for converting RegExes into DPL patterns with a best-effort approach for cases where a full conversion is impossible. Furthermore, it integrates GPT-4 to optimize the obtained DPL patterns. The evaluation with 946 RegExes collected from a large company shows that Reptile safely converted 73.7% of them. The evaluation of Reptile's pattern optimization with 23 real-world RegExes showed an F1-score and MCC above 0.91. These results are promising and have ample practical implications for companies that migrate to a modern log analytics platform, such as Dynatrace.

cs.SE

CAI: An Open, Bug Bounty-Ready Cybersecurity AI

By 2028 most cybersecurity actions will be autonomous, with humans teleoperating. We present the first classification of autonomy levels in cybersecurity and introduce Cybersecurity AI (CAI), an open-source framework that democratizes advanced security testing through specialized AI agents. Through rigorous empirical evaluation, we demonstrate that CAI consistently outperforms state-of-the-art results in CTF benchmarks, solving challenges across diverse categories with significantly greater efficiency -up to 3,600x faster than humans in specific tasks and averaging 11x faster overall. CAI achieved first place among AI teams and secured a top-20 position worldwide in the "AI vs Human" CTF live Challenge, earning a monetary reward of $750. Based on our results, we argue against LLM-vendor claims about limited security capabilities. Beyond cybersecurity competitions, CAI demonstrates real-world effectiveness, reaching top-30 in Spain and top-500 worldwide on Hack The Box within a week, while dramatically reducing security testing costs by an average of 156x. Our framework transcends theoretical benchmarks by enabling non-professionals to discover significant security bugs (CVSS 4.3-7.5) at rates comparable to experts during bug bounty exercises. By combining modular agent design with seamless tool integration and human oversight (HITL), CAI addresses critical market gaps, offering organizations of all sizes access to AI-powered bug bounty security testing previously available only to well-resourced firms -thereby challenging the oligopolistic ecosystem currently dominated by major bug bounty platforms.

cs.CR

Generating Accurate OpenAPI Descriptions from Java Source Code

Developers require accurate descriptions of REpresentational State Transfer (REST) Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) for a successful interaction between web services. The OpenAPI Specification (OAS) has become the de facto standard for documenting REST APIs. Manually creating an OpenAPI description is time-consuming and error-prone, and therefore several approaches were proposed to automatically generate them from bytecode or runtime information. In this paper, we first study three state-of-the-art approaches, Respector, Prophet, and springdoc-openapi, and present and discuss their shortcomings. Next, we introduce AutoOAS, our approach addressing these shortcomings to generate accurate OpenAPI descriptions. It detects exposed REST endpoint paths, corresponding HTTP methods, HTTP response codes, and the data models of request parameters and responses directly from Java source code. We evaluated AutoOAS on seven real-world Spring Boot projects and compared its performance with the three state-of-the-art approaches. Based on a manually created ground truth, AutoOAS achieved the highest precision and recall when identifying REST endpoint paths, HTTP methods, parameters, and responses. It outperformed the second-best approach, Respector, with a 39% higher precision and 35% higher recall when identifying parameters and a 29% higher precision and 11% higher recall when identifying responses. Furthermore, AutoOAS is the only approach that handles configuration profiles, and it provided the most accurate and detailed description of the data models that were used in the REST APIs.

cs.SE

PASDA: A Partition-based Semantic Differencing Approach with Best Effort Classification of Undecided Cases

Equivalence checking is used to verify whether two programs produce equivalent outputs when given equivalent inputs. Research in this field mainly focused on improving equivalence checking accuracy and runtime performance. However, for program pairs that cannot be proven to be either equivalent or non-equivalent, existing approaches only report a classification result of "unknown", which provides no information regarding the programs' non-/equivalence. In this paper, we introduce PASDA, our partition-based semantic differencing approach with best effort classification of undecided cases. While PASDA aims to formally prove non-/equivalence of analyzed program pairs using a variant of differential symbolic execution, its main novelty lies in its handling of cases for which no formal non-/equivalence proof can be found. For such cases, PASDA provides a best effort equivalence classification based on a set of classification heuristics. We evaluated PASDA with an existing benchmark consisting of 141 non-/equivalent program pairs. PASDA correctly classified 61-74% of these cases at timeouts from 10 seconds to 3600 seconds. Thus, PASDA achieved equivalence checking accuracies that are 3-7% higher than the best results achieved by three existing tools. Furthermore, PASDA's best effort classifications were correct for 70-75% of equivalent and 55-85% of non-equivalent cases across the different timeouts.

cs.SE

Microservice API Evolution in Practice: A Study on Strategies and Challenges

Nowadays, many companies design and develop their software systems as a set of loosely coupled microservices that communicate via their Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). While the loose coupling improves maintainability, scalability, and fault tolerance, it poses new challenges to the API evolution process. Related works identified communication and integration as major API evolution challenges but did not provide the underlying reasons and research directions to mitigate them. In this paper, we aim to identify microservice API evolution strategies and challenges in practice and gain a broader perspective of their relationships. We conducted 17 semi-structured interviews with developers, architects, and managers in 11 companies and analyzed the interviews with open coding used in grounded theory. In total, we identified six strategies and six challenges for REpresentational State Transfer (REST) and event-driven communication via message brokers. The strategies mainly focus on API backward compatibility, versioning, and close collaboration between teams. The challenges include change impact analysis efforts, ineffective communication of changes, and consumer reliance on outdated versions, leading to API design degradation. We defined two important problems in microservice API evolution resulting from the challenges and their coping strategies: tight organizational coupling and consumer lock-in. To mitigate these two problems, we propose automating the change impact analysis and investigating effective communication of changes as open research directions.

cs.SE

RobotPerf: An Open-Source, Vendor-Agnostic, Benchmarking Suite for Evaluating Robotics Computing System Performance

We introduce RobotPerf, a vendor-agnostic benchmarking suite designed to evaluate robotics computing performance across a diverse range of hardware platforms using ROS 2 as its common baseline. The suite encompasses ROS 2 packages covering the full robotics pipeline and integrates two distinct benchmarking approaches: black-box testing, which measures performance by eliminating upper layers and replacing them with a test application, and grey-box testing, an application-specific measure that observes internal system states with minimal interference. Our benchmarking framework provides ready-to-use tools and is easily adaptable for the assessment of custom ROS 2 computational graphs. Drawing from the knowledge of leading robot architects and system architecture experts, RobotPerf establishes a standardized approach to robotics benchmarking. As an open-source initiative, RobotPerf remains committed to evolving with community input to advance the future of hardware-accelerated robotics.

cs.RO

Incentive-Based Software Security: Fair Micro-Payments for Writing Secure Code

We describe a mechanism to create fair and explainable incentives for software developers to reward contributions to security of a product. We use cooperative game theory to model the actions of the developer team inside a risk management workflow, considering the team to actively work against known threats, and thereby receive micro-payments based on their performance. The use of the Shapley-value provides natural explanations here directly through (new) interpretations of the axiomatic grounding of the imputation. The resulting mechanism is straightforward to implement, and relies on standard tools from collaborative software development, such as are available for git repositories and mining thereof. The micropayment model itself is deterministic and does not rely on uncertain information outside the scope of the developer team or the enterprise, hence is void of assumptions about adversarial incentives, or user behavior, up to their role in the risk management process that the mechanism is part of. We corroborate our model with a worked example based on real-life data.

cs.SE

PentestGPT: An LLM-empowered Automatic Penetration Testing Tool

Penetration testing, a crucial industrial practice for ensuring system security, has traditionally resisted automation due to the extensive expertise required by human professionals. Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown significant advancements in various domains, and their emergent abilities suggest their potential to revolutionize industries. In this research, we evaluate the performance of LLMs on real-world penetration testing tasks using a robust benchmark created from test machines with platforms. Our findings reveal that while LLMs demonstrate proficiency in specific sub-tasks within the penetration testing process, such as using testing tools, interpreting outputs, and proposing subsequent actions, they also encounter difficulties maintaining an integrated understanding of the overall testing scenario. In response to these insights, we introduce PentestGPT, an LLM-empowered automatic penetration testing tool that leverages the abundant domain knowledge inherent in LLMs. PentestGPT is meticulously designed with three self-interacting modules, each addressing individual sub-tasks of penetration testing, to mitigate the challenges related to context loss. Our evaluation shows that PentestGPT not only outperforms LLMs with a task-completion increase of 228.6\% compared to the \gptthree model among the benchmark targets but also proves effective in tackling real-world penetration testing challenges. Having been open-sourced on GitHub, PentestGPT has garnered over 4,700 stars and fostered active community engagement, attesting to its value and impact in both the academic and industrial spheres.

cs.SE

ExploitFlow, cyber security exploitation routes for Game Theory and AI research in robotics

This paper addresses the prevalent lack of tools to facilitate and empower Game Theory and Artificial Intelligence (AI) research in cybersecurity. The primary contribution is the introduction of ExploitFlow (EF), an AI and Game Theory-driven modular library designed for cyber security exploitation. EF aims to automate attacks, combining exploits from various sources, and capturing system states post-action to reason about them and understand potential attack trees. The motivation behind EF is to bolster Game Theory and AI research in cybersecurity, with robotics as the initial focus. Results indicate that EF is effective for exploring machine learning in robot cybersecurity. An artificial agent powered by EF, using Reinforcement Learning, outperformed both brute-force and human expert approaches, laying the path for using ExploitFlow for further research. Nonetheless, we identified several limitations in EF-driven agents, including a propensity to overfit, the scarcity and production cost of datasets for generalization, and challenges in interpreting networking states across varied security settings. To leverage the strengths of ExploitFlow while addressing identified shortcomings, we present Malism, our vision for a comprehensive automated penetration testing framework with ExploitFlow at its core.

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Presentation: SymDefFix -- Sound Automatic Repair Using Symbolic Execution

In this presentation, we introduce our constraint-based repair approach, called SymDefFix. SymDefFix is based on ExtractFix [3] and replaces the dynamic analysis steps of ExtractFix to detect the error and find the potential fix locations in an input program with symbolic execution. We first briefly motivate and introduce our modifications of ExtractFix, and then demonstrate it with an example.

cs.SE

alurity, a toolbox for robot cybersecurity

The reuse of technologies and inherent complexity of most robotic systems is increasingly leading to robots with wide attack surfaces and a variety of potential vulnerabilities. Given their growing presence in public environments, security research is increasingly becoming more important than in any other area, specially due to the safety implications that robot vulnerabilities could cause on humans. We argue that security triage in robotics is still immature and that new tools must be developed to accelerate the testing-triage-exploitation cycle, necessary for prioritizing and accelerating the mitigation of flaws. The present work tackles the current lack of offensive cybersecurity research in robotics by presenting a toolbox and the results obtained with it through several use cases conducted over a year period. We propose a modular and composable toolbox for robot cybersecurity: alurity. By ensuring that both roboticists and security researchers working on a project have a common, consistent and easily reproducible development environment, alurity aims to facilitate the cybersecurity research and the collaboration across teams.

cs.RO

Can ROS be used securely in industry? Red teaming ROS-Industrial

With its growing use in industry, ROS is rapidly becoming a standard in robotics. While developments in ROS 2 show promise, the slow adoption cycles in industry will push widespread ROS 2 industrial adoption years from now. ROS will prevail in the meantime which raises the question: can ROS be used securely for industrial use cases even though its origins didn't consider it? The present study analyzes this question experimentally by performing a targeted offensive security exercise in a synthetic industrial use case involving ROS-Industrial and ROS packages. Our exercise results in four groups of attacks which manage to compromise the ROS computational graph, and all except one take control of most robotic endpoints at desire. To the best of our knowledge and given our setup, results do not favour the secure use of ROS in industry today, however, we managed to confirm that the security of certain robotic endpoints hold and remain optimistic about securing ROS industrial deployments.

cs.RO