arXiv subjects

Martin Van der Linden

Publications and source records attributed to Martin Van der Linden.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2024

Incontestable Assignments

In school districts where assignments are exclusively determined by a clearinghouse students can only appeal their assignment with a valid reason. An assignment is incontestable if it is appeal-proof. We study incontestability when students do not observe the other students' preferences and assignments. Incontestability is shown to be equivalent to individual rationality, non-wastefulness, and respect for top-priority sets (a weakening of justified envy). Stable mechanisms and those Pareto dominating them are incontestable, as well as the Top-Trading Cycle mechanism (but Boston is not). Under a mild consistency property, incontestable mechanisms are i-indinstiguishable (Li, 2017), and share similar incentive properties.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2023

Exclusion of Extreme Jurors and Minority Representation: The Effect of Jury Selection Procedures

We compare two jury selection procedures meant to safeguard against the inclusion of biased jurors that are perceived as causing minorities to be under-represented. The Strike and Replace procedure presents potential jurors one-by-one to the parties, while the Struck procedure presents all potential jurors before the parties exercise their challenges. Struck more effectively excludes extreme jurors but leads to a worse representation of minorities. The advantage of Struck in terms of excluding extremes is sizable in a wide range of cases. In contrast, Strike and Replace better represents minorities only if the minority and majority are polarized. Results are robust to assuming the parties statistically discriminate against jurors based on group identity.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2016

Betting and Belief: Prediction Markets and Attribution of Climate Change

Despite much scientific evidence, a large fraction of the American public doubts that greenhouse gases are causing global warming. We present a simulation model as a computational test-bed for climate prediction markets. Traders adapt their beliefs about future temperatures based on the profits of other traders in their social network. We simulate two alternative climate futures, in which global temperatures are primarily driven either by carbon dioxide or by solar irradiance. These represent, respectively, the scientific consensus and a hypothesis advanced by prominent skeptics. We conduct sensitivity analyses to determine how a variety of factors describing both the market and the physical climate may affect traders' beliefs about the cause of global climate change. Market participation causes most traders to converge quickly toward believing the "true" climate model, suggesting that a climate market could be useful for building public consensus.

cs.MA↗