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Maryam Kamgarpour

Publications and source records attributed to Maryam Kamgarpour.

At least 91 records · Page 5Linked to original sources

No-Regret Learning in Unknown Games with Correlated Payoffs

We consider the problem of learning to play a repeated multi-agent game with an unknown reward function. Single player online learning algorithms attain strong regret bounds when provided with full information feedback, which unfortunately is unavailable in many real-world scenarios. Bandit feedback alone, i.e., observing outcomes only for the selected action, yields substantially worse performance. In this paper, we consider a natural model where, besides a noisy measurement of the obtained reward, the player can also observe the opponents' actions. This feedback model, together with a regularity assumption on the reward function, allows us to exploit the correlations among different game outcomes by means of Gaussian processes (GPs). We propose a novel confidence-bound based bandit algorithm GP-MW, which utilizes the GP model for the reward function and runs a multiplicative weight (MW) method. We obtain novel kernel-dependent regret bounds that are comparable to the known bounds in the full information setting, while substantially improving upon the existing bandit results. We experimentally demonstrate the effectiveness of GP-MW in random matrix games, as well as real-world problems of traffic routing and movie recommendation. In our experiments, GP-MW consistently outperforms several baselines, while its performance is often comparable to methods that have access to full information feedback.

cs.LG↗

First Order Methods For Globally Optimal Distributed Controllers Beyond Quadratic Invariance

We study the distributed Linear Quadratic Gaussian (LQG) control problem in discrete-time and finite-horizon, where the controller depends linearly on the history of the outputs and it is required to lie in a given subspace, e.g. to possess a certain sparsity pattern. It is well-known that this problem can be solved with convex programming within the Youla domain if and only if a condition known as Quadratic Invariance (QI) holds. In this paper, we first show that given QI sparsity constraints, one can directly descend the gradient of the cost function within the domain of output-feedback controllers and converge to a global optimum. Note that convergence is guaranteed despite non-convexity of the cost function. Second, we characterize a class of Uniquely Stationary (US) problems, for which first-order methods are guaranteed to converge to a global optimum. We show that the class of US problems is strictly larger than that of strongly QI problems and that it is not included in that of QI problems. We refer to Figure 1 for details. Finally, we propose a tractable test for the US property.

eess.SY↗

Distributed Design for Decentralized Control using Chordal Decomposition and ADMM

We propose a distributed design method for decentralized control by exploiting the underlying sparsity properties of the problem. Our method is based on chordal decomposition of sparse block matrices and the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM). We first apply a classical parameterization technique to restrict the optimal decentralized control into a convex problem that inherits the sparsity pattern of the original problem. The parameterization relies on a notion of strongly decentralized stabilization, and sufficient conditions are discussed to guarantee this notion. Then, chordal decomposition allows us to decompose the convex restriction into a problem with partially coupled constraints, and the framework of ADMM enables us to solve the decomposed problem in a distributed fashion. Consequently, the subsystems only need to share their model data with their direct neighbours, not needing a central computation. Numerical experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method.

math.OC↗

On the Equivalence of Youla, System-level and Input-output Parameterizations

A convex parameterization of internally stabilizing controllers is fundamental for many controller synthesis procedures. The celebrated Youla parameterization relies on a doubly-coprime factorization of the system, while the recent system-level and input-output characterizations require no doubly-coprime factorization but a set of equality constraints for achievable closed-loop responses. In this paper, we present explicit affine mappings among Youla, system-level and input-output parameterizations. Two direct implications of the affine mappings are 1) any convex problem in Youla, system level, or input-output parameters can be equivalently and convexly formulated in any other one of these frameworks, including the convex system-level synthesis (SLS); 2) the condition of quadratic invariance (QI) is sufficient and necessary for the classical distributed control problem to admit an equivalent convex reformulation in terms of Youla, system-level, or input-output parameters.

math.OC↗

Learning Nash Equilibria in Monotone Games

We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent's cost function depends on all agents' strategies. We propose a distributed algorithm to learn a Nash equilibrium, whereby each agent uses only obtained values of her cost function at each joint played action, lacking any information of the functional form of her cost or other agents' costs or strategy sets. In contrast to past work where convergent algorithms required strong monotonicity, we prove algorithm convergence under mere monotonicity assumption. This significantly widens algorithm's applicability, such as to games with linear coupling constraints.

cs.MA↗

Actuator Placement for Optimizing Network Performance under Controllability Constraints

With the rising importance of large-scale network control, the problem of actuator placement has received increasing attention. Our goal in this paper is to find a set of actuators minimizing the metric that measures the average energy consumption of the control inputs while ensuring structural controllability of the network. As this problem is intractable, greedy algorithm can be used to obtain an approximate solution. To provide a performance guarantee for this approach, we first define the submodularity ratio for the metric under consideration and then reformulate the structural controllability constraint as a matroid constraint. This shows that the problem under study can be characterized by a matroid optimization involving a weakly submodular objective function. Then, we derive a novel performance guarantee for the greedy algorithm applied to this class of optimization problems. Finally, we show that the matroid feasibility check for the greedy algorithm can be cast as a maximum matching problem in a certain auxiliary bipartite graph related to the network graph.

math.OC↗

On Separable Quadratic Lyapunov Functions for Convex Design of Distributed Controllers

We consider the problem of designing a stabilizing and optimal static controller with a pre-specified sparsity pattern. Since this problem is NP-hard in general, it is necessary to resort to approximation approaches. In this paper, we characterize a class of convex restrictions of this problem that are based on designing a separable quadratic Lyapunov function for the closed-loop system. This approach generalizes previous results based on optimizing over diagonal Lyapunov functions, thus allowing for improved feasibility and performance. Moreover, we suggest a simple procedure to compute favourable structures for the Lyapunov function yielding high-performance distributed controllers. Numerical examples validate our results.

eess.SY↗

Robust Distributed Control Beyond Quadratic Invariance

The problem of robust distributed control arises in several large-scale systems, such as transportation networks and power grid systems. In many practical scenarios controllers might not have enough information to make globally optimal decisions in a tractable way. We propose a novel class of tractable optimization problems whose solution is a controller complying with any specified information structure. The approach we suggest is based on decomposing intractable information constraints into two subspace constraints in the disturbance feedback domain. We discuss how to perform the decomposition in an optimized way. The resulting control policy is globally optimal when a condition known as Quadratic Invariance (QI) holds, whereas it is feasible and it provides a provable upper bound on the minimum cost when QI does not hold. Finally, we show that our method can lead to improved performance guarantees with respect to previous approaches, by applying the developed techniques to the platooning of autonomous vehicles.

eess.SY↗

Unified Approach to Convex Robust Distributed Control given Arbitrary Information Structures

We consider the problem of computing optimal linear control policies for linear systems in finite-horizon. The states and the inputs are required to remain inside pre-specified safety sets at all times despite unknown disturbances. In this technical note, we focus on the requirement that the control policy is distributed, in the sense that it can only be based on partial information about the history of the outputs. It is well-known that when a condition denoted as Quadratic Invariance (QI) holds, the optimal distributed control policy can be computed in a tractable way. Our goal is to unify and generalize the class of information structures over which quadratic invariance is equivalent to a test over finitely many binary matrices. The test we propose certifies convexity of the output-feedback distributed control problem in finite-horizon given any arbitrarily defined information structure, including the case of time varying communication networks and forgetting mechanisms. Furthermore, the framework we consider allows for including polytopic constraints on the states and the inputs in a natural way, without affecting convexity.

eess.SY↗

Bounding Inefficiency of Equilibria in Continuous Actions Games using Submodularity and Curvature

Games with continuous strategy sets arise in several machine learning problems (e.g. adversarial learning). For such games, simple no-regret learning algorithms exist in several cases and ensure convergence to coarse correlated equilibria (CCE). The efficiency of such equilibria with respect to a social function, however, is not well understood. In this paper, we define the class of valid utility games with continuous strategies and provide efficiency bounds for their CCEs. Our bounds rely on the social function being a monotone DR-submodular function. We further refine our bounds based on the curvature of the social function. Furthermore, we extend our efficiency bounds to a class of non-submodular functions that satisfy approximate submodularity properties. Finally, we show that valid utility games with continuous strategies can be designed to maximize monotone DR-submodular functions subject to disjoint constraints with approximation guarantees. The approximation guarantees we derive are based on the efficiency of the equilibria of such games and can improve the existing ones in the literature. We illustrate and validate our results on a budget allocation game and a sensor coverage problem.

cs.GT↗

Designing Coalition-Proof Reverse Auctions over Continuous Goods

This paper investigates reverse auctions that involve continuous values of different types of goods, general nonconvex constraints, and second stage costs. We seek to design the payment rules and conditions under which coalitions of participants cannot influence the auction outcome in order to obtain higher collective utility. Under the incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, we show that coalition-proof outcomes are achieved if the submitted bids are convex and the constraint sets are of a polymatroid-type. These conditions, however, do not capture the complexity of the general class of reverse auctions under consideration. By relaxing the property of incentive-compatibility, we investigate further payment rules that are coalition-proof without any extra conditions on the submitted bids and the constraint sets. Since calculating the payments directly for these mechanisms is computationally difficult for auctions involving many participants, we present two computationally efficient methods. Our results are verified with several case studies based on electricity market data.

cs.GT↗

Exploiting Weak Supermodularity for Coalition-Proof Mechanisms

Under the incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, coalitions of participants can influence the auction outcome to obtain higher collective profit. These manipulations were proven to be eliminated if and only if the market objective is supermodular. Nevertheless, several auctions do not satisfy the stringent conditions for supermodularity. These auctions include electricity markets, which are the main motivation of our study. To characterize nonsupermodular functions, we introduce the supermodularity ratio and the weak supermodularity. We show that these concepts provide us with tight bounds on the profitability of collusion and shill bidding. We then derive an analytical lower bound on the supermodularity ratio. Our results are verified with case studies based on the IEEE test systems.

cs.GT↗

Core-Selecting Mechanisms in Electricity Markets

Due to its theoretical virtues, several recent works propose the use of the incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism for electricity markets. Coalitions of participants, however, can influence the VCG outcome to obtain higher collective profit. To address this issue, we propose core-selecting mechanisms for their coalition-proofness. We show that core-selecting mechanisms generalize the economic rationale of the locational marginal pricing (LMP) mechanism. Namely, these mechanisms are the exact class of mechanisms that ensure the existence of a competitive equilibrium in linear/nonlinear prices. This implies that the LMP mechanism is also core-selecting, and hence coalition-proof. In contrast to the LMP mechanism, core-selecting mechanisms exist for a broad class of electricity markets, such as ones involving nonconvex costs and nonconvex constraint sets. In addition, they can approximate truthfulness without the price-taking assumption of the LMP mechanism. Finally, we show that they are also budget-balanced. Our results are verified with case studies based on optimal power flow test systems and the Swiss reserve market.

cs.GT↗

Performance guarantees for greedy maximization of non-submodular controllability metrics

A key problem in emerging complex cyber-physical networks is the design of information and control topologies, including sensor and actuator selection and communication network design. These problems can be posed as combinatorial set function optimization problems to maximize a dynamic performance metric for the network. Some systems and control metrics feature a property called submodularity, which allows simple greedy algorithms to obtain provably near-optimal topology designs. However, many important metrics lack submodularity and therefore lack provable guarantees for using a greedy optimization approach. Here we show that performance guarantees can be obtained for greedy maximization of certain non-submodular functions of the controllability and observability Gramians. Our results are based on two key quantities: the submodularity ratio, which quantifies how far a set function is from being submodular, and the curvature, which quantifies how far a set function is from being supermodular.

math.OC↗

Strengthening the Group: Aggregated Frequency Reserve Bidding with ADMM

In a power grid, the electricity supply and demand must be balanced at all times to maintain the system's frequency. In practice, the grid operator achieves this balance by procuring frequency reserves in an ahead-of-time market setting. During runtime, these reserves are then dispatched whenever there is an imbalance in the grid. Recently, there has been an increasing interest in engaging electricity consumers, such as plug-in electric vehicles or buildings, to offer such frequency reserves by exploiting their flexibility in power consumption. In this work, we focus on an aggregation of buildings that places a joint bid on a reserve market. The resulting shared decision is modeled as a large-scale optimization problem. Our main contribution is to show that the aggregation can make its decision in a computationally efficient and conceptually meaningful way, using the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM). The proposed approach exhibits several attractive features that include (i) the computational burden is distributed between the buildings; (ii) the setup naturally provides privacy and flexibility; (iii) the iterative algorithm can be stopped at any time, providing a feasible (though suboptimal) solution; and (iv) the algorithm provides the foundation for a reward distribution scheme that strengthens the group.

math.OC↗

On infinite dimensional linear programming approach to stochastic control

We consider the infinite dimensional linear programming (inf-LP) approach for solving stochastic control problems. The inf-LP corresponding to problems with uncountable state and input spaces is in general computationally intractable. By focusing on linear systems with quadratic cost (LQG), we establish a connection between this approach and the well-known Riccati LMIs. In particular, we show that the semidefinite programs known for the LQG problem can be derived from the pair of primal and dual inf-LPs. Furthermore, we establish a connection between multi-objective and chance constraint criteria and the inf-LP formulation.

math.OC↗

Learning Generalized Nash Equilibria in a Class of Convex Games

We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent optimizes its convex cost function subject to individual and coupling constraints. The constraint sets are compact convex subsets of a Euclidean space. To learn Nash equilibria, we propose a novel distributed payoff-based algorithm, such that each agent uses information only about its cost function values and the constraint function values with their associated dual multiplier. We prove convergence of this algorithm to a Nash equilibrium, under the assumption that the game admits a strictly convex potential function. In the absence of coupling constraints, we prove convergence to Nash equilibria under significantly weaker assumptions, not requiring a potential function. Namely, strict monotonicity of the game mapping is sufficient for convergence. We also derive the convergence rate of the algorithm for strongly monotone game maps.

math.OC↗

Exploiting structure of chance constrained programs via submodularity

We introduce a novel approach to reduce the computational effort of solving mixed-integer convex chance constrained programs through the scenario approach. Instead of reducing the number of required scenarios, we directly minimize the computational cost of the scenario program. We exploit the problem structure by efficiently partitioning the constraint function and considering a multiple chance constrained program that gives the same probabilistic guarantees as the original single chance constrained problem. We formulate the problem of finding the optimal partition, a partition achieving the lowest computational cost, as an optimization problem with nonlinear objective and combinatorial constraints. By using submodularity of the support rank of a set of constraints, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm to find suboptimal solutions to this partitioning problem and we give approximation guarantees for special classes of cost metrics. We illustrate that the resulting computational cost savings can be arbitrarily large and demonstrate our approach on two case studies from production and multi-agent planning.

math.OC↗