arXiv subjects

Masoud Jamshidiyan Tehrani

Publications and source records attributed to Masoud Jamshidiyan Tehrani.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Dynamic Deception: When Pedestrians Team Up to Fool Autonomous Cars

Many adversarial attacks on autonomous-driving perception models fail to cause system-level failures once deployed in a full driving stack. The main reason for such ineffectiveness is that once deployed in a system (e.g., within a simulator), attacks tend to be spatially or temporally short-lived, due to the vehicle's dynamics, hence rarely influencing the vehicle behaviour. In this paper, we address both limitations by introducing a system-level attack in which multiple dynamic elements (e.g., two pedestrians) carry adversarial patches (e.g., on cloths) and jointly amplify their effect through coordination and motion. We evaluate our attacks in the CARLA simulator using a state-of-the-art autonomous driving agent. At the system level, single-pedestrian attacks fail in all runs (out of 10), while dynamic collusion by two pedestrians induces full vehicle stops in up to 50\% of runs, with static collusion yielding no successful attack at all. These results show that system-level failures arise only when adversarial signals persist over time and are amplified through coordinated actors, exposing a gap between model-level robustness and end-to-end safety.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Assessing Vulnerability in Smart Contracts: The Role of Code Complexity Metrics in Security Analysis

Software built on poor structural patterns often shows higher exposure to security defects. When code differs from established best practices, verification and maintenance become increasingly difficult, thereby raising the risk of unintentional vulnerabilities. In the context of blockchain technology, where immutable smart contracts handle high-value transactions, the need for strict security assurance is important. This research analyzes the utility of software complexity metrics as diagnostic tools for identifying vulnerable Solidity smart contracts. We evaluate the hypothesis that complexity measures serve as vital, complementary signals for security assessment. Through an empirical examination of 21 distinct metrics, we analyzed their inter-dependencies, statistical association with vulnerabilities, and discriminative capabilities. Our findings indicate a significant degree of redundancy among certain metrics and a relatively low correlation between any single metric and the presence of vulnerabilities. However, the data demonstrates that these metrics possess strong power to distinguish between secure and vulnerable code when analyzed collectively. Notably, with only three exceptions, vulnerable contracts consistently exhibited higher mean complexity scores than their neutral counterparts. While our results show a statistical association, we emphasize that complexity is an indicator rather than a direct cause of vulnerability.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

A Taxonomy of System-Level Attacks on Deep Learning Models in Autonomous Vehicles

The advent of deep learning and its astonishing performance has enabled its usage in complex systems, including autonomous vehicles. On the other hand, deep learning models are susceptible to mispredictions when small, adversarial changes are introduced into their input. Such mis-predictions can be triggered in the real world and can result in a failure of the entire system. In recent years, a growing number of research works have investigated ways to mount attacks against autonomous vehicles that exploit deep learning components. Such attacks are directed toward elements of the environment where these systems operate and their effectiveness is assessed in terms of system-level failures triggered by them. There has been however no systematic attempt to analyze and categorize such attacks. In this paper, we present the first taxonomy of system-level attacks against autonomous vehicles. We constructed our taxonomy by selecting 21 highly relevant papers, then we tagged them with 12 top-level taxonomy categories and several sub-categories. The taxonomy allowed us to investigate the attack features, the most attacked components and systems, the underlying threat models, and the failure chains from input perturbation to system-level failure. We distilled several lessons for practitioners and identified possible directions for future work for researchers.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

PCLA: A Framework for Testing Autonomous Agents in the CARLA Simulator

Recent research on testing autonomous driving agents has grown significantly, especially in simulation environments. The CARLA simulator is often the preferred choice, and the autonomous agents from the CARLA Leaderboard challenge are regarded as the best-performing agents within this environment. However, researchers who test these agents, rather than training their own ones from scratch, often face challenges in utilizing them within customized test environments and scenarios. To address these challenges, we introduce PCLA (Pretrained CARLA Leaderboard Agents), an open-source Python testing framework that includes nine high-performing pre-trained autonomous agents from the Leaderboard challenges. PCLA is the first infrastructure specifically designed for testing various autonomous agents in arbitrary CARLA environments/scenarios. PCLA provides a simple way to deploy Leaderboard agents onto a vehicle without relying on the Leaderboard codebase, it allows researchers to easily switch between agents without requiring modifications to CARLA versions or programming environments, and it is fully compatible with the latest version of CARLA while remaining independent of the Leaderboard's specific CARLA version. PCLA is publicly accessible at https://github.com/MasoudJTehrani/PCLA.

cs.SE↗