arXiv subjects

Masoud Seddighin

Publications and source records attributed to Masoud Seddighin.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Distortion of Multi-Winner Elections on the Line Metric: The Polar Comparison Rule

We study the problem of minimizing metric distortion in multi-winner elections, where a committee of size $k$ is selected from a set of candidates based on voters' ordinal preferences. We assume that voters and candidates are embedded on a line metric, and social cost is determined by the underlying metric distances. The distortion of a voting rule is the worst-case ratio between the social cost of the elected committee and an optimal committee. Previous work has focused on the $q$-cost model, in which a voter's cost is given by the distance to their $q$th closest committee member. Here, we study the additive cost, where a voter's cost is the sum of distances to all committee members. We introduce the Polar Comparison Rule and analyze its distortion under utilitarian additive cost. We show that it achieves a distortion of at most $2.33$ for all committee sizes $k>2$, improving upon the previously best-known upper bound of $3$. Moreover, for $k=2$ and $k=3$, we establish tight distortion bounds of $2.41$ and $2.33$, respectively. We also derive lower bounds that depend on the parity of $k$ and analyze the behavior of distortion for small and large committee sizes. Finally, we extend our results to the egalitarian additive cost.

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arXiv2026

Dynamic Pattern Matching with Wildcards

We study the fully dynamic pattern matching problem where the pattern may contain up to kwildcard symbols, each matching any symbol of the alphabet. Both the text and the pattern are subject to updates (insert, delete, change). We design an algorithm with O(nlog^2 n) preprocessing and update/query time O(knk/k+1 + k2 log n). The bound is truly sublinear for a constant k, and sublinear when k= o(log n). We further complement our results with a conditional lower bound: assuming subquadratic preprocessing time, achieving truly sublinear update time for the case k = Ω(log n) would contradict the Strong Exponential Time Hypothesis (SETH). Finally, we develop sublinear algorithms for two special cases: - If the pattern contains w non-wildcard symbols, we give an algorithm with preprocessing time O(nw) and update time O(w + log n), which is truly sublinear whenever wis truly sublinear. - Using FFT technique combined with block decomposition, we design a deterministic truly sublinear algorithm with preprocessing time O(n^1.8) and update time O(n^0.8 log n) for the case that there are at most two non-wildcards.

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arXiv2026

Metric Distortion with Preference Intensities

In voting with ranked ballots, each agent submits a strict ranking of the form $a \succ b \succ c \succ d$ over the alternatives, and the voting rule decides on the winner based on these rankings. Although this ballot format has desirable characteristics, there is a question of whether it is expressive enough for the agents. Kahng, Latifian, and Shah address this issue by adding intensities to the rankings. They introduce the ranking with intensities ballot format, where agents can use both $\succ\!\!\succ$ and $\succ$ in their rankings to express intensive and normal preferences between consecutive alternatives in their rankings. While they focus on analyzing this ballot format in the utilitarian distortion framework, in this work, we look at the potential of using this ballot format from the metric distortion viewpoint. We design a class of voting rules coined Positional Scoring Matching rules, which can be used for different problems in the metric setting, and show that by solving a zero-sum game, we can find the optimal member of this class for our problem. This rule takes intensities into account and achieves a distortion lower than $3$. In addition, by proving a bound on the price of ignoring intensities, we show that we might lose a great deal in terms of distortion by not taking the intensities into account.

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arXiv2025

Tight Bounds On the Distortion of Randomized and Deterministic Distributed Voting

We study metric distortion in distributed voting, where $n$ voters are partitioned into $k$ groups, each selecting a local representative, and a final winner is chosen from these representatives (or from the entire set of candidates). This setting models systems like U.S. presidential elections, where state-level decisions determine the national outcome. We focus on four cost objectives from \citep{anshelevich2022distortion}: $\avgavg$, $\avgmax$, $\maxavg$, and $\maxmax$. We present improved distortion bounds for both deterministic and randomized mechanisms, offering a near-complete characterization of distortion in this model. For deterministic mechanisms, we reduce the upper bound for $\avgmax$ from $11$ to $7$, establish a tight lower bound of $5$ for $\maxavg$ (improving on $2+\sqrt{5}$), and tighten the upper bound for $\maxmax$ from $5$ to $3$. For randomized mechanisms, we consider two settings: (i) only the second stage is randomized, and (ii) both stages may be randomized. In case (i), we prove tight bounds: $5\!-\!2/k$ for $\avgavg$, $3$ for $\avgmax$ and $\maxmax$, and $5$ for $\maxavg$. In case (ii), we show tight bounds of $3$ for $\maxavg$ and $\maxmax$, and nearly tight bounds for $\avgavg$ and $\avgmax$ within $[3\!-\!2/n,\ 3\!-\!2/(kn^*)]$ and $[3\!-\!2/n,\ 3]$, respectively, where $n^*$ denotes the largest group size.

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arXiv2025

Improved Maximin Share Guarantee for Additive Valuations

The maximin share ($\textsf{MMS}$) is the most prominent share-based fairness notion in the fair allocation of indivisible goods. Recent years have seen significant efforts to improve the approximation guarantees for $\textsf{MMS}$ for different valuation classes, particularly for additive valuations. For the additive setting, it has been shown that for some instances, no allocation can guarantee a factor better than $1-\tfrac{1}{n^4}$ of maximin share value to all agents. However, the best currently known algorithm achieves an approximation guarantee of $\tfrac{3}{4} + \tfrac{3}{3836}$ for $\textsf{MMS}$. In this work, we narrow this gap and improve the best-known approximation guarantee for $\textsf{MMS}$ to $\tfrac{10}{13}$.

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arXiv2025

Fair Assignment of Indivisible Chores to Asymmetric Agents

We consider the problem of assigning indivisible chores to agents with different entitlements in the maximin share value (\MMS) context. While constant-\MMS\ allocations/assignments are guaranteed to exist for both goods and chores in the symmetric setting, the situation becomes much more complex when agents have different entitlements. For the allocation of indivisible goods, it has been proven that an $n$-\WMMS\ (weighted \MMS) guarantee is the best one can hope for. For indivisible chores, however, it was recently discovered that an $O(\log n)$-\WMMS\ assignment is guaranteed to exist. In this work, we improve this upper bound to a constant-\WMMS\ guarantee.\footnote{We prove the existence of a 20-\WMMS\ assignment, but we did not attempt to optimize the constant factor. We believe our methods already yield a slightly better bound with a tighter analysis.}

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arXiv2025

Improved Approximate EFX Guarantees for Multigraphs

In recent years, a new line of work in fair allocation has focused on EFX allocations for $(p, q)$-bounded valuations, where each good is relevant to at most $p$ agents, and any pair of agents share at most $q$ relevant goods. For the case $p = 2$ and $q = \infty$, such instances can be equivalently represented as multigraphs whose vertices are the agents and whose edges represent goods, each edge incident to exactly the one or two agents for whom the good is relevant. A recent result of \citet{amanatidis2024pushing} shows that for additive $(2,\infty)$ bounded valuations, a $(\nicefrac{2}{3})$-EFX allocation always exists. In this paper, we improve this bound by proving the existence of a $(\nicefrac{1}{\sqrt{2}})$-$\efx$ allocation for additive $(2,\infty)$-bounded valuations.

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arXiv2025

Quantum Pattern Matching with Wildcards

Pattern matching is one of the fundamental problems in Computer Science. Both the classic version of the problem as well as the more sophisticated version where wildcards can also appear in the input can be solved in almost linear time $\tilde O(n)$ using the KMP algorithm and Fast Fourier Transform, respectively. In 2000, Ramesh and Vinay~\cite{ramesh2003string} give a quantum algorithm that solves classic pattern matching in sublinear time and asked whether the wildcard problem can also be solved in sublinear time? In this work, we give a quantum algorithm for pattern matching with wildcards that runs in time $\tilde O(\sqrt{n}\sqrt{k})$ when the number of wildcards is bounded by $k$ for $k \geq \sqrt{n}$. This leads to an algorithm that runs in sublinear time as long as the number of wildcards is sublinear.

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arXiv2025

Lower Bound for Online MMS Assignment of Indivisible Chores

We consider the problem of online assignment of indivisible chores under \MMS\ criteria. The previous work proves that any deterministic online algorithm for chore division has a competitive ratio of at least 2. In this work, we improve this bound by showing that no deterministic online algorithm can obtain a competitive ratio better than $n$ for $n$ agents.

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arXiv2025

Beating the Logarithmic Barrier for the Subadditive Maximin Share Problem

We study the problem of fair allocation of indivisible goods for subadditive agents. While constant-\textsf{MMS} bounds have been given for additive and fractionally subadditive agents, the best existential bound for the case of subadditive agents is $1/O(\log n \log \log n)$. In this work, we improve this bound to a $1/O((\log \log n)^2)$-\textsf{MMS} guarantee. To this end, we introduce new matching techniques and rounding methods for subadditive valuations that we believe are of independent interest and will find their applications in future work.

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arXiv2024

Almost Envy-free Allocation of Indivisible Goods: A Tale of Two Valuations

The existence of $\textsf{EFX}$ allocations stands as one of the main challenges in discrete fair division.In this paper, we present symmetrical results on the existence of $\textsf{EFX}$ and its approximate variations for two distinct valuations: restricted additive valuations and $(p,q)$-bounded valuations introduced by Christodoulou \etal \cite{christodoulou2023fair}. In a $(p,q)$-bounded instance, each good has relevance for at most $p$ agents, and any pair of agents shares at most $q$ common relevant goods. We show that instances with $(\infty,1)$-bounded valuations admit $\textsf{EF2X}$ allocations and $\textsf{EFX}$ allocations with at most $\lfloor {n}/{2} \rfloor - 1$ discarded goods, mirroring results for the restricted additive setting \cite{akrami2022ef2x}. We also present ${({\sqrt{2}}/{2})\textsf{-EFX}}$ algorithms for both restricted additive and $(\infty,1)$-bounded subadditive settings. The symmetry of these results suggests these valuations share symmetric structures. Building on this, we propose an $\textsf{EFX}$ allocation for restricted additive valuations when $p=2$ and $q=\infty$. To achieve these results, we further develop the rank concept introduced by Farhadi \etal \cite{farhadi2021almost} and introduce several new concepts such as virtual value, rankpath, and root, which advance the overall understanding of $\textsf{EFX}$ allocations. In addition, we suggest an updating rule based on the virtual values which we believe will lead to broader and more generalized results on $\textsf{EFX}$.

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arXiv2023

Randomized and Deterministic Maximin-share Approximations for Fractionally Subadditive Valuations

We consider the problem of guaranteeing maximin-share (MMS) when allocating a set of indivisible items to a set of agents with fractionally subadditive (XOS) valuations. For XOS valuations, it has been previously shown that for some instances no allocation can guarantee a fraction better than $1/2$ of maximin-share to all the agents. Also, a deterministic allocation exists that guarantees $0.219225$ of the maximin-share of each agent. Our results involve both deterministic and randomized allocations. On the deterministic side, we improve the best approximation guarantee for fractionally subadditive valuations to $3/13 = 0.230769$. We develop new ideas on allocating large items in our allocation algorithm which might be of independent interest. Furthermore, we investigate randomized algorithms and the Best-of-both-worlds fairness guarantees. We propose a randomized allocation that is $1/4$-MMS ex-ante and $1/8$-MMS ex-post for XOS valuations. Moreover, we prove an upper bound of $3/4$ on the ex-ante guarantee for this class of valuations.

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arXiv2023

Rainbow Cycle Number and EFX Allocations: (Almost) Closing the Gap

Recently, some studies on the fair allocation of indivisible goods notice a connection between a purely combinatorial problem called the Rainbow Cycle problem and a fairness notion known as $\efx$: assuming that the rainbow cycle number for parameter $d$ (i.e. $\rainbow(d)$) is $O(d^β\log^γd)$, we can find a $(1-ε)$-$\efx$ allocation with $O_ε(n^{\fracβ{β+1}}\log^{\fracγ{β+1}} n)$ number of discarded goods \cite{chaudhury2021improving}. The best upper bound on $\rainbow(d)$ is improved in a series of works to $O(d^4)$ \cite{chaudhury2021improving}, $O(d^{2+o(1)})$ \cite{berendsohn2022fixed}, and finally to $O(d^2)$ \cite{Akrami2022}.\footnote{We refer to the note at the end of the introduction for a short discussion on the result of \cite{Akrami2022}.} Also, via a simple observation, we have $\rainbow(d) \in Ω(d)$ \cite{chaudhury2021improving}. In this paper, we introduce another problem in extremal combinatorics. For a parameter $\ell$, we define the rainbow path degree and denote it by $\ech(\ell)$. We show that any lower bound on $\ech(\ell)$ yields an upper bound on $\rainbow(d)$. Next, we prove that $\ech(\ell) \in Ω(\ell^2/\log n)$ which yields an almost tight upper bound of $\rainbow(d) \in Ω(d \log d)$. This in turn proves the existence of $(1-ε)$-$\efx$ allocation with $O_ε(\sqrt{n \log n})$ number of discarded goods. In addition, for the special case of the Rainbow Cycle problem that the edges in each part form a permutation, we improve the upper bound to $\rainbow(d) \leq 2d-4$. We leverage $\ech(\ell)$ to achieve this bound. Our conjecture is that the exact value of $\ech(\ell) $ is $ \lfloor \frac{\ell^2}{2} \rfloor -1$. We provide some experiments that support this conjecture. Assuming this conjecture is correct, we have $\rainbow(d) \in Θ(d)$.

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arXiv2022

An EF2X Allocation Protocol for Restricted Additive Valuations

We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of $m$ indivisible goods to a set of $n$ agents. Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) criteria -- which requires that no agent prefers the bundle of another agent after removal of any single good -- is known to be a remarkable analogous of envy-freeness when the resource is a set of indivisible goods. In this paper, we investigate EFX notion for the restricted additive valuations, that is, every good has some non-negative value, and every agent is interested in only some of the goods. We introduce a natural relaxation of EFX called EFkX which requires that no agent envies another agent after removal of any $k$ goods. Our main contribution is an algorithm that finds a complete (i.e., no good is discarded) EF2X allocation for the restricted additive valuations. In our algorithm we devise new concepts, namely "configuration" and "envy-elimination" that might be of independent interest. We also use our new tools to find an EFX allocation for restricted additive valuations that discards at most $\lfloor n/2 \rfloor -1$ goods. This improves the state of the art for the restricted additive valuations by a factor of $2$.

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arXiv2020

On the Distortion Value of the Elections with Abstention

In Spatial Voting Theory, distortion is a measure of how good the winner is. It is proved that no deterministic voting mechanism can guarantee a distortion better than $3$, even for simple metrics such as a line. In this study, we wish to answer the following question: how does the distortion value change if we allow less motivated agents to abstain from the election? We consider an election with two candidates and suggest an abstention model, which is a more general form of the abstention model proposed by Kirchgassner. We define the concepts of the expected winner and the expected distortion to evaluate the distortion of an election in our model. Our results fully characterize the distortion value and provide a rather complete picture of the model.

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arXiv2020

Almost Envy-freeness, Envy-rank, and Nash Social Welfare Matchings

Envy-free up to one good (EF1) and envy-free up to any good (EFX) are two well-known extensions of envy-freeness for the case of indivisible items. It is shown that EF1 can always be guaranteed for agents with subadditive valuations. In sharp contrast, it is unknown whether or not an EFX allocation always exists, even for four agents and additive valuations. In addition, the best approximation guarantee for EFX is $(ϕ-1) \simeq 0.61$ by Amanitidis et al.. In order to find a middle ground to bridge this gap, in this paper we suggest another fairness criterion, namely envy-freeness up to a random good or EFR, which is weaker than EFX, yet stronger than EF1. For this notion, we provide a polynomial-time $0.73$-approximation allocation algorithm. For our algorithm, we introduce Nash Social Welfare Matching which makes a connection between Nash Social Welfare and envy freeness. We believe Nash Social Welfare Matching will find its applications in future work.

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arXiv2020

Approximating LCS in Linear Time: Beating the $\sqrt{n}$ Barrier

Longest common subsequence (LCS) is one of the most fundamental problems in combinatorial optimization. Apart from theoretical importance, LCS has enormous applications in bioinformatics, revision control systems, and data comparison programs. Although a simple dynamic program computes LCS in quadratic time, it has been recently proven that the problem admits a conditional lower bound and may not be solved in truly subquadratic time. In addition to this, LCS is notoriously hard with respect to approximation algorithms. Apart from a trivial sampling technique that obtains a $n^{x}$ approximation solution in time $O(n^{2-2x})$ nothing else is known for LCS. This is in sharp contrast to its dual problem edit distance for which several linear time solutions are obtained in the past two decades.

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arXiv2018

Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items With Externalities

One of the important yet insufficiently studied subjects in fair allocation is the externality effect among agents. For a resource allocation problem, externalities imply that a bundle allocated to an agent may affect the utilities of other agents. In this paper, we conduct a study of fair allocation of indivisible goods when the externalities are not negligible. We present a simple and natural model, namely \emph{network externalities}, to capture the externalities. To evaluate fairness in the network externalities model, we generalize the idea behind the notion of maximin-share ($\MMS$) to achieve a new criterion, namely, \emph{extended-maximin-share} ($\EMMS$). Next, we consider two problems concerning our model. First, we discuss the computational aspects of finding the value of $\EMMS$ for every agent. For this, we introduce a generalized form of partitioning problem that includes many famous partitioning problems such as maximin, minimax, and leximin partitioning problems. We show that a $1/2$-approximation algorithm exists for this partitioning problem. Next, we investigate on finding approximately optimal $\EMMS$ allocations. That is, allocations that guarantee every agent a utility of at least a fraction of his extended-maximin-share. We show that under a natural assumption that the agents are $α$-self-reliant, an $α/2$-$\EMMS$ allocation always exists. The combination of this with the former result yields a polynomial-time $α/4$-$\EMMS$ allocation algorithm.

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