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Matías Núñez

Publications and source records attributed to Matías Núñez.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Compromise by "multimatum"

We propose a solution and a mechanism for two-agent social choice problems with large (infinite) policy spaces. Our solution is an efficient compromise rule between the two agents, built on a common cardinalization of their preferences. Our mechanism, the *multimatum* has the two players alternate in proposing sets of alternatives from which the other must choose. Our main result shows that the multimatum fully implements our compromise solution in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We demonstrate the power and versatility of this approach through applications to political economy, other-regarding preferences, and facility location.

econ.TH↗

Price & Choose

We describe a two-stage mechanism that fully implements the set of efficient outcomes in two-agent environments with quasi-linear utilities. The mechanism asks one agent to set prices for each outcome, and the other agent to make a choice, paying the corresponding price: Price \& Choose. We extend our implementation result in three main directions: an arbitrary number of players, non-quasi linear utilities, and robustness to max-min behavior. Finally, we discuss how to reduce the payoff inequality between players while still achieving efficiency.

econ.TH↗