Searcharxiv⌕ Search

arXiv subjects

Matías R. Bolaños

Publications and source records attributed to Matías R. Bolaños.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Multiplexing of Continuous-Variable and Discrete-Variable Quantum Key Distribution Systems over Fibered and Free-Space Channels

Future quantum communication infrastructures will need to serve heterogeneous users on shared physical channels: short-range, high-throughput links favor Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution (CV-QKD), while long-reach, high-loss links remain the domain of Discrete-Variable QKD (DV-QKD). Wavelength-division multiplexing (WDM) of the two protocols on a common channel would address both regimes simultaneously, but their markedly different noise sensitivities make coexistence non-trivial and, to date, experimentally untested. Here we report the first simultaneous operation of two independent CV- and DV-QKD systems on a common optical channel, using standard C-band DWDM filters at 1550.12 nm (CV) and 1545.32 nm (DV). We demonstrate joint operation on both optical fiber and a 620 m urban daylight free-space link. On fiber, the two systems exhibit the expected complementarity, crossing over at 7.56 dB of channel loss where both deliver $\sim$1.43 Mbit/s; in daylight free-space, both sustain Mbit/s key rates under time-varying atmospheric attenuation. Across all configurations we observe no measurable multiplexing-induced penalty in QBER or excess noise. These results establish hybrid CV-DV WDM as a practical building block for heterogeneous quantum communication networks, where metropolitan high-throughput users and long-reach backbone links can be served on a single physical infrastructure.

quant-ph↗

Power-consumption Backdoor in Quantum Key Distribution

Over the last decades, Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) has risen as a promising solution for secure communications. However, like all cryptographic protocols, QKD implementations can open security vulnerabilities. Until now, the study of physical vulnerabilities in QKD setups has primarily focused on the optical channel. In classical cryptoanalysis, power and electromagnetic side-channel analysis are powerful techniques used to access unwanted information about the encryption key in symmetric-key algorithms. In QKD they have rarely been used, since they require an eavesdropper to have access to Alice or Bob's setups. However, security proofs of QKD protocols generally assume that these setups are secure, making it crucial to understand the necessary security measures to ensure this protection. In this work, we propose and implement a power side-channel analysis to a QKD system, by exploiting the power consumption of the electronic driver controlling the electro-optical components of the QKD transmitter. QKD modules typically require very precise electronic drivers, such as Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). Here, we show that the FPGA's power consumption can leak information about the QKD operation, and consequently the transmitted key. The analysis was performed on the QKD transmitter at the University of Padua. Our results are consistent and show critical information leakage, having reached a maximum accuracy of 73.35% in predicting transmitted qubits at a 100 MHz repetition frequency.

quant-ph↗