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Mateusz Łełyk

Publications and source records attributed to Mateusz Łełyk.

16 recordsLinked to original sources

Tightness and solidity in fragments of Peano Arithmetic

It was shown by Visser that Peano Arithmetic has the property that any two bi-interpretable extensions of it (in the same language) are equivalent. Enayat proposed to refer to this property of a theory as \emph{tightness} and to carry out a more systematic study of tightness and its stronger variants that he called neatness and solidity. Enayat proved that not only $\mathsf{PA}$, but also $\mathsf{ZF}$ and $\mathsf{Z}_2$ are solid. On the other hand, it was shown in later work by a number of authors that many natural proper fragments of those theories are not even tight. Enayat asked whether there is a proper solid subtheory of the theories listed above. We answer that question in the case of $\mathsf{PA}$ by proving that for every $n$, there exist both a solid theory and a tight but not neat theory strictly between $\mathsf{I}Σ_n$ and $\mathsf{PA}$. Moreover, the solid subtheories of $\mathsf{PA}$ can be required to be unable to interpret $\mathsf{PA}$. We also provide simple examples of proper solid subtheories of $\mathsf{ZF}$ and $\mathsf{Z}_2$, as well as further separations between properties related to tightness, including an example of a sequential theory that is neat but not semantically tight in the sense of Freire and Hamkins.

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Descending sequences in reflection hierarchies

There is no recursively enumerable sequence of sufficiently strong 2-consistent r.e. theories such that each proves the $2$-consistency of the next. Montalbán and Shavrukov independently asked whether this result generalizes to $0'$-recursive sequences. We consider a general version of this problem: For arbitrary $n$, for which complexity classes $Γ$ are there $Γ$-definable sequences of $n$-consistent r.e. theories each of which proves the $n$-consistency of the next? The answer to this question depends not only on $n$ and $Γ$ but also on the manner in which sequences are encoded in arithmetic. We provide positive answers for certain encodings and negative answers for others.

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Definiteness properties of first-order schemes

The paper aims to establish a convenient formal framework for investigating the phenomenon of scheme definiteness, exemplified by first-order internal categoricity as studied by Väänänen, among others. To this end, we introduce the notion of $Φ$-definiteness, thereby refining and extending the conceptual landscape that underlies various first-order categoricity notions in the literature (internal categoricity, strong internal categoricity, intolerance). We provide arguments for the robustness of our definition and present examples of schemes that separate different categoricity- and completeness-like notions. Finally, we offer a brief glimpse into the issue of the definiteness of two canonical foundational schemes - the induction scheme and the replacement scheme.

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Completions of Restricted Complexity I, Weak Arithmetical Theories

Given a first-order theory $T$ formulated in the usual language of first-order arithmetic, we say that $T$ is of *restricted complexity* if there is some natural number $n$ and some set $\mathcal A$ of $Σ_n$-sentences such that $T$ can be axiomatized by $\mathcal A$. Motivated by the fact that no consistent arithmetical theory extending $\mathrm{I}Δ_{0}+\mathsf{Exp}$ has a consistent completion that is of restricted complexity, we construct models of arithmetic whose complete theories are of restricted complexity. Our strongest result shows that there is a model of $\mathsf{IOpen + Coll}$ whose complete theory is of restricted complexity, where $\mathsf{Coll}$ is the full collection scheme.

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Classifying the complexity of models of arithmetic

We classify the possible Scott complexities for models of Peano arithmetic. We construct models of particular complexities by first giving a complete Scott analysis of colored linear orderings and constructing models of Peano arithmetic from these colored orderings. We also provide tight connections of certain Scott complexities with notions from the classical theory of models of Peano arithmetic, such as prime, finitely generated, and recursively saturated. This effort provides a powerful set of tools to understand the models of Peano arithmetic.

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Varieties of truth definitions

We study the structure of the partial order induced by the definability relation on definitions of truth for the language of arithmetic. Formally, a definition of truth is any sentence $α$ which extends a weak arithmetical theory (which we take to be EA) such that for some formula $Θ$ and any arithmetical sentence $φ$, $Θ(\ulcornerφ\urcorner)\equiv φ$ is provable in $α$. We say that a sentence $β$ is definable in a sentence $α$, if there exists an unrelativized translation from the language of $β$ to the language of $α$ which is identity on the arithmetical symbols and such that the translation of $β$ is provable in $α$. Our main result is that the structure consisting of truth definitions which are conservative over the basic arithmetical theory forms a countable universal distributive lattice. Additionally, we generalize the result of Pakhomov and Visser showing that the set of (Gödel codes of) definitions of truth is not $Σ_2$-definable in the standard model of arithmetic. We conclude by remarking that no $Σ_2$-sentence, satisfying certain further natural conditions, can be a definition of truth for the language of arithmetic.

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Universal properties of truth

We investigate abstract model theoretic properties which holds for models in which a truth or satisfaction predicate for a sublanguage of the signature is definable. We analyse in which cases those properties in fact ensure the definability of the respective truth predicate. In some cases, we formulate different axiomatic theories which are indispensable for such properties to hold and we analyse the mutual definability relations between those theories.

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Pathologies in satisfaction classes

We study subsets of countable recursively saturated models of $\mathsf{PA}$ which can be defined using pathologies in satisfaction classes. More precisely, we characterize those subsets $X$ such that there is a satisfaction class $S$ where $S$ behaves correctly on an idempotent disjunction of length $c$ if and only if $c \in X$. We generalize this result to characterize several types of pathologies including double negations, blocks of extraneous quantifiers, and binary disjunctions and conjunctions. We find a surprising relationship between the cuts which can be defined in this way and arithmetic saturation: namely, a countable nonstandard model is arithmetically saturated if and only if every cut can be the "idempotent disjunctively correct cut" in some satisfaction class. We describe the relationship between types of pathologies and the closure properties of the cuts defined by these pathologies.

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The two halves of disjunctive correctness

Ali Enayat had asked whether two halves of Disjunctive Correctness (DC) for the compositional truth predicate are conservative over Peano Arithmetic. In this article, we show that the principle "every true disjunction has a true disjunct" is equivalent to bounded induction for the compositional truth predicate and thus it is not conservative. On the other hand, the converse implication "any disjunction with a true disjunct is true" can be conservatively added to PA. The methods introduced here allow us to give a direct nonconservativeness proof for DC.

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Local collection scheme and end-extensions of models of compositional truth

We introduce a principle of local collection for compositional truth predicates and show that it is conservative over the classically compositional theory of truth in the arithmetical setting. This axiom states that upon restriction to formulae of any syntactic complexity, the resulting predicate satisfies full collection. In particular, arguments using collection for the truth predicate applied to sentences occurring in any given (code of a) proof do not suffice to show that the conclusion of that proof is true, in stark contrast to the case of induction scheme. We analyse various further results concerning end-extensions of models of compositional truth and the collection scheme for the compositional truth predicate.

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Scalar and Vectorial mu-calculus with Atoms

We study an extension of modal $μ$-calculus to sets with atoms and we study its basic properties. Model checking is decidable on orbit-finite structures, and a correspondence to parity games holds. On the other hand, satisfiability becomes undecidable. We also show expressive limitations of atom-enriched $μ$-calculi, and explain how their expressive power depends on the structure of atoms used, and on the choice between basic or vectorial syntax.

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Truth and Feasible Reducibility

Let $\mathcal{T}$ be any of the three canonical truth theories $\textsf{CT}^-$ (Compositional truth without extra induction), $\textsf{FS}^-$ (Friedman--Sheard truth without extra induction), and $\textsf{KF}^-$ (Kripke--Feferman truth without extra induction), where the base theory of $\mathcal{T}$ is $\textsf{PA}$ (Peano arithmetic). We show that $\mathcal{T}$ is \textit{feasibly reducible to} $\textsf{PA}$, i.e., there is a polynomial time computable function $f$ such that for any proof $π$ of an arithmetical sentence $ϕ$ in $\mathcal{T}$, $f(π)$ is a proof of $ϕ$ in $\textsf{PA}$. In particular, $\mathcal{T}$ has at most polynomial speed-up over $\textsf{PA}$, in sharp contrast to the situation for $\mathcal{T}[\textsf{B}]$ for \textit{finitely axiomatizable} base theories $\textsf{B}$.

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Models of Weak Theories of Truth

In the following paper we propose a model-theoretical way of comparing the "strength" of various truth theories which are conservative over PA. Let $\mathfrak{Th}$ denote the class of models of PA which admit an expansion to a model of theory Th. We show (combining some well known results and original ideas) that $$\mathfrak{PA}\supset \mathfrak{TB}\supset \mathfrak{RS}\supset \mathfrak{UTB}\supseteq\mathfrak{CT^-},$$ where $\mathfrak{PA}$ denotes simply the class of all models of PA and $\mathfrak{RS}$ denotes the class of recursively saturated models of PA. Our main original result is that every model of PA which admits an expansion to a model of CT${}^-$, admits also an expanion to a model of UTB. Moreover, as a corollary to one of the results we conclude that UTB is not relatively interpretable in TB, thus answering the question of Fujimoto.

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Notes on bounded induction for the compositional truth predicate

We prove that the theory of the extensional compositional truth predicate for the language of arithmetic with $Δ_0$-induction scheme for the truth predicate and the full arithmetical induction scheme is not conservative over Peano Arithmetic. In addition, we show that a slightly modified theory of truth actually proves the global reflection principle over the base theory.

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Models of Positive Truth

This paper is a follow-up to "Models of PT${}^-$ with internal induction for total formulae." We give a strenghtening of the main result on the semantical non-conservativity of the theory of PT${}^-$ with internal induction for total formulae (PT${}^- +$ INT(tot)). We show that if to PT${}^-$ the axiom of internal induction for all arithmetical formulae is added (PT${}^-$), then this theory is semantically stronger than PT${}^- +$ INT(tot). In particular the latter is not relatively truth definable (in the sense of Fujimoto) in the former. Last but not least we provide an axiomatic theory of truth which meets the requirements put forward by Fischer and Horsten in "The expressive power of truth."

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