arXiv subjects

Matias Slavov

Publications and source records attributed to Matias Slavov.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Timekeeping Beyond Human Whim: A Critical Analysis of Strong Conventionalism about Clocks

Conventional elements play an integral role in measuring time. Clocks unavoidably require a chosen standard of synchrony. The periodic process selected for the standard is not imposed upon us in any way. Conventionalism, in this regard, offers an insightful perspective on temporal measurement. The strong formulation of this doctrine is, however, questionable. After elaborating on strong conventionalism, it will be argued that it has three downsides: (i) it fails to properly distinguish between highly stable natural processes and complete randomness, as periodicities differ in terms of regularity; (ii) it does not explain that a clock actually measures something, to wit, parts of its own path along its worldline in spacetime; (iii) and relatedly, it omits the distinction between a temporal interval as a physical quantity and the arbitrarily chosen unit of time, leaving the distinction between temporal quantities and units a mystery. This article does not claim that strong conventionalism is incorrect; rather, considering the critical arguments against it, we may conclude that it remains an incomplete theory of what clocks measure.

physics.hist-ph↗

arXiv2025

Eternalism and Everettian Quantum Mechanics

This paper shall explore the conjunction of eternalism and Everettian quantum mechanics. It shall be argued that there is a strong analogy between these two views. In case there is an indefinite number of worlds and observers that are all equally real, there should be an indefinite number of local times which are all also equally real. Whereas Everettianism, specifically the diverging version, treats actuality indexically, relativistic eternalism treats tense indexically. All times exist analogously to all isolated Everettian worlds. There is no unique 'now' that cuts throughout all that physically exists. Instead, as eternalism propounds, all times exist. The paper concludes that eternalism and the many-worlds interpretation are not only compatible but complement each other, providing a coherent framework for understanding the nature of temporal reality.

physics.hist-ph↗

arXiv2022

Eternalism and Perspectival Realism about the 'Now'

Eternalism is the view that all times are equally real. The relativity of simultaneity in special relativity backs this up. There is no cosmically extended, self-existing 'now'. This leads to a tricky problem. What makes statements about the present true? I shall approach the problem along the lines of perspectival realism and argue that the choice of the perspective does. To corroborate this point, the Lorentz transformations of special relativity are compared to the structurally similar equations of the Doppler effect. The 'now' is perspectivally real in the same way as a particular electromagnetic spectrum frequency. I also argue that the ontology of time licensed by perspectival realism is more credible in this context than its current alternative, the fragmentalist interpretation of special relativity.

physics.hist-ph↗

arXiv2022

Eternalism and the Problem of Hyperplanes

Eternalism is the view that the past, the present and the future exist simpliciter. A typical argument in favor of this view leans on the relativity of simultaneity. The 'equally real with' relation is assumed to be transitive between spacelike separated events connected by hyperplanes of simultaneity. This reasoning is in tension with the conventionality of simultaneity. Conventionality indicates that, even within a specific frame, simultaneity is based on the choice of the synchronization parameter. Hence the argument for eternalism is compromised. This paper lays out alternative eternalist strategies which do not hinge on hyperplanes. While we lack a rigorous proof for eternalism, there are still cogent reasons to prefer eternalism over presentism.

physics.hist-ph↗