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Matija Novaković

Publications and source records attributed to Matija Novaković.

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Coloring t-perfect graphs with fewer colors

Recently, Chudnovsky, Cook, Davies, Oum, and Tan obtained the first finite bound on the chromatic number of t-perfect graphs, showing that they are 199053-colorable. We improve this bound to 186 by refining their proof. The original proof establishes that every graph with large odd girth and large chromatic number contains a certain structure called an r-arithmetic rope, and that its existence in a certain leveling of a graph with large odd girth would imply an odd wheel as a t-minor, a known obstruction of t-perfectness. While their technique requires a lower bound on the chromatic number that is exponential in r, we show that the existence of an r-arithmetic rope can already be guaranteed under a linear bound. Using a slightly weakened notion of arithmetic ropes allows us to reduce the bound even further.

math.CO

Stability Under Valuation Updates in Coalition Formation

Coalition formation studies how to partition a set of agents into disjoint coalitions under consideration of their preferences. We study the classical objective of stability in a variant of additively separable hedonic games where agents can change their valuations. Our objective is to find a stable partition after each change. To minimize the reconfiguration cost, we search for nearby stable coalition structures. Our focus is on stability concepts based on single-agent deviations. We present a detailed picture of the complexity of finding nearby stable coalition structures in additively separable hedonic games, for both symmetric and non-symmetric valuations. Our results show that the problem is NP-complete for Nash stability, individual stability, contractual Nash stability, and contractual individual stability. We complement these results by presenting polynomial-time algorithms for contractual Nash stability and contractual individual stability under restricted symmetric valuations. Finally, we show that these algorithms guarantee a bounded average distance over long sequences of updates.

cs.GT